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INTRODUCTION
In 1988 the Soweto People's Delegation and the councils of Soweto,
Diepmeadow and Dobsonville began to negotiate an end to the rent boycott and
the crisis in the provision of services. Discussions between civic bodies and local
government officials - which eventually resulted in the Soweto accord - were
increasingly infonned by the slogan 'one city, one tax base'. In the wake of the
accord, other parties to similarly established negotiations commonly based their
approach on the 'one city' slogan. As a result, local government negotiations and
the institutional arrangements that followed were increasingly infonned by this
notion.
The 'one city' slogan and the course of local government negotiations were
premised on at least two moments of contingency. From the 1980s onwards the
city was, for the first time, posited as a legitimate political destination in itself.
Whereas urban struggles had in the past bean linked to the capture of state or
regional power, during the 1980s a plethora of 'civic' organisations arose that
were self-consciously local in character and had as their object the appropriation
of the city, This amounted to an inclusion in the South African political lexicon of
a new political objective; one that was excluded by the couplet 'people-nation'
entailed in then preeminent language of National Democratic Revolution (NDR).
These semantic dlsplacernents were symptomatic of the ,growing influence of
western European Marxism in South Africa. They also si,gnaled the reduced
political significance of NDR from the late 1980's and 1990's in Alliance circles.
The collapse of Eastem European regimes and the political demise of s'" o:~. I
reduced the influence of strategic and political fonnulations explicitly informec ~s
Marxism-Leninism
As it became less common to refer to the 'people', 'socialism' and 'national
democracy' - to invoke the vocabulary of NDR, that is .. so these tenns were
supplemented with other expressions. From the late 1980's, that is, it became
popular to juxtapose the tenns city and community. These notions had
incongruent theoretical legacies that, when they were coupled, produced certain
ambiguities in South African conceptions of urban govemment.
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Section 1 will explore the genealogy of both words. The notion of community',
had undergone an interesting mutation. It was first popularised by B!ack
Consciousness authors of the 1970's and later appropriated by civic
organisations in the mid-1980's. In this regard it was invested with new
meanings. We shell see also in Section 1 that a concept of the city was strongly
informed by the work of Manuel Castells, and in particular by his text The City
and the Grassroots. In this regard certain activist-intellectuals, primarily based at
the Johannesburg non-govemmental organisation (NGO), Planact, began
exploring the pollfical and social consequences of the apartheid geography.
These findings informed Planact's influential relationship with many civic
organisations.
We shall see in Section 2 that the notion of community drew its meaning from
the theory of National Democratic Revolution which was in tum premised on a
classical reading of historical materialism. In contrast the notion of cilY, partly
inherited from the work of the Castells, was influenced by the European lVIarxism
of the 1960's and after. It shall be argued, moreover, that a condition for thinking
the city theoretically was Louis Althusser's concept of relative autonomy.
The tensions that the couplet city-community produced were not readily
apparent. Their heterogeneous philosophies were obscured by the opacity of
their theoretical Origins. The substitution of 'community' for 'people' and 'city' for
'nation' did not seem to subvert the relationship between the historical subject
and its objective that the theory of NDR established between 'people' and
'natlon'. If in the original grammar the people's will was believed interested in
national democracy and then socialism, the 'One City' slogan replaced 'people'
for 'community' and articulated their interest to urban integration. In this regard,
the 'One City' slogan and the theory of National Democratic Revolution seemed
to share a common philosophical premise. They £1 ppeared both to posit a
necessary relation between subject and political destoation that rested on two
related elements: experience and objective interests. In tHs regard the common
experience of racial capitalism and the apartheid city produced for the
people/community objective interests in national democracy and urban political
integration respectively.
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City and community seemed perfectly reconciled in the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP). The Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU) and the communist party had originally argued that the RDP was a
programme of 'socialist social investment' (SACP: 1994, p.3.). In their eyes the
adoption of the RDP as official policy by the ANC confirmed the credentials of
the new government as an agent of national democracy. In the words of the
SACP: the challenge ahead is to pursue the u ... the logic and assumptions of
democracy - majority rule, participation, empowerment, answerability, equality of
citizenship - into all other spheres of our soclsty - the economic, cultural, and in
reqard to gender relations. The Reconstruction and Development Programme
maps out the broad lines for advance on these fronts" (lbid., p.8). In this regard it
is" ...also the most direct route towards socialism in our country" (ibid., p.7).
We shall see alse that the RDP was easily coupled to notions of urban
integration. RDP capital assets could be located to simultaneously realise a post-
apartheid geography. In this regard the national democratic revolution seemed
also to address the spatial and economic legacy of urban segregation.
The apparent retention of NOR's philosophical grammar was symptomatic of the
appropriation of the 'city' to the grammar of NOR. Yet the theoretical legacy of
the city was not easily reconciled with the latter. In this regard its philosophical
origin interrupted local government policy as ambiguity in certain formulations.
These tensions have become more explicit as the political transition has
progressed.
Constitutional negotiations were informed by a natural law jurisprudence and a
!iberal-pluralist political vocabulary. The notion of 'rights' had long been part of
the Alliance vocabulary and yet prior to the unbanning of political organisations,
its language had co-existed uneasily with the theory of National Democratic
Revolution. As these political vocabularies have come to dominate policy
debates so the ambiguities implicit in South African local govemment have
become more apparent.
It will be argued that the incongruence between city and community produced
divergent conceptions of the local as a political space. On the one hand there
was a tendency to treat local government as an managerial! technocratic
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institution for nationaVprovincial plans, for the RDP, for example. On the other
the then Interim Constitution defined local govemment as an autonomous
sphere of govemment in its own right and the final version entrenched councils
as a separate tier of govemment.
In Section 3, I will consider the expression of political values in the layouts of
Boksburq, Alberton and Germiston. It will be argued there that competition
between different conceptions of the city was symptomatic of the tension in the
dominant attitude to the city. It shall be argued that the dominant conception of
local govemment (and hence the city) was unable to accommodate local
conditions as political conditions, as practices implying diverse notions of the
social good. Local circumstances, that is, were treated as problems or
opp=tunltles for management. In Section 4 I will explore the conception of
democracy implicit in this formulation.
Sections 5 will explore the contlict that claimed several thousands of lives ::-,
Katlehong, Tokoza and Vosloorus as the interruption of the local as a political
space. Section 6 will detail the durability of the managerial conception of local
govemment by considering the practices of the local govemments of Boksburg,
Alberton and Germiston in the aftermath of the violence and Section 7 will
explore some of the consequences of such a role.
It will be argued the notion of the 'apartheid city' posited space as a political
element that configured social relations in its own right. Following from this, and
giving it theoretical expression, I will say thell space constitutes a third category
of conditions that determines the form of the social in the conjuncture. I will
argue that one of the great strengths of contemporary political philosophy has
been its rigorJus attention to the relationship between subject, time and the
social. I want to suggest, however, that a further element must be added to this
chain of concepts. If we problematise, that is, the relationship between
'experience' and 'interests' we do nat simply give relative temporal autonomy to
the social whole, but relative spatial autonomy as well. In this regard space
constitutes a further dimension of the social whole,
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SECTION 1: ONE-CITY-ONE-TAX-BASE
On the evening of 30 August 1990, representatives of the Soweto People's
Delegatior and various Black Local Authorities in Soweto emerged from a 15-
hour meeting to announce that an agreement had been reached which would
end the rent boycott (Swilling and Shubana, 1990). Under the settlement more
than R500 million-worth of arrears would be written off, residents would begin
paying an interim service charge, and a metropolitan chamber would be created,
mandated to negotiate a 'new system of local government and administration for
the region'. In Soweto the accord was widely celebrated as the near culrnnanon
of a long and historic struggle by African communities for citizenship in the South
African city.
Since the mid-1980's1, Planact, a developmental NGO opercting out of Yeoville
and the Soweto People's Delegation had 3rgued that the sb~regation of urban
space under apartheid necessarily led to the underdevelopment of some of its
parts. What seems to have influenced the timing was the international
publication of the The City and the Grassroots by the French academic,
Emma, .uel Castells. More shall be said about this later. They argued that the
exclusion of mining, industrial and manufacturing enterprises from the jurisdiction
of African townships both reduced them to mere labour reservoirs for local
industry and deprived them of the tax-income such "'~tivities generated. That is,
these locals taxes accrued not to the city as a whole, but exclusively to the
institutions of 'white' local government within whose demarcation they fell.
African residents were thus deprived of any industrial cross-subsidisat'on, so
that the full cost of maintaining the urban environment fell entirely upon them.
Despite the fact, therefore, that African labour and purchasing power were
integral to the urban economy, African residential areas saw none of the
revenue generated by that economy. As a result, it was argued, African
1What seems to have influenced the timing was the international publication of the The
City and the Grassroots by the French academic, Emmanuel Castella and the interest it
provoked in the NGO. More shall be said about this in the course of the dissertation.
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townships effectively subsidised local government functions in white areas. All
the tax revenue received by white local authorities was used for infrastructure,
utilities and maintenance in the areas under their jurisdiction. African residents,
by contrast, were burdened with the fu!1cost of services. But the system did not
just benefit white property owners; it also reduced the municipal tax burden on
industrial and commercial enterprises, and therefore improved their rate of profit.
When Black Local Authorities were established in 1982, they gave political
status to urban segregation. The Act provided for fully fledged local government
structures in so-called black areas. Like their white counterparts, they would be
responsible for collecting taxes, rendering municipal services, such as sewage
and refuse collection, and providing electricity, health services and housing.
Whereas in the past the cost of local government administration hr:.j rested
partly with white local authorities, and after 1971 with the state, SLAs were to be
entirely self-financing. This meant that African communities had to bear the costs
not only of maintaining and servlcinq their urban environments, but also of
apartheid administration.
Given that BLAs were excluded from the tax base of the city as a whole, they
depended for revenue on rents and tariffs for water, sewage collection and
electricity, while simultaneously paying inflated costs for these basic services.
Where BLAs bought bulk electricit~1directly from ESCOM, for example, they
were disadvantaged by the purely residential nature of the areas under their
jurisdiction. That is, the formula used by the Electricity Supply Commission to
calculate the cost per unit of electricity penalised clients whose demand
fluctuated significantly. Areas without industrial activity experience peak
demands in the mornings (when people prepare for work) and in the evenings
(when they return home). This disqu~lified townships from the discount available
to areas where the demand is regularised by the continuous consumption of
industrial plants. As a result, BLAs paid more per unit of electricity than their
white counterparts. Alternatively, where white local authorities bought bulk
electricity from ESGOM and then sold it to their neighbouring black counterpart,
they charged an additional administration fee (Swilling, Cobbett and Hunter
1991). As a result, BLAs depended on a narrow tax base to pay for their own
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administration crst~ , the maintenance and improvement of the urban
infrastructure, and the provision of services. Moreover, the price of these
functions were structurally inflated, and the taxable income grossly insufficient.
Councilors thus repeatedly increased charges to balance their permanent
structural deficits (Planact 1992a, Seekings 1991, Shubane 1991).
Local Government Negotiations
By the late 1980s, therefore, South African local government was in a perilous
condition. Rent, service and consumer boycotts had bankrupted and/or forced
the collapse of 106 of the 272 Black Local Authorities nationally (Urban
Foundation 1991). Many others sustained only a tenuous existence. These
activities often coincided and merged with a host of other activities: the 'defiance
campaign' spearheaded by the United Democratic Front (UDF), trade union
activities, resistance to education, land invasions, strikes, mass marches and
stay-aways. Together they contributed to a growing crisis in the management of
urban areas. Against this backdrop, civic organisations were able to press for
10c.9.1 negotiations with either the resident black iocal authority, but more usually
with the neighbouring 'white' local authority. Both these parties h£;,jan immediate
interest in' negotiations. Civics believed they were potentially a way of ending
electricity cut-offs. For local councils, they seemed to hold out the promise of an
end to boycotts.
initially negotiations focused primarily on so-called 'phase-one' issues: rent
boycotts, and interim service charges. Some forums had even advanced to
phase two discussions, involving the upgrading of certain facilities, agency
agreements, electricity transfers, etc. Very few, however, had progressed to
phase three and beyond: that is, the establishment of an interim administration.
Under these conditions, the notion of structural urban underdevelopment - as
suggested by the 'one city' slogan - grew in appeal. The slogan implied that
negotiations premised on the existing apartheid geography were destined to fail
precisely because the rent and services crisis was intimately related to this
spatial-political configuration. The progression from phase one and two
dlscusslons to phase three negotiations thus required an irnportant conceptual
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shift: a recognition that boycotts and non-payment were symptomatic of a
structural problem, rather than the source of the problem in the first place
Planact and the SCA argued that negotiations between civic organisations and
local governments not premised on the reorganisation of existing municipal
boundaries, that did not address the spatial-political dispensation, would merely
reproduce the structure of apartheid urban underdevelopment. It followed,
therefore, that negotiations about payment and the provision of services had to
be linked to a broader discussion about the transformation of the urban spatial-
political-economy as a whole. They demanded, therefore, that politically
segregated administrations yield to single, non-racial authorities able to 'utilise
their economic potential as spenders, consumers and investors... to address
economic hardship at a local level' (Planact 1992a). It was this politico-strategic
approach that underpinned the slogan 'one city, one tax base'. The capture of
the city as a whole was thus deemed a condition of the defeat of the urban
apartheid political economy.
In this regard there were major legal hurdles. The only national legislation that
existed for transitional arrangements was the Interim Measures for Local
Govemment Act (IMLGA', followed by the Provincial and Local Authority Affairs
Amendment Act of 1992. The former provided for the establishment of joint
administrations, the appropriation of a proportion of finance generated by the
industrial and commercial tax base of white local authorities, uniform service
charges, and continued central govemment finance for 'non-viable' joint
administrations. Like the IMLGA, the amendment act was also rejected by the
civic movement for 'entrenching separate and segregated apartheid local
govemment structures' (see draft proposals by the SANCO-led delegation to the
LGNF). Planact et a/were Worried that the state would seek to 'negotiate em end
to the rent boycott crisis, and then draw civics into accepting "local options"
(Pial! act 19920). Many local forums seemed poised to establish 'joint
administrations'; that is, to institutionalise co-operation and collaboration
between former 'black' and 'white' local authorities that seemed to concemed
NGO's and the natlonal civic merely to the sanction the existing spatial-political
arrangement. SANCO and Planact worried, therefore, that local forums might
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have pre-empted notional constitutional negotiations by effectively condoning
'own affairs'- t}lt thi', <ing; and in so doing reproducing the terms of a political
process incapable of addressing the source of the urban crisis: separate tax
bases as a result of apartheid. The Alliance, under pressure from SANCO in
particular, decided therefore that separate ~'igh-Ievei negotiations were required
to accelerate progress on these issues a~rOS5the country. This initiative, they
agreed, should occur at a national level in a local government negotiating forum
(LGNF). SANCO was elected to lead the alliance's representation there. It was
proposed that this body contain 'statutory' and 'non-statutory' c\~legations; where
the former was defined as those bodies that had already participated in
government structures, and the latter, those that had not.
The LGNF met for the first time in March 1993. SANCO submitted a
recommendation for a Transitional Measures for Local Government Act that
would dissolve existing political structures and replace them with appointed
interim local councils (ILCs), and in metropolitan areas interim metropolitan
councils (IMCs). TheSE)would be established on the basis of new interim local
and metropolitan boundaries that would ignore existing 'homeland' borders. A
two-tier system of local government was envisaged, with the functions of
finance, planning, transport, bulk services and change management located at
metropolitan level. A deadline of July 1993 was suggested to begin the process
of dissolution, demarcation and appointment. The result of this process was the
original version of the Local Government Transition Act (LGTA) of 1993.
For our purposes the LGNF and the subsequent LGTA rested on the
assumption, itself at the heart of the 'One City' slogan, that the South Africa
politicai geography shared a common form and a common urban political-
economy. Their national jurisdiction was justified, therefore, on the basis that
South African cities resembled each other structurally making it legitimate to
speak of the 'apartheid city' generally. As a result responsibility for policy
concerning the urban form was located at higher tiers of government while local
governments themselves merely deemed responsible for the execution of
development plans determined elsewhere: they would be the 'hands and feet of
the RDP' as the then office in the ministry of the president chose to describe it.
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This thinking was a persistent legacy of the philosophical grammar of BC and
NOR It posited urban-social 'needs' as local instances, local phenomena, of the
national political morphology that should be addressed by national plans and
IOCi.~1agents.
The Notion of Community
The ~Ienealogy of the term 'community' is obscure. Despite its prominence in
contemporary South African usage its meaning and origin does not appear in the
recently published Oxford Dictionary of South African English. This is surprising
because the term has beer given peculiarly South {I\'" :Inmeanings.
An explicitly political usage was found in the Black (.,onsciousness literature that
emerged durinq the 1970's. Here its definition was given by the descriptions and
portrayals of the 'black man's suffering' (Matlou quoted in Sole, 1993).
"We as the black community are all oppressed, landless and at the mercy of the
government. So how can we as black people be different from one another? It is
called a Black Experience" (Mutloatse quoted in Sale, 1993).
The community was referenced to a shared experience of suffering under
apartheid such that subjectivity wa3 reduced entirely to structure. Steve Biko
thus remarked: "We are oppressed not as individuals, not as Zulus, XhOS9S,
Vendas or Indians. We are oppressed because we are black" (Biko quoted in
Sole, 1993).
The term 'black' was used as a rubric and a short-hand. It symbolised and
expressed a common 'black experience' that manifested as a certain psycho-
pathology. If previous explanations of apartheid stressed oppression, material
lack and exploitation, Black Consciousness emphasised the 'spiritual poverty'
that 'emasculated' and 'passified' black persons. At the heart of apartheid was
an anti-humanism that reduced the "black man to a man only in form" (Biko,
1996). "All in all the black man has become a shell, a shadow of a man,
completely defeated, drowning in his own misery, a slave, an ox bearing the
yoke of oppression with sheepish timidity" (Ibid., p. 29). Black Consciousness
was in this way construed as a form of 'psychotherapy" (Biko, 1988) that induced
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catharsis by revealing the truth of the black condition, by ·showing the black
people the value of their own standards and outlook" (Ibid" p. 31), In so doing
the objective of Be was to "make the black man come to himself; to pump back
life into his empty shell; to infuse him with pride and dignity" (Biko, 1996), so that
he might realise his true, authentic identity. The 'truth' of apartheid, in this
readinq, was a primitive alienation that estranged the 'black' man from himself.
Black Consciousness thus emphasised the positive elements of African history
and culture as a condition of psychological synthesis and political re-awakening.
Psychological emancipation as the engine of history. The reference here was
Franz Fanon but also Hegel.
"The basic problem in South Africa has been analysed by liberal whites as being
apartheid. They argue that in order to oppose it we have to form non-racial
groups... For the liberals, the thesis is apartheid, the anti-thesis is non-
racialism ... Black Consciousness defines the situation differently. The thesis is
in fact a strong white racism and therefore the antithesis must ipso facto be a
strong solidarity amongst blacks ... " (Biko, p. 90).
These princlples required 'black unity' as a means to counter white power. BC
thus invoked the common experience of black people as a condition of their
unity. This was how the term 'community' was used in various texts. It denoted
the shared 'black' experience of 'white' racism.
Yet the notion of 'experience', as used here, was fraught with ambiguity. This
arose partly from a slippage between the psychological model and 1iko's
reading of Hegel. The dialectical principles were premised on a notion of v.hite
homogeneity that required their negative: black unity. BC authors were thus at
pains to describe and reveal the shared circumstances of black people that
issued a common interest in 'black' liberation. If this implied, however, that
experience itself was unmediated and that political interests (in liberation etc.)
arose directly from experience, the psychoanalytic model suggested otherwise.
The centre-piece of the black experience was for Biko a psychological alienation
that was the cause of political immobilisation. In other words, Bike's thesis
suggested that the 'black' condition yielded not a self-conscious realisation of
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political interests but rather, political acquiescence. This was the implicit
vacillation at the heart of Black Consciousness. What was the 'black
experience'? oppression and exploitation that realised political action? Or rather
white racism that resulted in black psychological introjection?
This ambiguity lay at the heart of BC's subsequent ecll: .s. During the 1970's the
black consciousness movement seemed to its younger members fixated on the
psychological nature of the 'black experience' to the neglect of what the
emerging radical trade-unions were beginning to analyse as the material
conditions that determined it. At the Black Renaissance Convention in 1974
younger delegates (associated or part of the growing trade-union militancy)
argued that "we have little in common in our African identity alone" (Gwala
quoted in Sole, 1993, p.127). At issue was the quality and uniformity of exactly
this 'experience'. The ierm implied a monolithic racial psychology that either
neglected or obfuscated the roles of class, region, gender or ethnicity in the
formation of political identities. When BC activists did initiate worker
organisations they tended to stress leadership, recreational programmes, black
dignity and so on (Ibid., p. 128). Conspicuously absent from their early rhetoric
were the notions of class and exploitation. BC thus resonated less and less with
the growing tide of trade-unionism, informed as it was by various readings of
Marx and Lenin. As the labour movement began to have a greater presence in
South African politics, we shall see, the term 'community', by then curre.«, began
to cohabit with a new 'experiential' reference2.
The Re-Making of Community
During the early 1980s, the then Federation of South Amr..an Trade Unions
(FOSA TU) was overtaken by strategic debates arising from differing notions of
class and class struggle. So-celled charterists suggested that class be treated in
relation to the concrete historical processes through which it is was constructed
and in which it had to struggla (Norval and Howarth, 1992). Political
consciousness was derived not simply from the factory floor or the relations of
11 If Steve Biko recognised that 'experience' was associated with rnisrecognition - it produced not self-
conscious political interests but rather political stasis - he nonetheless assumed that the 'black' experience
inclined 'black' towards unity and resistance.
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production, but rather from a much wider discursive field. In contrast, workerists'
in the federation, following an argument reminiscent of S'dney Bunting, insisted
on the srecific interests of the working class vis-a-vis the national (that is, multi-
class) stn '191e(Hudson, 1989). More shall be said about this in Section 2.
The strategic accomplice of the Charterist line was the expansion of the political
field to include additional areas of struggle. For the first time since the eclipse of
SACTU in the 1960s, trade union activists begC"~to organise amongst township
residents qua township residents. In this regard, civic organisations emerged in
the political space created by this conceptual-strategic shift.
Mzwanele Mayekiso, formerly of the Alexandra Civic Organisation (ACO)
remarks: The kind of socialist organizing (sic) project discussed in the union
movement - especially by intellectuals associated with the Federation of South
African Trade Unions (FOSATU) - was centred on the shopfloor, and was
actually opposed to community struggles. On the other hand, there were other
trade unionists ... who did reach out to communities, and later FOSATU's
successors in COSATU reversed the older animosity to community struggles"
(Mayekiso: 1996, p.51).
In Wattville, to take just one example, we can trace the origin of the civic to the
organisation split within the Metal and Allied Workers' Union. Both Abie
Nyalunga and Vincent Themba - founding members of t.heWattvilfe Concerned
Residents Committee - remembered their interest in township politics as arising
from this division. Thernba explained that he was until then preoccupied with
union issues and mostly not concerned with external community politics.
Across the 'East Rand' and elsewhere, therefore, the expanded scope of trade-
union activists brought to the townships the strategic and conceptual repertoire
of the new populist trade-unionism. In this way the term 'community', that had
previously conveyed a sense of cultural and racial unity, increasingly gave wuy
to a meaning linked to NDR.
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The Theory of National Democratic Revolution
Like the Black Consciousness literature above, community here was referenced
vis-a-vis a shared or common experience of apartheid. If the BC literati,
however, emphasised its racial and psychological experience, NOR defined it
differently. Apartheid was not simply a racial system. it was rather, and in
addition, a system of racial capitalism.
"One of the peculiarities of the South African society," explained Suttner and
Cronin in 1986, "is that written into its structure is this systematic national
oppression of all the blacks. It is one of the factors that facilitates capitalist
exploitation in South Africa. National oppression and capitalist exploitation are
inextricably interlinked" (Suttner and Cronin: 1986, p.129). As a result, they
continued, "a programme to end racial oppression in South Africa has to attack
the key power centres of capitalism with which racial oppression is interlocked"
(Ibid., p.129). The argument rested on the following syllogism: capitalism needs
racial oppression so that resistance to the latter is thus simultaneously anti-
capitalist.
It has been shown by Peter Hudson amongst others how the above conclusion
rested partly on Lenin's analysis of imperialism and colonialism. In the Road to
South African Freedom, the SACP's politico-strategic document of 1963, 'white
South Africa', in a politico-theoretical maneuver informed by Imperialism: the
highest stage of capitalism, was identified with an advanced stage of monopoly
capitalism. "Such an economy and state," observes Hudson "are, on Lenin's
analysis, driven to colonise, i.e. to deprive of their politir.al autonomy, other
'peoples and countries' in order to extract superprofits via the exploitatlon of two
proletariats" (Ibid., p.26). South African social relations resembled colonial
relations because a certain category of agents were not only exploited but had
lost their political autonomy,' What distinguished South African colonialism
from classical examples .at the presence of the colonisers (white South
Africans) and the: colonised (the 'non-white' majority) within a common political
territory. As a result South Africa was a colonial SOCiety'of a special type'.
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Colonial domination was characterised also by the complex sociology of the
colonised. Racial oppression in South Africa, argued Suttner and Cronin in
repeating faithfully the analysis of the SACP, was indiscriminate affecting ail
black persons irrespective of class: "...traders, small farmors and petty
manufacturers," they explained, "are nationally oppressed by Group Areas, and
other forms of racial discrimination .... These middle elements, and not just those
among them who are black, are themselves in the thrall of the big monopolies
who are squeezing them ... [As a result] the nationalisation of monopoly industry,
banks and other financial institutions speaks not only to the interests of the
workers, but is also aimed at all others who are dominated by the monopolies ..."
(Ibid., pp. 178/9). The local bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie thus shared with
the working class and interest in defeating imperial, monopoly capital. This made
possible a class alliance that would struggle for national democracy through
national liberation.
For our purposes NOR, in defining the South African experience as one of
national domination and directing political struggle, therefore, to the national
state, had a monist and unitary conception of the political terrain. It encouraged a
politics interested exclusively in a single objective: the capture of state power. In
its theory, therefore, NOR lacked a concept for the politics which during the
t 980's it would partly bear and for which it would also be found theoretically
lacking.
The Notion of 'CI
Much has bee .In about the urban resistance of the 1980's. Many authors
have located the w' urce of protest and discontent in the contradictions inherent
in the system of !ocat government financing. Tom lodge, for example, found the
immediate origin of the 1984-5 Vaal uprising in the proposed rent increase
announced in Vereeniging on 5 August 1984 (Lodge 1991). Mark Swilling and
Khehla Shubane situated the Soweto rent boycott in the context of rent
increases in Chiawelo Extension 3, Naledi Extension 2 and Jabulani in March
1986, and a new electricity levy introduced in May that year. So did Andrew
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Boraine In respect of Mamelodi (1987), Planact in all its studies, Jeremy
Seeking$ (1988,1991,1992), Chaskalson (1988), and Khehla Shubane (1991).
Seekings was thus fairly typical when he argued that the rent increases and
consequent political violence were products of the system of local government
financing. tn this regard he explained thot when township residents, already
suffering at the hands of a deepening recession from 1981 onwards, were asked
to pay higher rants and service charges for electricity in particular they
expressed their grievance and discontent through open protest and
demonstration against black local governments (Seekings 1991).
His explanation above, like the others, is premised on a tautology; on a curious
'leap of faith' not warranted by the explanatory logic. Seeking would have us
bl.":lievethat the local character of rents and services in itself determined that
local government be the object of political protests; by which he means
presumably that their nature as public goods provided by third tier governments
constituted the 'local' as the political horison against which to direct their
opposition. Politics as geometry. In this regard, most studies merely repeat the
truism that popular resistance during this period was usu311ylocal in character,
they being satisfied to allow description to serve as explanation. This ret nee
to the topography of political resistance (national, regional, local), that is, does
not tell us how local governments came to be considered as political targets in
the first place. Indeed, there is a specious continuity in this reasoning that merely
juxtaposes protest, civic organisations and local government withou': ever
establishing the mode and form of their connection. Seekings himself made this
point when he remarked that researchers 'I.erely 'read' township protest off the
structural context of the political economy (Seekings 1991). It is far from obvious,
that is, that protests about rent and service inflation necessarily, that is
automatically, attached themselves to local govemments as local governments
and not say, as merely institutional incarnations of the apartheid state generally.
After all local issues were previously deemed merely symptoms of the racial
political-economy as a whole. It is instructive, in this regard, to see how Khehla
Shubane inadvertently invokes exactly this last mentioned idea to reference local
concerns not to local political objectives, but to national ones.
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Following the logic of the theory of internal colonialism, he suggests that the
structure of local government for the African population was historically
conceived and implemented as a control mechanism rooted in the legac~1of
colonisation, and later decolonlsation, The division of the city and the reduction
of African townships to labour reservoirs 'originated in colonial conquest, and
has been maintained through deliberate policies pursued by successive white
govemments ...' In this regard, the transfer of power from a colonial authority to
the wh;te population meant that for the 'indigenous populations ... power
relstlons remained essentially unchanged' (Shubane 1991). For Shubane, then,
the central logic entailed in the configuration of local government was a
relationship of domination between a colonial and later internal colonial power
and an (African) indigenous population.
The strategic accomplice of Shubane's argument, reminiscent too of NOR, is the
deployment of local issues in the service of anti-colonial struggles that have as
their object the colonial state. Shubane thus demonstrates the possibility of
I:. 1iculating such protests to a political destination other than local government,
so that rent and service issues lose their specificity vis-a-vis these institutions
and the city.
Shubane has just cause to argue as he does. Seekings himself has observed
that at the moment when local rnovernents were attracted to the ANC and UDF's
national critique of and opposition to the state', the impetus to protest and
demonstration was provided by "local factors ... rather than those national
factors themselves ..." (Seekings 1991). Seekings here means that national
issues alone were not enough to guarantee widespread support for UOF
campaigns but were attached to national political agendas simply to give the
latter greater resonance on the ground. This seems to confirm the ease in which
such concerns were placed in the service of a variety of political objectives.
Indeed, we should note that during the early and mid 1980's there was an
absence in any major political vocabulary of the notion of local government as a
political horison in itself; including that of civic organisations I It certainly cannot
be found in UOF publications or pronouncements prior to 1988. And it was only
invoked by the trade union movement, the ANC or the SACP much later.
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This becomes more apparent when we consider the content of demands raised
by civic organisations prior to 1988. Given that all local government negotiating
forums trace their origin to the precedent set by the Soweto accord, it is worth
briefly reviewing the process.
Pamphlets issued by the Soweto Civic Association In 1986 juxtaposed rent,
sewerage and electricity issues, on the one hand, and national slogans
conceming the military occupation of townships, the state of emergency,
detainees, etc. on the other. There was no rr•sntlon of local government or the
city. Just two years later (in 1988), however, demands made by the Soweto
People's Delegation were addressed precisely to this horison. The SPD called
for the writing-off of arrears, the transfer of houses to residents, t.heupgrading of
services, affordable charges, and, most significantly, the establishment of a
single tax base fa" Soweto and Johannesburg. Here 'local issues' were
articulated not to the national political terrain, but in addition, and for the first
time, to a political conceptlon of the city. Swilling thus remarked that there was a
'strategic shift' that 'moved from protest demands to what became known as
transformational demands' (Swilling, Shubane 1990). In terms of this analysis an
opposltlonal notion of politics was replaced by something positive and
programmatic. That is, 'initial demands (in 1986) merely sought to protest high
rents, unfair standards of service maintenance and a range of political
grieval1ces ... The new transformational demands were in the form of alternative
policy proposals' (Swilling, Shubane 1990),
Yet there is a notable omission from these sentences. Swilling nowhere
mentions that in the first instance, demands were referenced to a national
agenda and in the second to a localised notion of city. There is no re..ence to
this, surely the most dramatic, shift. Indeed, the distinction is all but erased by
the generic term 'political gri~vances'. This is precisely the site of the lapsus in
the logical reasoning mentioned earlier. What were the conditions that provided
for the emergence of this new political destination? To this question we find no
answer in the existing South African literature. Instead we find two explanato"}
tendencies that prevent the question from ever being posed. Either local
govemment emerged as a political object in itself by a twist of geometry or their
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specifically local character is erased by simply reducing them to an instance, a
phenomenon of the national state. But if 'one city' initiatives were not intuitively
available from the structure of the urban political economy, and if they did not
figure in the strategic repertoire of political organisations, how do we account for
their apparently mlraculous origin'" I 'h;1Isuggest that they are the products of a
purely contingent intervention.
By the late 1980s the little theoretical coherence in the ANC Alliance,
undergirded by the theory of NOR, was beginning to give way to other theoretical
options. Since the beginning of the negotiated settlement, that is, ANC policy
vacillated between proposals reminiscent of NOR and others more sympathetic
to notions of liberal pluralism. The collapse of east European regimes after 1989
also interrupted the conceptual pre-eminence of Mlarxisrn-Leninism in the South
An ican left. It was precisely in the hiatus provided by these disturbances that the
llnk between community and the national democratic state became unhinged.
With the decline or the NOR, 'community' became available to a variety of
political destinations - including the city.
Negotiations and the displacement of NOR thus made available to political
orqanlsations a host of new intellectual traditions not immediately associated
with the customary centres of ANC/SACP theoretical practice. These included
non-govemmental organisations and, most notabiy, Planact. It is here that we
should partly seek the origin of the 'one city' initiatives.
Planact
Planact is a funded non-govemmental organisation that provides a range of
urban development services to 'community-based' organisations. It was
originally launched in 1985 by a group of professionals working in private
practice and at uolversltles, and it deliberately sought to maintain its professional
and multidisciplinary character. As such it brought together a variety of skills:
development and urban planners, architects, geographers, lawyers, political
'scientists' and former activists with diverse backgrounds. Planact thus had at its
disposal a wide range of theoretical and technical vocabularies that transcended
the stock of conceptual resources available to most political organisations.
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Furthermore, the organisation had a network of connections with universities,
other NGOs and think-tanks all over the country.
When local negotiations began in Soweto in 1988, and elsewhere in the country
after the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, civic organisations found themselves
inadequately equipped to manage and lead a process in which they had little (if
any) experience. Whereas civics had in the past been chiefly preoccupied with
the mechanics of developing and mobilising resistance to apartheid, negotiations
required a new range of skills, including an ability to evaluate technical
intormation and generate policy. Often they were dealing not just with the
'enemy', but with officials that had a virtual monopoly over local resources, were
well versed in bureaucratic legalism, and were familiar with the specialised
information related to the functions of local government.
Planaet was well positioned to provide. strategic and technical support. The
organisation already had a reputation from its work in Langa in the Cape, and
many of its members were known to influential political activists. When
discussions began between the Soweto People's Delegation and various local
authorities, Planact was invited to help. This marked the first significant joint
political venture between local activists and organised activist professionals
(ooside the legal field).
At this time and in Planact there was growing interest in the work of Manuel
Castells, sod in particular in his seminal work The City and the Grassroots. Here
Castells argued that there was insufficient understanding of the fundamental
processes at work in the production of the material basis of most of our
experience: the city (Oaetells, p.xvi). For the first time the urban form was
posited as a primitive unit of social and individual experience. Our failure to
appreciate the urban form, he suggested, resulted from an intellectual deficiency
that lay deep in the theoretical foundations of social research (Ibid., xvl), Castella
spoke here of a theoretical prejudice: "interpretations of urban crisis tend to be
couched strictly in economlstlc terms, identifying the source of our problems in a
single (actor that varies (according to the author's ideological taste) from the
inherent logic of monopoly capital to the inevitable incompetence of public
bureaucracy" (Ibid., xvi) What Castells objected to here was the assumption that
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the urban space had only an incidental bearing on political action. In all these
cases the spatial setting of collective and/or individual action was either ignored
altogether or reduced to a visual backdrop. The city itself did not feature as a
causal element.
As a result Castells sought "cautiously [to] construct a new theory of urban
change that c(ould]... determine the relationship between state, space and
society" (Ibid, xv). His project was referenced, in this regard, to what he defined
as the central ambivalence in Marxist theory': that Marxism was not a unified
theory but rather had two emphases both equally Marxist (Ibid., 298). It was
simultaneously the theory of capital and the development of Ilistory through the
development of the productive forces while also being the theory of class
struggle (Ibid., 298).Marxist writers had inadequately made the link between the
mode of production and the historical practices of class struggle. Marx, Oastells
suggested, had no answer and Lenin resolved the tension by institutionalising
the class struggle in the communist party. Lenin had recognised the play of
contingenr.y in the movement of a class in itself to a class for itself. But rather
than notice the implicit critique of exp,~rience that his observation implied
displaced political responsibility (for the revolution, for socialism) away from a
spontaneous uprising of the working cia • to a well organised vanguard party.
That is, the communist party represented the objective interests of the working
class and in making the revolution simultaneously realised its will.
What worried Castells, however, was that Marxist theory could not account for
the wave of political movements associated with the 1960's and early 1970's:
May 1968 in France, Autunno Caldo in Italian factories in 1969, the Spanish
resistance against Franquism, the German Student Movement, the liberation
movements throughout the 'third world', the Unidad Popular in Chile and so on.
"Olasslcal Marxism," wrote Castells, "was ambiguous about the eXisting social
movements: they were the living proof of class struggle and resistance to
capitalist exploitation ...On the other hand," he added, "social movements were
degraded as spontaneous trader-unionism..." (Ibid., 299). They were not self-
consciously proletarian (neither h"\ fact or in ideology) and were therefore
regarded as either the work of agent provocateurs or inherently reformist. As a
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result Castells remarked "although Marxist theory might not have room for social
movements other than the historically predicted class struggle, social
movements persist" (Ibid, p.299) He concluded: "experience was right and
Marxist theory was wrong on mis polnt..." (Ibid., 299).
Castells sought, therefore, a new theory of social change. In particular he
wanted to account for the "increasing contradictions in the process of
urbanization, the growing number of social conflicts aimed at urban policies and
the embryos of some powerful urban protests in the 1970's ..: (Ibid., p.300) In
this regard he posited three primary variables as the basis of a new theory of
urban transformation:
demands on collective consumption, that is, goods and services directly or
indirectly provided by the state
defense of cultural identity associated with and organised around a specific
territory, and
political mobilisation in relationship to the state, particularly emphasising the
role of local government.
For South African intellectuals the theory held exciting possibilities. It addressed
theoretical and historical questions to a new terrain: the urban form itself. The
mass urban resistance of the 1980's, they claimed, was best explained in terms
of crises in the provision of municipal services: housing3, electricity, refuse
collection, water and services - as crises resufting from demands on collective
consumption, rather than as crises resulting solely from the point of production.
That is, the specifically urban, or local, nature of these issues, they argued,
meant that political resistance was directed at the local state; in addition to the
national state. Researchers and academics began to pose new questions. They
enquired about the structure of the South African city, the form of the local state
and the relationship between the two. What was most exciting to activist
intellectuals was the new political phenomenon of t::e 1980's: civic organisations.
They seemed to resemble what Castells called urban social movements. Their
3 Tire withdmwal of free-hold rights from township dwellers made all housing stock municipal property for
which rent was owed to the relevant Provincial Administration and after 1982 to a Black Local Authority.
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sociology transcended class, they addressed their grievances to local
government and most interestingly, their campaigns suggested (both implicitly
and explicitly) a new political function for the city. That is, urban social
movements were not only urban-based - that is situated in urban space - but
also urban orientated (Ibid., p.69). Castells meant here that social protest and
organisation implied new meanings for the city. Their activities suggested in
practice (at least) new functions for the urban form. In this regard he argued that
the city was a social product determined by "conflicting social interests and
values" (Ibid., xvii) that gave the city political meaning. He argued that the roles,
purpose and structures of the city were the outcome of conflict between
institutionalised dominant interests, on the one hand, and grassroots mobilisation
on the other. The urban form was, in other words, not simply a spatial
phenomena of other historical processes but the consequence of specifically
urban processes.
Mark Swilling and Billy Cobett amongst others began to explore the meaning of
what became known as the 'apartheid city'. They sought to explore the South
African city as the spatial expression of what Castells called a 'social content'.
Planact started to argue that the configuration of urban space reproduced the
very logic of apartheid so that that urban communities had experienced a form of
'disempowerment' peculiar to their position in the apartheid city: residents were
alienated from the urban social product, excluded from the political process and
democratic participation, and separated from the knowledge and means to
intervene effectively in their urban environment. This was manifest in the non-
availability of surplus time arising inter alia from the long hours spent traveling to
and from artificially separated work and residential areas; the depletion of
discretionary household income by transport costs; haz.ardous neighbourhoods
arising from an inadequate sewage infrastructure and refuse removal; inferior
health services; a lack of recreational space and facilities; and spatial layout
plans (based on the colonial grid pattern), that had failed to create supportive
neighbourhoods or provide adequate protection against crime (Planact 1992a).
As a result, it was held, township residents were alienated from themselves, not
just in their capacity as workers or as members of a nation but equally as city
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dwellers. We can see now why the theory of National Democratic Revolution
was found unsatisfactory by this new generation of activist-professionals. If NOR
saw only in local, urban struggles the crisis in the apartheid system generally,
Planact saw in them the proof of the crisis of the urban system in particular.
The NGO thus highlighted the specific, indeed autonomous, nature of the urban
political-economy and demanded, therefore, greater political attention for the
urban state as its partial regulator. In this regard local campaigns, spearheaded
by civic organisations seemed to offer the means not simply to undermine the
state as a national body, but to incapacitate a key element of the urban
apartheid system. We can say, therefore, that the condition for making of local
government a horison of political struggle in itself required the positing of the
urban political-economy as a social sphere in its own right.
If, prior to the 1980s, therefore, the notion of freedom implicit in the alliance
politics of the ANC and SACP was defined in relation to state and parliamentary
power, the 'one city' slogan also related it to the city. This amounted to an
inclusion in the South African political vocabulary of a new objective for political
struggle: the city. In this regard, the 'one city' slogan potentially expanded the
terrain of democratic struggle to include other objectives in themselves.
Yet the possibility of widened political field existed only precariously. It was only
a small step from simply reintegrating the political capture of the city into an
narrative that reduced it to a moment in a longer historical chronology: This was
implied when 'local issues' were attached to national democratic campaigns and
not necessarily to the city. This dissertation will argue that this last mentioned
impulse was a legacy of the notion of 'community' as discussed. This is the
tension, moreover, that lies at the heart of current debates in and around the
relationship between local government, community landdevelopment. At the very
moment when the One City slogan suggested the specifiCity of the urban system
and hence of local government as a political objective, another logic reduced
'local issues' to interior moments of a national political struggle.
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Substitutions of the (Local) Subject
There are two moments of essentialist logic in BC, NDR: and the 'One City'
slogan: The first refers to the 'blacks'l'people'l'community' as the necessary
bearer of the general will; and the second fixes that subject to a pre-determined
political outcome: 'black' liberation! National Democracy and then
Socialism/urban political integration. During the 1990's, however, these terms
were unsettled. On the one hand the meaning of 'community' changed. On the
other hand the destination of the 'people's will' again became unhinged from its
previous political target.
During the early 1990's the notion of civics as agents of the public good was
heavily contested. Symptomatic of this growing skepticism was an article by
Steven Friedman in 1992 where he wrote a damning indictment of the tendency
of civic associations to "colonise civil society" (Friedman, 1992). This argument
was largely won and was manifest in the later formulation of development
forums. What was interesting about this debate was that it effectively jettisoned
the notion of civics as organic representatives of the community. Planact
remarked. that 'no organisation should be excluded from the CDF' (Planact
1995). SANCO concurred, and added that: 'communities are never homogenous
or unified ... Community groups ... must be broadly representative, reflecting the
interests of all the diverse groups in the community. They cannot be dominated
by one party, a warlord, traditional leaders or men' (SANCO 1994). Surely this
implied a final break (at least in principle) with the authoritarian logic of NDR? To
what extent. however, did it imply a space for genuine political choices?
SANCO's later interest in organisational diversity seemed to address Steven
Friedman's requirements for negotiated development: inclusivity and
representativeness; where the former concerned "the extent to which
[processes] include all interests", and the latter by "the extent to which
beneficiaries of development are represented or merely spoken for" (Friedman,
1992). This suggested that a democratic practice would contest the rights of
civics to speak for communities as a whole. Democratised development WOUld,
therefore, require widening the field of representation on development forums.
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We have already seen, however, that the notion of community was implicated in
an essentialist logic premised on two moments. Steven Friedman's objections
referred only to one of them: the identity between civic and community; that is,
the assumption that civics best articulated the objective interests of communities.
What was not addressed anywhere was the n 1n of the gene Ial interest to
which the communities' will was apparently affixed.
Here it is worth remembering Marx's call for "universal franchise" in the CivI1 War
in France. The object of general elections was to select personnel (subject to
immediate recall) to realise the will of the people. In this regard the 'democratic
process' was not about the content of the public good itself. That was known
objectively. The space of representation was reduced to selecting priorities,
choosing the most appropriate form of implementation and determining the
people to do ;~
The new det. of community certainly gave it a certain complexity that it was
formerly lacking seeing in communities a multiplicity of groups that could not
simply be represented by civic organisations. If this, however, sounded like a
concession to pluralism it was not. Social 'interests' were still affixed to a
common pOlitical objective; and in this case social intrastructu-nl development. I
shall come to this later. What was seldom contested in any of these narratives,
however, was the position of the community as subject. As such, policy debates
tended to deliberate the most appropriate means to realise the communities' will.
The representative space was merely broadened to more accurately determine
developmental priorities et al. Political choice remained circumscribed. Diverse
interests implied different development priorities. They did not suggest different
notions of the social good altogether.
Let us return again to the SANCO proposals on Development Finance.
While the national civic structure later recognised the presence of diverse social
interests, it nonetheless believed them to share a common political interest in the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). The content of the RDP
was sourced from the shared African experience of apartheid that determined
common social 'needs' that could in tum be provided through a national
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development programme. In this regard the RDP was associated (if not
conflated) with the general will. The role of 'community organisations' in
development was tightly circumscribed. Local Development Forums (LDFs) and
Community Development Forums (CDFs) were responsible for merely
imple..,enting the RDP: identifying development 'needs' and priorities,
pres. .rising a council to build a school, for example; ensuring the convenient
positioning of services and infrastructure, guaranteeing job creation and perhaps
even performing some of the physical delivery themselves (SANCO, 1994).
During the early 1990's Planact was concerned that, without additional
structures, local government would remain unreceptive to tile "needs' of the
community' (Planact 1995). "The challenge for communities," it argued, "[was] to
make sure that local government [was] democratised and that it: involve[d]
communities in identifying and prioritising development needs, respond[ed] to
the real needs of communities and redirect[ed] local resources to meet
community needs ..." (Planact 1995). Planact was, therefore, tempted by
institutional mechanisms to bind local government officials to joint decision-
making with 'community' organisations; and civic organisations in particular.
In Benoni, for example, the development of the informal settlement at Tambcvllle
took place through a joint technical committee (JTC) that institutionalised
bilateral negotiations between the Benoni Town Council and the Wattville
Can" rned Residents Committee. The terms of reference rendered the JTC
accountable not just to the white local authority. but also to the civic association.
The committee was thus intended to be a meeting place of two formally equal
partners. In the context of apartheid local government, the JTC proved to be an
Invaluable forum: it expanded the council's responsibilities to include the African
residents of Benoni in a way that both Jvanced the integration of the city, and
set a precedent for 'community-driven (.,,~velopment'. The apparent success of
the latter encouraged Planact to suggest similar forums as institutional
appendages to democratic local authorities (Chipkin, 1995).
LDF's in their original formulation, therefore, were intended to resist the racial
bias of apartheid local government. They also reflected a suspicion of
representative democracy. Mark Swilling summarised a widely held belief when
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he once remarked: "civic associations have an accurate perception that the
electoral process ... is not inherently democratic. Elections are governed by rules
set by people with interests ... In addition, it is a universal wisdom that the better
off classes in society tend to use the democratic process far more effectively
than the poor..." (Swilling 1992, p.6). By implication, for democracy to address
the 'needs' of the poor (or "disadvantaged communities") it needed something to
moderate its class bias. This was partly the intention behind lDFs.
In this regard LDFs were intended to override political institutions potentially
opposed to the general will. SANCO and certain NGOs were still incliner! ,
therefore, to give LDFs statutory powers either to oblige elected local
governments to undertake certain activities or to require them to consult and win
their agreement for development plans. There was widespread support for the
latter. On the 'East Rand', for example, the Eastern Services Council (for
reasons associated with the complex politics of the sub-region) lobbied strongly
for such a role. This would have obliged an elected body to defer to an unelected
one - simply because it was believed that LDFs somehow better represented
communities than local governm:,nts.
Yet the fur·.;Cof the South African debate made ltf,elf felt. Planact began to
consider ,) less structured role for 'communities', including simply an advisory or
mar. oring function through local development forums. In this regard, it became
more sympathetic to the role of civics envisaged by Friedman (1992) and
Shubane and Madiba (1992), If Planact nonetheless foresaw a partnership role
with local government, SANCO W8$i still attached to older conceptions. It
continued to encourage, for example, autonomous forums based on 'direct
democracy' that would have 'preferential access to development finance'
(SANCO 1994), and would undertake certain development projects
independently.
The debate was finally superseded by the local government elections on
November 1, 1995. After that day elected Councils were ostensibly 'Ie~ii:~nised';
that is granted the status as authentic representatives of the communities' will.
We should be cautious to assume, however, that this marked a rupture with the
logic we have seen above.
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We have already noticed that the work of civic associations and LOFs was
believed in the service of a necessary and inexorable political objective. What
they assumed, in practice at least, was an unmediated relation between subject
and 'experience' that determined 'objective interests'. In one sense local
go\'emments were conceived in terms of this grammar. We have already seen
how this was possible when we referred to the Civil War in France. Local
government simply superseded civic and LOF without any change to the
philosophical grammar between subject and political destination. In other words
they simply replaced firstly civics and then LOF's as the authentic voice of the
community interested objectively in the ROP ? This is certainly the dominant
conception. Local government is deemed responsible for giving physical
expression to an image of the urban form determined either regionally or
nationally. Take for example, the role envisaged for local authorities by the
Urban Development Strategy published by the then National RDP office:
"The primary responsibility of local authorities is to ensure the delivery of
services at a community level within an agreed planning framework" (Urban
Development Strategy, p.35)
In other words locel government is conceived here as a delivery agent. It is not
responsible for the planning framework itself. South African conceptions of the
local have thus partly retreated towards concconcns reminiscent of NOR. The
political authority is deemed merely a runctionary of the national state despite the
renewed interest in so-called 'civil SOciety'since the local government elections.
The State and Civil Society
If in earlier formulations of development forums there was 3 tangible suspicion of
liberal democracy, today it is far more to refer to these institutions in terms of the
ambiguous and equivocal language of state and 'civil society'. It is now usual to
view LDFs and other such organisations as the representative bodies of a
vaguely defined 'civil society' in relationship to the local state. In this regard
debates have mostly focused on the inclusivity of these bodies and their capacity
to truly embody all its interests. What is important about this discursive shift is
t.he notion of plurality it sugges(s. The only thing definitions of the phrase seem
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to share is an insistence that civil society comprises all those elements not
present in the state. What the new affirmation of 'civil society' seemingly does, is
contest the logic of integration implied by NOR and other logics of uniformity. In
the classical Marxist formula the space between the two was progressively
closed by the development of the general will and its final capture of the state -
where the iatter became merely an agent of the former, In this formulation the
separation between state and civil society disappeared precisely because both
shared a common will. And yet the new civil society rhetoric implies the
permanence of that split. This has at least two explanatory forms: the first is
what might be called pragmatic and skepticai, where the integration of tho social
is uru.chievable because the state tends to generate its own bureaucratic
momentum that subverts the genercll interest. In another formulation, and more
importantly, the gap is permanent precisely because tile general will is
lmpoaslble. That is, at anyone time certain interests and political identities will
not be accommodated within the state form; leaving a permanent outside
arranged (and perhaps organised) in contestation to it. The notion of civil society
(in some of its formulations) potentially grants a certain complexity and diversity
to the notion of community. What tris partly implies (in appearance anyway) is
the recognition that distinct and plural identities exist that can not easily be
captured by the notion of the general will.
We shall see, however, tllat it is not difficult to appropriate the notion of 'civil-
society' to the philosophical grammar of NOR. In other words, and this is the
dominant conception in South Africa, the plural and diverse interests of so-called
'civil-society' speak only to a certain pOlitical horison; they refer, 1hat is, to the
content, the priorities and schedules of developmental agendas. They do not
speak of notions of the social good itself. As a result attention continues to focus
on realiSing development and the delivery of services. This debate continues to
be informed by the essentialism and teleology discussed earlier. What is not
appreciated is that political diversity implies a fundamental break with NDR and
like-minded grammar. It implies too that political differences are not just about
the method and priorities of realising the corr ,~unities' will but suggests, in
addition, that there are diverse conceptions of the content of the public gOOd
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itself. There are, therefore, two political logics inscribed in the notion of civil
society that have been simultaneously attached to the notion of community. This
shall be explored in greater detail in section 2.
For now we can say that the conditions of the 'One City' slogan were various
moments of contingency that saw subject and te/os fluctuate - with varying
degrees of stabifity - according to the vicissitudes of South African political
practice. As a result divergent theoretical systems were sometimes juxtaposed in
a set of slogans. This is the legacy of the conception of the city dominant today.
The 'one city one tax base' slogan and 'comrnunity-driven development' adjoined
contrary problematics. South African conceptions of local government are
consequently haunted by an ambiguity Rrising from these differences. At the
moment, that is, when the One City slogan seemed to imply the specificity of the
urban political-economy, the notion of 'ccmmunity' simultaneously reduced each
particular city to an example of the 'apartheid city' generally. I will explore exactly
this tension.
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SECTION 2: THEORETICAL LEGACiES
It has been argued so far that South African conceptions of local government are
shot through with ambiguity. This arises, I have suggested, from the legacy of
two contrary theoretical systems unwittingly juxtaposed in a cluster of slogans:
'One-City-One-Tax-Base' and 'Community-driven-development'. What are these
systems?
In New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, Emesto Laclau observes in
Marx the juxtaposition of two non-identical contradictions. The Communist
Manifesto, for example, refers to the contradiction between the expansion of the
forces of production beyond a determinate phase of the relations of production.
Here a "mechanical" tension in the system prevents the development of
particular relations of production. (Laclau:, p.6) But this, he asserts. "is a
contradiction without antagonism" (Laclau: p.6). Laclau comments: the fact that
two oppositional forces cause stasis or even the collapse of one or both of them
does not necessarily mean that this process will manifest itself in a hostile
confrontation between groups. But this is exactly what is presupposed in the
Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Here Marx
assumes that a period of social revolution follows necessarily from the
contradiction above:'
This is the same theoretical ambivalence that Castells mentioned in The City
and the Grassroots. "How is the connection established between the structure
and the practices, between the mode of production and the historical process of
class struggle?" (Castella, p. 298), he asked. There have been various attempts
within the Marxist canon to resolve this ambiguity. Lenin spoke of a revoMionary
vanguard party that would realise the objective interests of the working class by
"This is not a problem ill logic. The statement that production is the basic condition of society is an
ontological premise; from which Marx generates epistemological chums about the physiology of the social.
This occurs within what David Hillel-Ruben has called the "correspondence" theory of knowledge. The
statement that contradiction necessar'ly produces antagonism is an epistemological statement that has as its
referent the ontological premise above. It. is perfectly valid. The task of Althusser and others is to prove
that it is not fmc. And here lies the difficulty: for the truth of the premise is relative to the respective
epistemological subject to whom it refers. It is thus necessary to demonstrate the superiority of a certain
concept of the subject over another.
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advancing the class struggle to revolution. Trotsky further elucidated a theory of
combined and uneven development to explain why revolution happened in the
most 'backward' European country (Russia) rather than in the advanced
capitalist states. What Lenin (and Trotsky) sought to understand was the 'current
situation', the concrete historical circumstances in which the Mode of Production
and the General Contradiction (between Capital and Labour) was specified. In
so doing they returned Marxism to the conjuncture: the conditions and
circumstances of empirical history. Th' - was the theoretical and historical task
that South African Marxists inherited: to situate history-in-general in the existing
conjuncture, in the unique conditions and circumstances of South African
capitalism. Peter Hudson has demonstrated the theoretical legacy of South
Afric.an formulatione and in particular the theory of National Democratic
Revolution. This section will attempt briefly to highlight the conceptual premises
of NOR. In particular it will explore the relationship it posits between subject and
\t;::l!os.It will also help us realise exactly what Castelts rejected and by implication
the conceptual premises whicl") made the city available for theorisation. It will
also make apparent the conceptual incongruence between the concept of the
city and the theoretical content of community.
For the classical Marx, the polarisation of the social 'totality' into separate
classes, different spheres (political, economic) was symptomatic of the
concealed nature of exploitation. The social alienation of the object of labour was
expressed (under capitalism) as a relationship between commodities; as c
relation between things and not people. ExplOitation alienated the worker from
herself, from the class that appropriated the objeGt of labour and from the state
that intervened (politically) to reproduce the structure of (economic) exploitation.
If the centre-piece of capitalist exploitation was thus a primitive alienation that
was the advent of all difference ('man from nature', 'class from class'),
communism was its opposite: "the positive transcendence of all estrangement"
(Marx, 1979). The process of social integration, however, was interior to the very
motion of capitalist development itself: s.•lIjC division moved autogenetically
towards its own synthesis. In this regard the speCificity of the proletariat vis-a-vis
the mode of production Imbued it with the quality of universal agent responsible
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for the reintegration of the social. In other words, the shared experience of the
relations of production determined at once both the class position and the
objective (or real) material interests of historical agents. For the working class
this included the elimination of exploitation as the source of alienation: Put more
simply: because exploitation was the author of all social difference, and the
objective interest of the working class was the defeat of exploitation, the working
class was the universal agent of social integration.
Whereas in this narrative, the logic of integration, passed through an
intermediate phase (socialism) to Communism, the theory of NOR inserted a
further stage. The specificity of South African capitalism as a special type of
colonialism necessitated an additional horizon of struggle: national liberation.
South African capitalism was premised on a form of racial domination that was
its lifeblood. As a result the struggle against the latter was simultaneoualy anti-
capitalist in character. The national democratic state (neither capitalist nor
socialist but rather "socialist in orientation" (Suttner and Cronin, 1986)) marked
an additiorClI stage in the Marxist chronology.
NCR thus invested Marxism-Leninism with an interesting contingency: the
histo'ical task of the working class was subsumed into the category "people" or
"nation" such that the latter temporarily undertook the historical task at hand. The
people were defined as historical agent and the National Democratic State as
their destination. NOR thus involved a certain type of linguistic displacement.
That is, new words were invested with the same theoretical content: 'proletariat'
for 'people' and 'nation'. During the 1980's a new substitution was made. In this
rl?gard, NOR attached itself to a term already popularised in the 1970's by Black
Consciousness, making of 'communities' mere SUb-units of the 'people', and
imbuing them with the latter's same political will.
What did NDR assume about the relationship between the subject of history and
its telos? How did it conceive the pOlitical? This section will not explore NDR as
historical text, but will rather exarmne the conceptual logic on which it was
premised. This section will also take as given the credentip,ls of NDR as a
coherent rendition of Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, the South African Communist
Party never believed it was anything but that. Peter Hudson, moreover, has
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demonstrated the genealogy of the concept in the international communist
literature. Jonny Steinberg (Steinberg, 1996) has recently explained the identity
between the SACP's major programme documents and certain Leninist texts. As
a result I feel justified exploring the conceptual logic of NDR by way of a reading
of Marxism generally; and in particular by way of what Louis Althusser ca!led
theoretical humanism.
The starting point for this discussion is an apparent anomaly. In 1988 the SACP
published the programme of its recently-held congress. The Path to Power, as it
was called, was produced at a time when urban struggles throughout South
Africa had been one' of the hallmarks of the period. Moreover, a concept of the
South African city had by this time received expression in the 'One City' slogan,
Nowhere is this mentioned in the booklet. Indeed, the city does not receive any
comment, an aside, or even a footnote. Why? I will argue here that this omission
does not simply constitute an oversight, a banal neglect, but reflects a certain
theoretical prejudice, one that makes it impossible to see in township resistance
anything other than the generalised opposition to apartheid. At the heart of this
'oversight' is certain philosophy of the political. I will permit myself, therefore, a
theoretical discussion to answer this question.
Essentialism and National Democratic Revolution
V.:Jis Althusser attached enormous theoretical significance to Lenin's writings on
the Russian Revolution. Lenin argued in Left Wing Communism, an infantile
disorder that revolution happened in Russia precisely because it was the most
backward state in the chain of imperialist states. It was the 'weakest link'. Russia
had accumulated the largest sum of historical contradictions that fused in a
'ruptural unity' that was the October revolution (Althusser: 1990a, p.99). As a
result, Althusser concluded, "we can no longer talk of the sale, unique power of
the general contradiction" (Ibid., p.100), The General Contradiction (the
contradictior. between the relations and forces of production) is itself determined
by 'unique' contingent 'circumstances'. Its conditions of existence are not internal
to itself. It is not a self-reproducing essence that encloses its own conditions of
being. Rather, it is specified in the conjuncture. "Everything depends on the
~D~E~M~O~C~R~A~C~y,~C~I~T~IE~S~A~N~D~S~P~A~C~E~ 43
condltions" (Ibid., p.206). But what are these remarkable 'conditions' that
determine 'everything'? They include:
"... the forms of the superstructure (the State, the dominant ideology, religion,
politically organised movements and so on)... [and] the intemal and extemal
historical situation which determines[the General Contradiction] on the one hand
as a function of the existing world context (what dominates it - competition of
capitalist nations, or 'imperialist intemationalism', or competition within
imperialism, etc.) ..." (Ibid., p.106).
Alhusser suggests two broad categories: the superstructure and the tunctlons of
the national past. The first - the superstructural conditions - are in their nature
instances of a specific mode of production at a certain time. In this regard they
are intemal to the General Contradiction in the sense that they are phenomena
of it. The second type of condition designates 'survivals' (ideologies, 'national
traditions', even the custom and 'spirit' of a people) not destroyed during the
transition to a new mode of production. The chronology of the sentence is
important: they are survivals of the past. They may partly determine aspects of
the General Contradiction (its modality), but they are in themselves not
determined by it. Althusser calls these conditions extemal moments.
Extemal moments are not just historical idiosyncrasies and/or at best theoretical
anomalies. They gesture towards a new concept of the social. Lenin, Althusser
suggests, gave to philosophy a new concept; albeit in the practical state. What
was this new concept and how was it different from the old? Althusser wams us,
however, that there are no pure concepts waiting to be discovered There are
only metaphors, hints and gestures (Ibid., p. 203) that make sense relative to the
Hegelian dialectic. They suggest how to specify Marxist concepts in contrast to
the Hegelian dialectic.
For Althusser "[t]he Hegelian totality is the alienated development of a simple
unity, of a simple principle, itself a moment of the development of the Idea: so,
strictly speaking, it is the phenomenon, the self-manifestation of this simple
principle which persists in all its manifestations ... [T]he unity of a simple essence
manifesting itself in its alienation produces this result: that every concrete
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difference featured in the Hegelian totality, including the 'spheres' visible in this
totality (civil society, the State, religion, philosophy, etc.), all these differences
are negated as soon as they are affirmed: for they are no more than 'moments'
of the Simple internal principle of the totality, Which fulfills itself by negating the
alienated difference that it posed..." (Althusser:1990b, p.203) (bold-I.C) Let IJS
unpack this description. For Hegel there is only a single contradiction of Which
the social totality is the manifestation. In other words, the particular form of social
practice and consciousness is the merely the expression of the particular stage
of development of this internal principle and does not affect the Idea itself. The
simple principle is the condition of existence of the social totality. But the
conditions of its own existence are internal to itself, It is a self-contained
essence: detennining but never determined. In other words, since the elements
of the whole are merely phenomena of an essence, they all develop at the same
rate -the rate of development of the Idea. They all have identical temporalities.
This means too that the ideas, concepts, practices and institutions of the past
can never effect the present. There can be no 'survivals' from the past. It means
also that there can be no spheres of autonomous practice in the social. The
economy, the state, science, art, philosophy all develop at exactly the same rate
for they have no independent effectivity.
We are now in a better position to understand the apparent oversight in The
Path to Power. It was an oversight in appearance only. Rather, the omission of
the city was a necessary theoretical blind-spot. Classical Marxism, if it even
considered the city, treated it as an insignifrcant spatial backdrop for social
struggles ariSing from the economy. It is surely no coincidence that neither Marx,
nor Engels, nor Lenin etc. ever addressed themselves to the form of the city. In
South Africa too the urban character of resistance was mostly ignored until the
late 1980's. It was not believed to affect the mode, quality or objective of political
struggle.
We have already seen that for classical Marxism and the theory of National
Democratic Revolution alike, the sole determinant of the social was the
contradiction between the (racial) relations and forces of production (the General
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Principle). The latter functioned like an essence. The city had no special
conditions of existence. Like the rest of the social totality it was fully determined
by the General Contradiction. In this regard, it featured as a phenomenon of the
economy that was its essence. It had no peculiar social rhythm or history of its
own and was, therefore, not able to be theorised in terms specific to it. Indeed,
its concept was specified elsewhere: in the General Contradiction.
In contradistinction Manuel Castells argued that the urban form was not
reducible to the General Principle, It was, he suggested, determined by 'external
conditions' not arising from the economy: e.g. social demands on public goods
and cultural identity. In this sense Castell implied that the city was a relatively
autonomous sphere of social practices. It had its own temporality and its own
peculiar conditions of existence. In so doing Castells transcended (both explicitly
and in practice) the conceptual inheritance of classical Marx;sm. Autonomous
spheres and times required a different concept of the social. They were not
available to a Hegelianised Marx.
We have seen that for Althusser, Hegel reduced all the concrete elements of a
historical epoch to one principle, intemally unified, and entirely self-sustaining
(Althusser.1990b, p.103). The Hegelian dialectic was premised on an essence
that had no external conditions. We can now understand, according to
Althusser, what the Marxist concept of the social was. It was not the Hegelian
'totality'l A new term had to be found that designated an entirely new concept:
the social whole. "Instead of the ideological myth of a philosophy of origins...
Marxism establishes in principle the recognition of the givermess of the complex
structure ...", commented Althusser, (Althusser:1990a, p.198) It had as its
starting point "the ever-pre-givenness of a structured complex unity". There is
never a simple contradiction of which the social is its expression. The Marxist
whole is always already constituted in complexity: in a plurality of origins. It is
complexly-structurally-unevenly-determined: that is, overdetermined. (Althusser.
1990a. p.209).
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We call now see why the Marxist whole is radically different from the Hegelian
totality. It has multiple, contradictions. Social practices are not epiphenomena of
an essence. They have their own effectivity and their own temporalities. Each
sphere of practices has partly its own (external) conditions of existence .. "The
coexistence of the different structured levels... and therefore of the economic
infrastructure, of the legal and political superstructure, of ideologies and
theoretical formations (philosophy, sciences) can no longer be thought in the co-
existence of the Hegelian present... [;] and in consequence [in] the model of
continuous and homogenous time ..." (Althusser:1990a, p.99). Each instance has
its own specific time (Althusser:1990a, p.99)6. The Marxist whole is
overdetermined, however, not simply because there is reciprocal determination
between base and superstructure. More importantly, social relations are not just
phenomenon of an essence precisely because they are partly determined by
external conditions: by circumstances and situations not themselves internal to
the General Contradiction.
We shall see also that multiplying the origins of the social - accommodating the
possibility of external conditions - does not just expand the terrain of social
experiences. It does not merely add to an experience of the economy an
experience of other spheres of the social. Subjects do not just experience say,
the city, in addition to the economy. There is no accumulaflon of experiences.
Rather, the quality of experience itself is transformed. This is because the
specifically monist concept of the social (according, at least, to Althusser and
Castells) destroys the possibility of any relation of direct expression between the
'instances' of the social, which, as we have explained above, are relatively
'autonomous' in relation to one another. The dimension of subjectivity or
consciousness cannot thus be construed as merely expressing or reflecting, via
the medium of 'experience', economic, political or any other objective social
identity. The forms of social consciousness are specific and not reducible to any
other social dimension. The concrete individual is thus cauaht in the intersection
~rnesto Laclau has used this concept of differential temporality to argue that the repetitive nature of pre-
capitalist life, made it difficult (if not impossible) to think. in anything but metaphysical terms.
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of these different social instances or dimensions so that her experience of her
economic and/or political identity (e.g. 'worker', 'nationally oppressed') is always
and necessarily conditione':' by the existing forms of social subjectivity and is
thus never directly expressive 0: such identities. There is thus no direct
relationship between experience and consciousness. It is not possible, therefore,
to read a priori objective social interests from the nature of the social itself. But
this is exactly what the theory of National Democratic Revolutior. and Black
Consciousness ~fore that, assumed. The fundarn=r tal diffeience between
them was their description of the essential apartheid f> \!:r~
of the appropriate political objectives.
BC and the theory of NDR were thus premised on 11
posited a necessary relation between the subject (blao





on a certain notion of 'experience'. In this regard bc.n discourses We. .sed
on a relation of identity between the objective and subjective dimensions of
social life.
The im '!ications ofthis grammar for democracy were ambiguous. At the moment
when theorists of NDR spoke of the national democratic state as a multi-party
state - as a state representing diverse interests - an alternative logic associated
with "people's power" interrupted. This took seriously the identificationary reason
of BC and NDR to narrow (if not annul) the distance between political subjects
as national/black subjects. The distance between the representatives of the
people and the people themselves was reduced or closed by definition. All had a
common experience of the racial oppressionl relations of production that issued
common interests in national/black liberation. It mattered not that they did not
articulate t~1I3 interest. It could be defined objectively. Political difference was
thus circumscribed by the pre-defined destiny of political outcomes. What was
eradicated was politics as a terrain of genuine contestation: as an arena of
competing political wills supporting divergent political outcomes.
This logic found most cogent expression in ,he civic movement. Civic
organisations often derived their own identity from the transfer of the theoretical
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content of 'people' to a localised notion of 'community', Dan Sandi, then General
Secretary of SAN CO -moe rernsrked;
"I think it should be emphasised that civics today are volunteer organisations in
the sense that residents join their structures voluntarily, although one belongs to
a civic structure whether he/she is registered or not. This is because the civic is
the residents, and the residents is the civic" (cited in Richard Tomlinson, 1994).
In this regard the conflation between civic and residents was achieved by a logic
of identity lnherred from Black Consciousness and the theory of NOR. FN our
purposes a notion of exoerience was used to link the object of experience (the
real) - "acial oppression, racial capitalism, apartheid geography and so on - to a
conscioui.-ess of the political objective (black liberation, national democracy,
urban integration). We can now better understand why civic organisations in the
1980's could conflate their 'interests' with those of the community. They claimed
to know the truth of the real (to understand its essential experience) and could,
therefore, determine objectively the political interests of the comrncnlty,
What was not apparent to civics was the theoretical SUbstitution that had
eccompanled their rise, 'Community' as implied in BC texts and 'community' as
used by civic organisations referred ambiguously to different political agendas:
the first was referenced vis-a-vis black liberation and the second vis-a-vis
national democratic revolution. These differences were obscured by the usage
of just one word to denote both possibilities. Ironically this may have been a
condition for its popular success. Civic organisations appropriated a term already
made familiar and populer by a previous decade of political mobilisation. Implicit
in the appropriation of the term was an important political substitution.
Community as articulated by civics attached the 'black experience' then - implicit
in the term - to a national democratic agenda, rather than BC's programme of
'black' liberation. This was made possible because both discourses shared a
common theoretical grammar.
If civic organisations could not recognise the discursive changes that
accompanied their rise, the), were party to an even greater blindspot, The notion
of city that emerged in the late 1980's and early 1990's was premised on a very
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different theoretical grarr.mar. For our purposes two theoretical elements are
important: relatively autonomous spheres and experience,
We have already seen ~hat the classical Marxism on which NDR was premised
treated the social 'totality' as the epiphenomenon (the superstructure) of the
essence (the economy) that determinsd it. In this regard it had no space for
relatively autonomous spheres. It could not accommodate external
circumstances that were partly their conditions of existence. NOR could thus
only ever multiply the range of experiences. This was the condition of its very
existence. National democratic subjects experienced economic exploitation and
racial oppression in addition, it suggested. The politico-strategic accomplice was
a two-stage path to communism: first national democracy and then socialism.
The 'One-City' slogan expanded the range of experiences even further:
economic exploitation, racial oppression and urban domination as well.
We have seen, however, that the notion of city rested on a completely contrary
theoretical system. In its original concept it could not simply refer to an expanded
political field within the r~larxist-Leninist teleology. Rather, taken from Manuel
Oastells, the city was a relatively autonomous sphere not fully determlned by the
economy. Indeed, we have seen that Castells suggested certain exlra-econornic
facters as determinants of the urban form.
VVe have seen also that the accornpllce of relative autonomy was a radically
different concept of experience. In this regard, the relation between the real and
consciousness of the real as a relation of direct expression was refuted.
Experience of the 'apartheid city' could not, therefore. produce uniform social
interests across South African cities generally. If there is no direct relation
between experience and objective political interests then it is impossible to
assume to know the interests of urban residents in advance: or generally (which
is the same thing),
We car. now give precise theoretical expression to the ambiguity mentioned at
the beginning of this section.
We have seen that a notion of 'city' and 'community' were juxtaposed during the
1980's and that community drew its theoretical meaning from the theory of NOR.
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In this regard, obi . "i~/e political lnterests were referenced vis-a-vis the state, and
the national state 1.1 particular. We 'iave seen also that NOR could not
accommodate the notion of relative autonomy either theoretically or politically but
could, instead, only expand the range of political objectives in linear chronology.
In this regard, the city was treated (at best) as the spatial outcome of racial
capitalism. It was reduced to an expression of the racial relations of production
that determined it. in contrast, and in concept, the notion of the city drawn
originally from Manuel Castells refuses entirely to reduce the urban form to the
economy or anything else. In this regard, it is determined by peculiar conditions
that cannot be known in advance.
The political corollaries of these tendencies are quite different. The first locates
poli~ical responsibility for the urban form at the national (or other tiers) of
government. The second grants to local urban govemments relative political
autonomy to give political expression to local conditions.
In South AfIica both tendencies have been given political expression alongside
each other. Urban areas are variously represented by their own elected
governments. This apparent autonomy is circumscribed, however, by national,
Provincial and/or regional development plans, which very often define local
governments in narrow technical terms. In this regard, thet'e is a tendency for
political responsibility for the urban form to be determined either regionally or at
higher tiers of government; and for local governments to be treated primarily as
implementing agents. In South Africa, therefore, the contradictory understanding
of local government in practice is symptomatic of the peculiar history of the city in
concept.
In this regard, the next section will focus on certain local governments situated in
the urban conurbation east of Johannesburg. It will show how their work was
torn between two contradictory political impulses that are, in tum, symptomatic of
their ambiguous political formulation.
The choice of the East Rand is partly personal and partly methodological. While
being the area best know to me it also serves well the purposes of this thesis.
Firstly: from the pOint of view of national legislation the local govemments there
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are unexceptional. They are defined in exactly the same terms as any other
urban third tier governments. Yet they are particular. Boksburg, Alberton and
Germiston, the local governments that will be considered here, are respectively
the same age as and older than Johannesburg. In this regard they have a long
history of self~government that has seen them develop very specific ideas about
their role and the areas they serve. We can see through them, therefore, the
way the new South African conception of local government, on the one hand,
seems to respect their autonomy (and therefore their conceptions of their
function) and on the other hand wants to invest them, like all the others, with a
uniform notion of their role.
In particular we can see how since 1993, Boksburg, Alberion and Germiston
have struggled to assert their political autonomy from a regional development
body; the Eastern Services Council (ESC) - today the Eastern Gauteng Service
Council (EGSC) - interested in pursuing and implementing national and
provincial development plans. In so doing they have attempted to defend their
own definitions of their respective roles against the new national one
represented by the EGSC.
Secondly: in the chapter after the next, we will see that in 1990 the three former
African townships of Katlehong, Tokoza and Vosloorus, recently included in the
jurisdictions of Germiston, Alberton and Boksburg separately, erupted in possibly
the worst example of urban civil-war in South African history. We will also see
tl1at in trying to pursue their new role these authorities not only prevented
themselves from coming to terms with the political exigency thrown up by the
war, but even from fulfilling their mandate in terms of the new dispensation.
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SECTION 3: URBAN FORMS ON THE 'EAST RAND'
Outside the discipline o' geography there has been a general neglect of space
as an important theoretical element. This is true in political philosophy, history
and sociology as well. Sue Parnell and Alan Mabin observed in 1995, for
example, that in South Africa, academic inquiries often take the apartheid
geography as their implicit starting-points (Parnell and Mabin, pp. 40). As a
result, they note, certain authors specialised in historical and political processes
in African townships, others dealt with Coloured areas and still others with White
locations. What is important to notice, therefore, is that the urban form was
treated simply as a spatial backdrop for other processes, and in particular the
setting for class and ethnic formation and political struggles. It was judged, that
is, as the place in which these events unfolded, but not as an element intrinsic to
these very processes themselves. The writings after 1988, positing the notion of
the 'apartheid city', thus revealed an important lack in the South African social
and political hlatory. They posited, for the first time, the spatial structure of the
city, not simply as an arena in which things happened, but as a factor integral to
their form and trajectories. What they also highlighted was the importance of the
urban state to these processes. Unfo.umately, both this state form was analysed
in general terms that rendered abstract their particular configurations and their
particular functions. As a result we lack in South Africa, studies of particular local
governments and their specific modes of operation,
In this regard I want tentatively - tentatively, because this will not be a rigorous
historical study - to show on the East Rand, and in Boksburg, Alberton end
Germiston in particular, that distinctive values informed how they functioned and
what they took to be their roles. These differed substantially from the gene,1c
duties that South African studies have attributed to them. In this way these local
governments tried to invest their respective spatial morphologies with political
meanings different to those that can be apprehended if we see them solely
through the lens of the 'apartheid City' generally defined. Indeed, I will argue in
this section that it is precisely the difference between their particular conceptions
of their role, and the specific political meanings they have attached to the areas
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under their jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a conception of local government
and the urban political economy garnered from national sources on the other,
that was at stake in the third tier institutional politics in the East Rand durin~Jthe
first half of the 1990's.
I will argue that opposition for and against the proposed East Rand Metropolitan
Chamber· akin to a Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Oharncor - rested on
differing conceptions of the city and the role of local government. It will be
argued til at Boksburg, Alberton and Germiston, in th~ir practice, wanted to
defend their parochial readings of the urban form against a reading thr1treduced
each city to a mere instance of a generic, national type. The co. iflicts between
them and the Eastern Gauteng Services Council, therefore, were symptomatic of
the differing notions of the city and of local government. One the one hand,
Boksburg, Alberton and Germiston sought to defend their limited political
autonomy to give expression to what they understood in practice to be their
different roles. On the other hand, the EGSC sought to reduce local
governments within its jurisdiction to mere 'deliver." agents for plans determined
elsewhere.
A New Geographic Expression
The establishment of the .st Rand Regional Services Council (ERRSC) in
1987 granted a temporary consensus to the "East Rand" as a geographic
expression. The local government transition, however, rendered the term
ambiguous once again. Whereas most local authorities had by 1992 agreed that
the 'East Rand' was largely synonymous with the boundaries of the RSC
(Humphries, 1992), the transformation of the latter into the Eastem Services
Council and now Eastern Gauteng Services Council (with the assocleted
redefinition of the EGSC's functional area) has destabilised this precarious
understanding.
Prior to 1987 no regionally established body (such as the East Rand transport
authority (Ormet) or the Administration Board) had the s~lmbolicauthority to give
stable geographic definition to the 'East Rand'. The establishment of the RSC
represented the arrival of a more powerful regional organisation, and, therefore,
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also of a more durable regional definition. This ~ettled the meaning of the area at
the time around the following municipalities: Alberton, Tokoza, Boksburg,
Vosloorus, Benoni, Wattvilfe, Daveytown, Brakpan, Tsakane, Germiston,
Katlehong, Kempton Park, Edenvale, Bedfordview, NigE" Duduza, Sprit'(.ISand
Kwa-Thema. In total 18 local authorities. Yet the more recent questlonln, of the
place and role of a services-type council has simultaneously disrupted the
territorial definition the old RSC partly steadied. In many respects. c )fore, the
(definitional) center of the region has been disputed and the geography of the
term was once again available for contestation.
After 1993 negotiations conceming the demarcation of local governments took
their cue from the options available from the Local Government Transition Act.
For our purposes, debate centered on the metropolitan or non-metropolitan
character of the East Rand. The outcome of this controversy rofound
implications, not just for the nature and shape of then eXisting Ie' .homles,
but for the continued existence of the then Cast Rand Regional Services
Council.
In the obscure IEJgalese of the LGTA, provisions were made for the
"disestablishment" of RSC'sGand their replacement with a Service Council "for
non-metropolitan" local government areas. These bodies would be granted the
power to raise and claim the reqional services levy and the regional
establishment levy referred to in the Original RSC Act. Apart from these few
6 Following the presentation of the Croeser Working Group's (Croeser, 1993) report in ]983, which
recognised the need for transfer payments from wealthy white areas to less affluent black, indian and
coloured areas, the government introduced Regional Services Councils (RSC's) in 1985. These were
intended to provide area-wide coordinatirm {If r,apitnl projects at a I -cal level so as to produce efficient
administration through economies of scale. They were also intended to fucilitate the improvement of
infrastructural assets in black areas as well as provide the resources for black local authorities to effectively
render services and balance their budgets.
After belatedly agreeing to include black city co mcillors in their membership, the RSC Act effectively
marginalised their representation by defining a 10Cdl authorities' voting capacity according to the amount of'
services it acquired from an RSC. This ensured the defacto dominance of wealthier white auth1rities. The
"multiracial' nature of Me's, therefore, addressed problems within the existing structure of local
government and were thus an attempt to preempt the expansion ofBLA's revenue bases without effecting
changes in their actual delimitation.
Moreover, RSC capital ventures in black townships ironiccJi;, f~t..hcr Cl'",!,,;...,h,n;.1 :1:., "cry crises they were
designed to help alleviate. Such projects assumed that BLA's had the operating income and administrative
capacity to maintain and manage the new assets. Mostly they did not.
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details, however, the LGTA was shent on substantive issues relating to the
character and form of ~hese new Councils. All that was apparently clear,
according to the information brochure issued at the signing of the LGTA, was
that "a transitional metropolitan council [could not] co-exist with RSC's in the
same area", Indeed, the same brochure continued that: "where a TMC [was]
established "that area [would} have to be excised from the area of any RSC
because the powers and duties of metropolitan councils and RSC's [were]
essentially the same: In other words, if the 'East Rand' was defined as a single
(or even several metropolitan areas), the Eastern Services Council would be
"disestablished" (Local Government Transition Act, 1992).
This suggested two options to the then Regional Services Council: it could either
become the bureaucratic heart of an East Rand metropolitan chamber; or
mutate into a vaguely defined Services Council. Apart from a certain degree of
political expedience that would see the Council choose the option most likely to
see it into the future, the choice of action rested also on the RSC's own reading
of the urban form. In terms of the LGTA a "metropolitan area" displayed the
following characteristics:
it comprised the areas of jurisdiction C!i multiple local governments;
it was densely populated and had an intensive movement of people, goods
and services within the area;
it was extensively developed or urbanised and had more than one central
business district, lrdustrial area and concentration of employment; and
economically it formed a functional unit comprising various units which
where interdependent economically and in respect of services.
While the 'East Rand' could corntortably be said to fillfill the first three
requirements, the fourth proved ',otly contested. Interviews conducted with the
Council in late 1994 by Richard Humphries depicted the sub-region as a
"corurbatlon of urban areas" with an embryonic metropolitan character tendin!:j
towards an integrated rnetropolitan whole (Humphries, 1992b). And yet the
March 1992 strategic plan, developed by the RSC's consultants Wagner Net
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suggested instead that: "The East Rand has developed over the years into a
unique metropolitan area which distinguishes itself from its neighbouring areas
with regard to cultural value systems, socio economic conditions, industrial
activity, local authority coordinating mechanisms, demographic forces, physical
phenomena" (East Rand Regional Services Council, 1992). There is an
important difference in these definitions that is wori.h dwelling on briefly.
The RSC's latertl1inking implied that the metropolitan form of the East Rand was
then tentative, and though it was moving in that direction, there existed strong
and independent units that needed to be accommodated. The political
accomplice of this analysis was a "soft" metropolitan option with strong local
authorities reflecting the distinct histories of its municipal components. This view
was reflected in speeches by RSC spokespersons and consultants at its
regional summit held in October 1994. Bill Cameron, for example, suggested
that the then PVVV govemment be requested to allow for a "bottom-up"
"metropolitan services council" for the Eaot Rand (Presentation by Bill
Cameron,p.27). This was certainly not the implication of the earlier formulation.
The 1992 document referred to an already complete metropolitan area such that
the region even had distinct cultural values I What could this suggest if not a
robust metropolitan structure for the East Rand? And indeed, this was reflected
in proposals submitted by Wagner Nelon the 17 May 1993.
The RSC had correctly interpreted the Central Witwatersrand Negotiating
Chamber (CWNC) as the precursor for local govemment negotiations nationally.
As early as December 1992, therefore, the chairperson of the Council met with
East Rand councilors and raised the prospect of the Central Wits example. After
discussing the idea with the then govemment in January 1993 and apparently
receiving approval for some type of East Rand negotiating forum, the RSC
approached "representatives from Vosloorus and Daveytown" for discussions. It
seems that the RSC had recognised the imminent transformation of apartheid
local government and the resultant participation of what it called "non-system"
players, On th(~19 February 1993 the Council Officially met a delegation from the
Civic Association of Southern Transvaal (CAST).
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These actions were informed by several related worries. The RSC was
concerned that the transformation of local government might threaten its
institutional status (if not existence); and, therefore, also the quality of services it
could render. A Wagner Nel report repeatedly measured the desirability of
institutions against their ability to "add to [the] quality of life" or "deliver the
goods". Indeed, one of its major criticisrns of the CWMC was precisely the
"decrease" in the "quality of life" that apparently resulted. The Council identified
the need to protect its future operations as a "critical issue". "Never," it remarked
"destroy or substitute systems and structures that deliver" (East Rand Regional
Services Council, 1994(a), p.16). The RSC management was particularly
concerned at what it S,:~Was a growing trend away from Regional Services
Councils. The De Loor Commission (De Loor Commission discussed in Dewar,
1993) for example, favoured the replacement of RSC's with some form of
metropolitan government. These sentiments also seerned preferable to the ANC.
This OCCUlTedat a time when the Council had just recently resolved to "extend its
operations beyond those of the conventional engineering type services". At a
conference at Valley Lodge in 1991 the organisation had developed a "strategic
mission" that saw itself as a major political and developmental f,;layer in the
future. Tho RSC was thus motivated not just by the desire to survive, but to
expand its powers and functions. In this regard the Council interpreted political
trends at the time as moving towards metropolitan-type institutions for local
government. And it, therefore, imagined to that such a structure for the East
Rand best ensured its survival into the new democratic age.
But the security of the RSC's future rested on another change as well: the
transformation of its blighted apartheid image. The Council had clearly
recognised this fairly soon after the unbanning of the ANC. At a "strategic
summit" held at Valley Lodge in 1991, the RSC developed a "total strategy"
consisting of 5 "strategic thrusts", These included:
• "One safe city ~one tax base"
e "One person - one job"
• "One family - one house"
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e "Affordable services and infrastructure 'for all"
• "Social Affirmative Action for ali"
• If these slogans SCI '-tj today like bad parodies of the 1980's, their mimicry of the
style and vocabulary of the "liberation movement" was deliberate. It represented
an attempt to recast their language and image in order to "win the favour"
(Coetzee, Maria., Germiston 7/8/95) of the civics and the ANC. In a remarkable
feat of historical myth-making the RSC reinvented itself as an agent of
democratisation (apparently because in the past it included Black Local
Authorities on its board), formed during the demise of the old regime, and
established for the "laudable" purpose of "upgrading and improving deprived
(:.,eas" (ERRSC, 1994a, p.12). Tnls, of course, contrasted with the more
respectable view that RSC's buttressed crisis-ridden apartheid local government
by throwing a lifeline to the much hated BLA's Nonetheless in terms of the new
mythology the Council also argued that it had a proven "track record" of
achieving "commendable aims" and it was, therefore, best suited to "continue
render[ing] extremely valuable services in regional planning, the provision of
urban infrastructure and the collection of regional levies" (Ibid., p.13). In this
view, a metro structure, formed around the RSC, could best satisfy the Councils
vision of "municipal development" through long term regional planning. The
Wagner Nel report, titled Proposals in respect of the need end framework for the
establishment of the proposed East Rand Metropolitan Forum thus envisaged a
single Local Govemment Forum for the entire region. Th!s would have as its
primary goal: "to assist with and monitor the implementation of the East Rand
RSC's Total Strategy". Curiously, the document was classified as confidential
and only (reluctantly) made available almost 3 years later. The embarrassing
nature of the report was almost certainly related to events that superseded it.
In early 1994 RSC notes (East Rand Regional Services Council, 1994a) record
that plans for a single regional negotiating forum were scrapped and an
alternative strategic intervention adopted. What seems to have been the crucial
tuming-point was a "summit" convened for councilors and officials at
Maccaauvlei in February 1994. During an apparently te'1se and sometimes
angry weekend it became readily apparent that delegates strongly opposed a
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regional metro structure. Instead, they preferred autonomous local authorities
served by an RSC-type establishment. In addition, the former Norkok local
authorities (Kempton Park, Edenvale and rledfordview) favoured an
independent metropolitan structure for themselves. As a result of this opposition
the East Rand Regional Services Council commissioned a "dynamic
demarcation model" {East Rand Regional Services Cour'cil, 1994b, p.2} fn.m its
consultants Wagner Nel to evaluate competing options oi local government in
the area, According to the consultants that prepared it the model assumed that
the legislative criteria for demarcation were inadequa;e. It included several other
factors for consideration; including what it believed to be International trends in
politics, management and government.
The report concluded that nine East Rand TLC's be establlshco - integrating
formerly segregated white and black local authorities - and recommended also
that the RSC's area of jurisdiction be expanded to include Kempton Pa,X, Nigel
and Heidelberg. These areas, it suggested, should be served by an East Ran,'
Metropolitan Services Council that would retain the old RSC functions,
According to the consultants that devised the criteria, however, the findings
reflected more the politics of the region than the "science" (Ibid., p.7) it was
intended to serve. Indeed, Johan Wagner lamented the careerism of the local
authority officials that undermined the prospects of an East Rand metropolitan
vision. The new proposal thus represented a significant reversal from the earlier
position.
When the RSC failed to convene an East Rand Local Government Forum due to
~";IIorganised opposition, it resolved to participate in the various negotiathIg
forums 8.'\ a statutory participant. RSC minutes from the time suggested that this
was never more than a strategic decision: it would pursue this course of action
because of the "inuistinctness" (sic) conceming u the practical implication
involved with a Transitional Metropolitan CounciL" (Ibid., p.57) In other words,
having lost the fight to establish itself as the heart of a metro chamber it would
temporarily settle for a "metropolitan" (Ibid., p.57) services council and take the
battle to the individual LGNF's Yet this assumed as a prerequisite that all local
authorities in thf' area accept the TLC option. Otherwist= a Services Council
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could be "excised" from the territory declared "metropolitan" by any negotiating
forums that chose the TMC option. As a safequard, theref.Jre, the RSC argued
that all LvNF's "partake collectively" to develop a joint "East Rand stand-point"
(lbld., p.S8) for the pre-interim period, A "uniform" approach, it continued, would
not only "avoid division" but also minimise "disruption and uncertainty" (Ibid.
p.58). In this regard the Council proposed that Local Authorities only consider
Metropolitan options after the pre-interim phase; that is, after the first local
government elections. This, it warned, would prevent opportunist councils, that
opted for a TMC, from applying to incorporate neighbouring TLC's into its
domain, we uld deter policy makers from declaring the entire PWV region one
metropolitan area and would, wouid give local authorities time to "educate" (Ibid.,
p.59) new participants in Local Management matters as well as avoid making too
many cr. 1gesat the same time. Most of these arguments were spurious. Even
at the time there was little serious talk of a provincial metropolitan area - that is,
of a single chamber for the then PWV. Moreover, there was nothing in the LGTA
to suggest that a metro council could unilaterally absorb neighbouring TLC's.
What worried the RSC, of course. was that independent moves to establish a
metropolitan structure would reduce its jurisdictional area if not eliminate it
altogether.
Tile new tactic, however, carried certain risks for the RSC, in effect, trusted its
future to the complex political processes in each forum. This was to prove even
more hazardous than they expected. Richard Humphries (Humphries, 1994)
observed that the ERRSC misinterpreted the Lccal Government Transition Act.
It understood itself to be a "focal government body" as defined in the Act and
believed that it had a legal right to sit on each statutory delegation in each local
negotiating forum. This was quite simp~ywrong. As a result the RSC played a
limited, even non-existent role in the East Rand LGNF's,
The results of this legal oversight were costly. Apart from the failure to generate
a "uniform position" (East Rand Regional Services Council, 1994b, p. 12), most
damaging to the RSC was the loss of Kempton Park to a North East Rand
Transitional Metropolitan Council consisting of Modderfontein, Edenvale,
Ternblsa and eventually Midrand. In line with LGTA provisions this area was
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subsequently exempted from the Regicnal Services Council's area of
jurisdiction. While Germiston, Alberton and Boksburg finally chose to be
Transitional Local Councils the idea of a metro chamber for these areas was
strongly favoured by many. Most wonying to the RSC, rJwover, was the
reductiun of its urban jurisdiction and the independent tendency towards metro
formation.
By the finalis ~ion of negotiated agreements in late 1994 and their promulgation
by the Gauteng premier the East Rand looked very different. Within tl Ie former
boundaries of the East Rand Regional Services Council there now existed seven
separate Transitional Local Councils: Greater Alberton, Germiston, Boksburq,
Benoni, Brakpan, Springs and Nigel. In addition there was also a Metropolitan
chamber with Kempton Park, Edenvafe, Modderfontein and Tembisa. In other
words the urban core of the "sub-region" now consisted of politically independent
local authorities linked only through their degree of functional integration. In this
regard the single "metropolitan" character of the entire region was disputed and
lost. Indeed, if the RSC boundaries had before constituted an intelligible
definition of the term 'East Rand', the sub-region ceased to exist as a political
entity.
On the 1st January 1995, a Provincial Proclamation (Number 4 of that year)
disestablished the East Rand Regional Services Council and established in its
place an Eastem Services Council (ESC), The new institution now did not just
include the urban localities of Alberton, Germiston, Boksburg, Benoni, Brakpan,
Springs, Nigel and Heidelberg but also the TLC's of Devon, Bronkhorspruit and
Cullinan as well as the rural Transitional Councils Of Elands River, Pienaars
River and Suikerbosrand. So too were the Local Area Committees of
Hammanskraal, Nestpark, Roodeplaat and Vischkuil placed under its authority.
The new Council was thus entrusted large rural areas over and above the urban
conurbation formerly associated with the East Rand. Indeed, it was now
responsible for areas to the North and East of Pretorial Moreover, in addition to
the former powers of the old Regional Services Council, the ESC; was also
granted the status of a local govemment charged with the actual administration
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of many of these rural areas. As a result it was delegated certain functions
(such as housing) that the old Regional Service Council never was.
Whereas the boundaries (and practice) of the former RSC may have given
some content to the East Rand as a coherent urban unit, the loss of certain
municipalities to a metropolitan government and the immersion of the rei nainder
in a much larger territory, rendered the term meaningful in name only. There no
longer existed any institution around which an 'East Rand' metropolitan form
could reasonably be said to exist.
The question that we must now ask is the following: why was a regional
metropolitan option defeated on the East Rand? It far from obvious that in terms
of the Constitutional guidelines for demarcation the Central Witwatersrand more
clearly resembled a metropolitan area than the 'East Rand'.
One response may have been implied in this paper already. The RSC read the
future of local government in metropolitan structures and wanting to preserve its
integrity attempted to establish itself as the heart of an East Rand metropolitan
bureaucracy, When the latter option seemed unlikely the RSC simply discarded
it in favour of an alternative that also secured its survival: a Services Council for
a non-metropolitan area. While the then RSC was almost certainly guilty of
political opportunism and bureaucratic inertia, we would be mistaken to reduce a
certain culture of professionalism and a sincere reading of the urban form to
political expediency.
At the RSC 'summit' in October 1994 the case for municipal intf;.'Qrationwas
made. The Council argued that rt:gional planning was required to "even-out"
(East Rand Regional Services Council, 1994c, p.4) population densities affecting
the distribution of wealth. The 'East Rand' also required a coordinated economic
intervention to "bring work to communities" (Ibid., p.4) and to prevent the
negative effects of municipal rivalry. This, it was argued, resulted in the
duplication of planning and a "culture of competition" (lbid., p.13) for commercial
and industrial development that harmed prospects for growth by over-supplying
floor space. The same applied to land-use. An uncoordinated land policy might
create artificial scarcities in one municipality and land invasions in another.
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The most cogent reason for regional coordination, the RSC explained, was the
need to cross-subsidise "depressed areas" (Ibid., p.6) from affluent ones.
Massive backlogs, the Council argued, required the regional "transfer of rates
and levies from the affluent core to deprived peripheral areas" (Ibid., p.7) to
achieve an equitable distribution of resources and infrastructure. What further
worried the RSC then (and continues to worry the EGSC now). however, was
that pressure on the urban infrastructure was steadily increasing as migration
into the area intensified. The position ot the sub-region at the intersection of the
province's two primary economic corridors - the historical gold belt stretching
East-West across the Witwatersrand and the more recent steel belt running
North-South and linking Pretoria with the Rand - made it an attractive cesnnanon
for job-seekers from all around the country; and from Southern Africa as a
whole. And yet population growth would unevenly be carried by the so-called Far
East Rand municipalities. That is, the lack of spare land in authorities closest to
Johannesburg would see population densities in the "Far East Rand" rapidly
intensify. This meant that areas experiencing serious economic decline (because
of their peripheral location) would have carry the greatest pressure for
development. The RSC thus requested that "well developed areas of the East
Rand help... provide development capital for those... absorbing a large
proportion of the impact of rapid urbanisation" (lbld., p.s),
The RSC was argued that the region as a whole faced certain developmental
problems that could not be trusted to separate and competitive local authorities
to address on their own. It held that there needed to be regional coordination to
plan 'rationally' for the future. What loomed heavily in the minds of officials was
the prospect of uncontrolled urbanisation like they had recently seen in Cairo
and Sao Paulo.
A Developmental City
We would be rnlstaken to believe, however, that opposition to a metropolitan
structure was premised simply on bureaucratic inertia, petty localisms and/or
hostility to the new politcal dispensatlon. These were certalnly factors. It will be
suggested here that implicit in the opposition were contrasting notions of the city
and also differing understandings of the role of local gO'femment.
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For the ESC (and now the EGSC) the RFlt'.Onstrllction and Development
Programme provided an excellent opportunity to proceed with its developmental
concept of the urban complex. In this regard the Council began work on a
Frameworl( for the Reconstruction and Development Programme that planned to
address the heritage of apartheid in a "comprehensive and integrated" manner
(East Rand Regional Services Council, 1995, p. 1).
The document envisaged local participatory IvJlJms (such as Community
Development Forums and Local Development Forums) attended by so-called
'community organisations', tha. would identify and communicate 'needs' to local
govemments for implementation. In this way resources could be mobilised to
satisfy local wants in a way that advanced a regional vision of the urban system.
This included:
• making the urban environment more "compact" by improving the proximity of
residential and employment areas,
8 increasing the mobility of the urban population through investment in public
transport infrastructure
• runturinq economic growth by lifting apartheid restrictions on entry to the market,
f) encouraging the formation of small and medium sized business enterprises, and
• increasing the supply of business land to the former discriminated
• improving the human habitat by incrementally extending property rights to all
families,
10 re-integrating towns and townships, infilling and densification with the emphasis
on the delivery of serviced residential sites; and
II making existing educational instfMions, health facilities, public libraries and
recreational areas more available through more compact cities (Ibid., pp.6-7).
The implementation of these proposals, however, was premised on a shared
vision of the future urban form. For they required carefully planned and
coordinated actions to achieve the kind of balance and equality that these plans
envisaged. In this regard the Council went through a lengthy consultation
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process to win approval for the ideas contained in 11S framework document. At
three separate weekends-away, local government "experts", local government
delegates and various "interest groups" (including the South African National
Civic Organisation (SANCO), business and political parties) workshopped
concepts in and around deveiopment to formulate a general agreement (Ibid,
preface). After the formation of Local Development Forums, workshops where
planned for these representatives as well. The gatherings apparently proved
mostly successful in that unity of purpose was achieved in principle.
What worried the then ESC most was that many local authorities lacked the
pulitical will execute such projects. In private discussions with certain officials
they expressed deep reservations about the commitment of local government
bureaucrats to initiatives that might he unpopular with themselves and white
residents in general.
As a result ESC officials where keen to find institutional mechanisms to oblige
iocal authorities to undertake certain ventures in their own areas. In this regard a
modified metropolitan structure for the region was once again proposed. This
envisaged a highly devolved metro chamber (or metropolitan services council)
responsible primarily for long-term planning and bulk service provision. In other
words a metropolitan authority would provide a regional framework for
development and relatively autonomous local authorities would implement the
vision in their own areas.
• Within the ESC itself there where proponents of even stronger metropolitar.
measures. In this view a regional development structure - consisting of
delegates from local authorities and Local Development Forums - would be
established to evaluate between different capital projects. These would be
measured against certain pre-defined criteria; and in this case against the ESC's
development vision. Delegates would then decide which projects most advanced
the plan; and budgetary expenditure would be allocated accordingly. This implied
the displacement of budgetary control away from local authorities to the regional
development authority itself (Interview with Coetzee, Maria. Germiston, 23/3/96).
What is important for our purposes is the very notion of a developmental city.
The ESC proposals implied a consensus view of the function of local
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government. It assumed as given that the urban form be the spatial expression
of social egalitarianism, supported by a metropolitan structure with local
authorities designed to realise an equality of services and infrastructure through
a compact city in a regulated market.
No matter how laudable these proposals may be they nonetheless implied a
regional urban whole; and, therefore, also a common political WI!1. Indeed, at the
moment when the EGSC seemed to have recognised the political independence
of local govemments' - what it called 'separate towns' accommodated in a
'devolved' metropolitan authority - a logic of uniformity interrupted its thinkir.g to
demand censer ISus and agreement. What was at stake was the capacity of
ccmpeting notlons of the city to assert themselves politically. And this lay at the
heart of demarcation disputes on the 'East Rand'. What was often being
contested was the very Uniformity of vision required by the ESC.
A Metropolitan Structure for Boksburg, Alberton and Germiston
On Saturday the 29 July the Mayor of Boksburg made an important
announcement, His council, together with Councils of Germiston and Alberton,
were applying to the MEC for Local Govemment and Housing to be
reconstituted as a Transitional MetropOlitan Council.
What seems to have inspired the move was precisely the redistributive function
envisaged by the Eastem Services Council. Local govemment officials in these
areas begrudged the siphoning off of their funds to subsidise less viable
municipalities elsewhere. According to figures for the years 1987/88 to 1993/94
- quoted in a demarcation report commissioned by the then East Rand Regional
Services Council - the RSC's total levy income for that period was just over
R875 million. Moneys raiser! from Germiston, Boksburg and Alberton
contributed slightly more than 60% to this total: almost R530 million, that is. The
effects of cross-subsidisation were felt most acutely by Germiston which
contributed more than R348 million fr- RSC coffers (almost 40% of the total
RSC income) and received only R145 million for projects in its area. It thus
supported other local authorities to the tune of R202 million rands or 22% of
total funds allocated (East Rand Regional Services Council, 1994c, p.E5). The
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situation subsequently deteriorated. Whereas Kempton Park had historically
carried some of the burden of cross-subsidisation, after the formation of the
North East Rand Metropolitan Council and its exclusion from the jurisdiction of
the EGSC, Germiston and other wealthier local authorities were left to make up
the shortfall - in a context, moreover, of expanded financial responsibility. The
inclusion of areas like Bronkhorspruit, Hammanskraal and Suikerbosrand into
the new boundaries of the EGSC meant that revenue generated in Boksburg,
Alberton and Germiston would be spent in these far-away rural places; at a time
when the: general deterioration of the 'East Rand' eccnomy was already
constraining budgets. What made matters worse was the new voting system
introduced with Services Councils. Whereas in the past, ballots where weighted
according to the quantity of services purchased from the then Regional
Services Council - granting large and wealthy local authorities the ability to
hetter influence the quantity and destination of RSC funds - the ESC was
comprised of equal members with equal votes; thereby ending the structural
disadvantage inherited by smaller councils.
'East Rand' officials resented the increased burden of cross-subsidisation to
areas that where both remote and contributed little to their local economies.
Frustration was further compounded by the ESC's policy of targeting areas most
in need of aid that qualified rural districts for financial transfers more readily than
it did urban localities. The loss of revenue to rural districts seemed particularly
painful given the daunting financial obligations these authorities already faced.
Not only where they expected to finance the massive infrastructural development
required in former African townships, but the physical devastation to housing and
infrastructure, caused by the four year war, imposed further financial demands.
Officials and counciffors where thus keen to retain as much revenue as possible
to spend locally. By reconstituting their Transitional Local Councils as a single
metropolitan authority, Boksburg, Alberton and Germiston believed they could
exclude themselves from the jurisdiction of the Eastern Services Council; and In
so doing end their financial obligations to it. Despite the apparent advantages of
the move, it was fraught with dangers: not the least being opposition from the
Provincial government - which seemed keen to realise its developmental
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objectives through the various Services Councils. Indeed, when the proposal
was submitted to the Demarcation Board in October 1995 it was rejected; only
partially because there was insufficient time to complete the process before local
government elections. More importantly, however, integration raised deep
concerns from the local authorities themselves. Right from the beginning the
Alberton council expressed certain reservations about the process; and whei1
the motion was originally submitted to the council it was rejected (Interview with
Weiman, Johan., Alberton, 17/5/96).
There seem to have been several reasons for the Alberton decision. Unlike
Germiston, and to a lesser extent Boksburg, Alberton had historically been least
affected by redistribution. Indeed, over the period 1987 to 1994 the Council
gained nearly R270 thousand through financial allocations from the RSC. As a
result this was not the most pressing issue on its agenda. Instead, other factors
worried the Council.
Through a regimen of strict fiscal conservatism, the authority had accumulated a
large financial reserve that it used for capital prolects'. Officials worried that in a
metro their savings would be consumed by debt repayments for amounts raised
individually from the private sector by other municipalities Germiston, for
example, had allegedly paid for its municipal offices and civic centre through
external loans. Boksburg also had outstanding obligations. More worrying,
however, was that the SUbstantial discounts made available to the residents of
Alberton - by cross-subsidising their rates from income generated from industry
and commerce - would be reduced as Council rates where adjusted upwards to
correspond wit.h higher service charges in Boksburg and Germiston (II" .
Alberton, 17/5/96)
The thought that troubled officials most, however, was the costs associated with
integrating former African areas into an expanded municipal authority.
Infrastructural development and repair in KATORUS would not just exhaust
reserves but would also potentially require increases in municipal levies. Such a
7 It should not be forgotten that the accumulation of such a reserve was made possible in the context of
apartheid local government that freed the Alberton Town Council from any financial responsibility to
Tokoza, Moreover, the Council itself was partly subsidised by the displacement o~t~e costs ofloeal
government in Afiican areas onto township residents themselves. See Planact, Swilling, etc....
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move was not just unpopular amongst officials. In a conservative ana mostly
Afrikaans-speaking town there where worries that such an option would be
strongly resisted. Officials were thus keen to welcome alternative, non-
refundable income for development and then recover the costs of maintenance
from township residents themselves. In this regard the Reconstruction and
Development Programme, and in particular the KATORUS Special Presidential
Project, was supported by all three local authorities. The RDP would contribute
R6S0 million to capital projects over five years, while a further R2,4 billion would
be raised from Provincial and National governments. In this way, it was hoped,
that the immediate financial costs of the transition would not be carried by the
local authorities themselves, but would, instead, be shouldered by other tiers of
government; in a way that partially protected white ratepayers and industry from
the costs of integration. Nonetheless local authorities ':vuuid be responsible for
the repair and upkeep to new capital stock. This required, however, that levels of
payment in African areas were enough to recover maintenance expenditure. In
this regard, Alberton was reluctant to inherit the massive backlogs in Katlehong
and Vosloorus where levels of payment where either extremely low or
significantly below costs; in a context where payment in Tokoza was satisfactory.
In other words, the local authority was unwilling to SUbsidisedevelopment across
its municipal border.
These reservations, however, implied more than a narrowly-defined economic
self-interest. What is striking is the sense of Municipal autonomy upon which
they were premised. Officials were concerned to protect "their" financial reserve,
"their" levies, and "their" ratepayers (Ibid, 22/1/1996). There was no feeling of
being part of a larger regior:al or even sub-regional entity. Indeed, one senior
official remarked - without prompting it should be added - that a metropolitan
option would deny Alberton residents their sense of "ownership" and their
peculiar Alberton "identity" (Ibid., 2211/1996). What this ir-plled was that the
boundaries of Alberton delineated not simply an area of rnu ";(;ip31 administration
but rather, and in addition, a site of specific cultural and SCl"",,,; practices as well.
Local autonomy was asserted most aggressively during the demarcation
process. The latter was regarded largely as a technical issue related t(.
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"functional integration" rather than a politicai issue related to the urban form. As
a result discussions tended to take place in forums consisting primarily of
"experts" lobbied by local government officials and former RSC's and their
consultants. In terms of the Local Government Transition Act a demarcation
board was required to have:
• a chairperson with considerable experience in law or local government; and
• additional members who jointly had knowledge of a) rural, town and regional
planning; b) development economics; c) municipal finance; d) municipal services
and administration; and e) other disciplines and sl<ilIs as may be necessary,
(LGTA, 1992)
This granted to the process a set of criteria strongly informed by the political
agendas of local councillors, officials and their consultants. Demarcation
reflected more their priorities than it did those of urban residents. This meant that
on the East Rand, parochial values (articulated by local governments)
interrupted moves to establish a metropolitan chamber for the East Rand as a
whole; and even stalled a metropolitan option for Boksburg, Alberton and
Gerrniston.
It would be' incorrect to believe, however, that staunchly defended autonomy was
simply informed by a srnail-rninded localism. In many cases resistance to
regional political options was premised on divergent urban political values.
The Balanced City
In 1959 the Germiston Chamber of Commerce together with the City Council
Jlished a 455 page honorarium to celebrate its Golden ,Jubilee.Poised on the
dawn of unparalleled economic growth and reflecting on its transformation from
impoverished agricultural dorp to "leading industrial city" (Germiston Chamber of
Commerce, 1986, p.3) the book declared Germiston "the heart of South Africa"
and the centre of a strident and progressive industrialism. "There are a few
people in South Africa who think of Germiston as being just a suburb of
Johannesburg," commented the then Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce.
"When having read this book," he continued, "I hope they will be converted to my
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way of thinking - that Johannesburg is just a suburb of the City of Germiston"
(Ibid., p,3). This was not just puffery. It signaled a belief in the cities historical
role at the vanguard of a technological modernism, advancing South Africa into a
new age; one premised on leading-edge manufacturing at the service of a self-
assured South African national identity. Unlike the mining industry that seemed
to hanker after English respectability, the establishment of Iscor in 1936 - as the
precursor for post-war industnal growth - was self-consciously attached to a
project of (white) South Afneen nation-building. Genniston was thus not simply
another modem city. It believed itself to be the very crucible of South African
modemity. In this regard it boasted the most advanced industrial sector in the
country and a Central Business District resplendent with the city hail on
President Street. If tlie Johannesburg equivalent reflected an old fashioned
classicist; ~'1atspoke of its adherence to a colonial past, Gordon Leith designed
for Genniston in 1934, what was at the time regarded one of the most modem
city halls in the Wr1· 'J; and a suitable statement of Genniston's self-imageR.
If during the 1950's and 1960's Genniston believed itself to be I'ntegral to a
metropolitan Johannesburg by the late 1980's there had been an important
spatial shift rightwards. This was reflected in the Council's 1989 Development
Profile. The front cover boasted that Genniston was "the Republic's sixth largest
city - situated at the centre of the Witwatersrand" (Germistnn City Council,
1989). This irnplicit geography was explained further by the 1992 Structure Plan:
"die stad is tussen die Sentraal Witwatersrand en die Oosrand gete"9 (Genniston
City Council, 1992, p.15). The report continued further: "die sterk ekonomiese
skakeling wat Gerrniston met beide die Sentraal Witwatersrand en met die
Oosrand het, maak duldelike indeling van Genniston by een van die twee
substreke moeilik"10 (Ibid., p,15). While this concern assumed that both the
Central Witwatersrand and the East Rand would pursue Metropolitan options,
8 These remarks come from numerous informal drives with my father, Clive Chipkin, author of
Johannesburg Style: Architecture and Society 1880 's - 1960 's ( David Philip Publisher's, Cape Town).
9 Translated as: "the city lies between the Central Witwatersrand and tl-- last Rand"
10 Translated as: "Germiston's strong economic dealings with the Cenual Witwatersrand and the East Rand
makes the straightforward inclusion of Translated as: "the city lies between the Central Witwatersrand and
the East Rand"
IU Translated as: "Germiston's strong economic dealings with the Central Witwatersrand and the [<1StRand
makes the straightforward inclusion of Genniston in one of the two substructures difficult".
----~-----------------------------
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Germiston rejected association with either areas. Instead it saw itself at the
intersection of both regions. By 1995 this had changed slightly. The structure
plan for that year commented that: "Greater Germiston represents an integral
component in the G luteng region ...", (Germiston City Council, 1995, p, 9). While
the "spatial orientation" tactfully omitted a mention of either regional conurbation,
the plan, nonetheless, ac:knowledged the "significant influence" (Ibid., p.11) of,
what it called the Greater Germiston functional region: Alberton,
Germiston/BedlOrdview, Kempton Park, Edenvale, Benoni and Boksburg; a
functional area, it agreed, that "was defined as the East Rand" (Ibid., p.11). This
semantic equivocation reflected Germiston's growing sense of unease.
As South African manufacture began to stagnate during the 1980's, the 'East
Rand' was severely affected. A report by BMI Building Research Strategy
Consulting Unit noted that the sub-region's growth rate had declined from 5,3%
between 1970 and 1980 to little over 1% in the following decade11. T li~reduced
tne contribution of the area to South Africa as a whole from 8,52% in 1981 to
7,73% in 1988 (Ibid., p.12). In this context Germiston became worried by its
status as a predominantly industrial area. The 1990/91 Budget Speech
complained that slower economic growth restrained expenditure on key strategic
projects. Indeed, there was growing concern that the city could no longer rely on
its industrial sector to sustain growth into the future (Germlston City Council,
Budget Speech, 1990/9'1).
This was paralleled by generaiised feelings of social malaise. A survey
conducted by the Eastern Gauteng Services Council found that residents of
Germiston were by far the least satisfied with their environment (ERRSC, 1991,
The Need for the Rendering of Services at the Regional Level), They
complained of loud noises, bad air quality and a lack of facilities for public
recreation. In contrast with residents of Boksburg and Alberton, many citizens of
the town remarked that they would prefer to live in a neighbouring authority. So
whereas in the past, G~\rmiston had relied on its vibrant industrial profile to
compensate for environmental defects, economic stagnation quickly highlighted
11 The Region was defined as: Alberton, Bedfordview, Benoni, Boksburg, Brakpan, Edenvale, Genniston,
Kempton Park and Springs.
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these drawbacks. This was becoming increasingly apparent to the Council.
Indeed, the strucnno plan for 1992 recognised that: "As gevolg van die
dominante nywerheidskarakter het die dorp swak beeld as woondorp"12 (City
Council of Germiston, 1992, p.16).
Growing public disenchantment and structural economic stagnation required
from the Council a new strategy to urban government. That is, it needed to
develop policies for the future that no longer privileged the industrial sector. This
was by no means easy. The local authority was still deeply affected by its former
status in the apartheid dlsoeosatlon. Simply put: local authorities were entrusted
with the technical provision of services Within their area. They were not allowed
to develop policy. Responsibility for the latter fell to the regional arm of the
central government; and in particular to the Transvaal Provincial Association
(TPA). In this regard councillors could exercise their preferences within a
framework. They could not develop the framework itself. ihe neglect of strategic
planning was also compounded by Germiston's prolonged reliance on its
industrial sector. This meant that planning in the past had been a fairly
bureaucratic task related to maximizing technical aspects of the industrial
environment. In 1986 the Council, nonetheless, convened a workshop to
determine a long and short-term agenda for planning. There is evidence to
suggest that the gathering was largely influenced by Germiston's consultants:
the company Van deer Stiff, Baileys, Greece and Drupe. The result of these
sessions was a notion of the "balanced city" (Interview with Caetzee, Maria,
Germiston 7/8/95). Balance here refe.red not to inequalities between "black"
and "white" residential areas, but to Germiston's asymmetrical reliance on
industry. Indeed, faced with economic stagnation (and potentially even decline),
the Council was interested in a strategic framework that no longer relied chiefly
on its industrial base. New thinking suggested that Germiston should moderate
its industrial image, by encouraging other sectoral growth.
The 1990/91 Budget Speech, for example, prioritised municipal spending for the
Central Business District. Large shopping complexes in neighbouring
12 Translated as: "As a result of'its dominant industrial character, the town has a bad image as a residential
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municipalities reduced the de!;irability of the town centre as a prime shopping
area. In 1990 this meant that the retail sector was not just underdeveloped but
was in decline. The Structure Plan for that year, therefore, requested substantial
investment for the 'renewal' of the inner city. Central to these plans was the
construction of the 'Golden Walk' - e: large shopping mall in the middle of town.
Associated with this strategy where plans to 'beautify' ("aesthetically renew") the
CBD, build a public library in town, expand parking facifities and improve road
access to the centre. (City Council of Germiston, 1990).
If the rejuvenation of the CBD was regarded integral to 'balance', so too where
residential improvements. Germiston planners provided for 'green belts' to shield
homes from the noxious smells and noises of nearby industrial areas. In
addition, deslqns were discussed to transform Germiston Lake into a prestigious
office park and hotel complex. This scheme was intended to create both an
attractive business address as welf as draw some of the overnight, international
tourist-trade away from Kempton Park. Many of these plans were superseded by
subsequent events. The lifting of influx control in 1986, for example, quickly saw
vacant the land occupied by homemakers from all over the region. This quickly
put paid to plans for expenditure on suburban improvement in these areas.
If unexpected events interrupted Council plans, others partly realised them. As
the political transition began to change the shape and jUrisdiction of local
authorities, Germiston lobbied vigorously for the inclusion of Bedfordview in its
area. When this was achieved it gave to Germiston, not just prestigious
residential areas, but also a prime site of retail and commercial activity: the
Eastgate shopping complex. When combined these plans where intended to
realise balance in the urban morphology; wher~ balance referred to the growth of
other economic sectors.
These development priorities may also help explain Germiston's history of
(geographic) equivocation. The city council was reluctant to be part of a regIonal
conurbation that reduced its particular needs to the needs of an area generally. It
did not want to be politically subservient or financially obliged. Germiston may
still have been thinking of its leading-edge past. If not, then it was certainly
area".
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wanted to defend its sense of independence. If it was not the 'heart' of
Johannesburg, it did not regard itself just a suburb; or later a substructure, of a
Johannesburg metropole. The same applied to the East Rand. In this context
Germiston preferred an orientation that situated it at the intersection of two urban
regions: the Central Witwatersrand and the East Rand. As the transition
progressed and it looked less and less likely that an East Rand metropolitan
chamber would be formed, so Germiston increasingly defined its bearing relative
to these towns. Such a location seemed best to secure its status as an
independent city. And one, moreover. that pursued its own particular agenda.
A Shared Planning Vocabulary
If the 'compact' and 'balanced' city seemed to imply quite different priorities, they
nonetheless shared a conceptual framework. Both notions rested on a town
planning vocabulary that viewed urban (and rural) space as differentiated
patterns of homogenous 'land-use'. These were arranged in either sectoral
and/or corridor patterns so that a city, for example, was viewed as a complex of
land-use 'sectors' - residential, industrial, commercial, environmental and so on -
configured in sectors and somenmes corridors. The distinction between rural and
urban was thus sustained by distir,julshing between the type and scale of their
respective sectors: industrial, commercial, retail etc. in cities and predominantly
agricultural in the countryside.
Spatial planning, within this schema, was intended to integrate sectors in a form
that "maximised" their respective features, generated "mutually beneficial"
relationships and avoided "benefits" to the one at the expense of the other. What
remained ambiguous, however, were the political criteria on which planning was
premised. That is, within lhis spatial taxonomy, how was 'mutually beneficial',
'benefits' and so on measured? It was precisely the specificity of these criteria
that remained obscured by the EGSC methodolom'. Notions of 'compact' and
'balanced' spatial regimes may have shared a common commitment to
integration, but they nonetheless understood this term differently.
The 'compact' city was partially referenced to an urban application of
underdevelopment theory. If this analysis emphasised the political and economic
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separation of the city, 'com~elf more recently added a specifically spatial
dimension to the 'One-oity' thinking. It envisaged, for example, massive
infrastructural spending to physically 'integrate' African areas into the main body
of the city. This was a premised on a belief that physical separation did not
simply express apartheid legally and forma::,: but also produced unequal and
discriminatory access to other sectors ofthe city. That is, the marginal location of
African residential areas prohibitively raised the costs of travel, made access to
work opportunities distant and divorced these areas from the main retail and
commercial sectors.
Making use of the same spatial language, Germiston granted to the term
'integration' a different focus. In this regard, it referred not specifically to the
relationship between African areas and other land-use functions, but rather, to
the relationship between industrial sectors and others. If thinking referenced to
the 'compact city' gauged policies vis-a-vis the spatial separation of the apartheid
city, 'balance' measured plans against their potential contribution to economic
growth and also their effect on the quality of (non-industrial) land-use functions.
What is important to note is that the notion of 'balance' did not necessarily
exclude the 'compact city'. It was mostly a question of priorities. The physical
integration .of ('racially') segregated components, for example, would also
improve the quality of other land-use sectors vis-a-vis industry. And hence also
contribute to 'balance'. What differed where the criteria. 'Balance' hsd at the
back of its mind the primacy of economic growth. In this regard it seemed
entirely feasible to argue that 'balance' and 'compact' where merely separated by
time: two moments in a chronology of development. First economic growth and
secondly social/infrastructural spending. This may partly explain agreements
reached in principle for the then ESC's development framework. Officials from
Germiston may have supported such plans. But not as priorities,
The 'Complete' City
Whereas for the Germiston City Council, the history of the municipality was also
largely the history of industry. This was not the case in Boksburg. According to
the Council's centenary brochure, it was only after the Second World War that
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the town began to encourage industrial ventures. Prior to this "efforts had been
concentrated on residential and associated commercial areas" (Boksburg Town
Council: 1987(a) p. 6). While Council brochures quote industrialisation as a
'turning-point' it seems not to have been a mutually exclusive departure. The
Council also continued to pursue a pre-war interest in its suburban quality.
By the 'i980's, for example, the Council could boast that there where 20 000
proclaimed residential erven and "thousands more in the planning stage"
(Bokburg Town Council, A Century of Progress, p.18). These formed a 'close-
knit community' served by 'well-established' (Ibid!., p.18) schools, tertiary
institutions, 19 creches, kinderqartens and after-school cer'" In addition the
town was 'extremely proud' (Ibid., p.18) of its 1611aPrince \"._Jrge Stadium, 9
municipal tennis clubs, five municipal swimming pools, a 'splendid' 1H hole golf
course, a squash club, various bowling clubs and an ice-skating and roller-
skating rink. Boksburg Lake also remained a 'major attraction' (Ibid., p.19), not
only for the people of the town, but for residents from all over the Reef. And the
brochure continued ... What this meant together, according to the Council, was
that: "Boksburg [was] known for its pleasant living condltione". Above ali," it
added, the town "means happy living". "Magnificent green suburbs; shops to
cater for every conceivable need, conveniently close to Jan Smuts International
Airport and major markets, with a sophisticated road and rail network; [and]
superb recreation facilities" (Ibid., p.2). These qualities it claimed "represent the
good life for the discerning resident who is aware of the value of money" (Ibid.,
p.2).
Of course, these descriptions can mostly be dismissed as hype. What is
nonetheless interesting about them is the nature of the hype. They contain a
very different self~image to, say, the marketing puffery of Germiston. The latter
regarded itself chiefly as an industrial city seeking 'balance'. Boksburg, in
contrast, believed itself to be "in every sense of the word the complete town"
(Ibid., p. 22). It is interesting to note that even Reiger Park was depicted in these
terms.
These descriptions contained an implicit land-use policy: an attractive residential
town serviced by other sectors. Here the focus seemed to be the quality of the
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urban 'lifestyle' (lbid., p.21). If under apartheid this logic applied solely to 'white'
group areas ~ and to a lesser degree 'coloured' townships ~ there were no
conceptual hurdles from applying the notion of 'completion' to African areas as
well. This thinking seems to have accorded far better with notions of the
'compact' dty, than say, the 'balanced' city. 'Complete' and 'compact' potentially
shared a common object: the improvement of the urban environment for
residential usage. 'Integration' for both terms, therefore, referred to a similar
process: the proximity of certain land-use clusters to residential areas.
I have argued in this section that the failure to €;~tablish a form of third tier
government for the 'East Rand' as a whole was partly a result of opposition from
Boksburg, Alberton and Germiston. We have seen that at stake in this contest
were differing conceptions of the city and differing conceptions of local
government. In particular, I have argued that the local governments discussed
above sought to defend their particular conceptions of their role against one
garnered from the Reconstruction and Development Programme.
In the section that will fo:low I will suggest that this process was a) made
possible and b) reflected an ambiguity at the heart of the current formulation of
South African local government. It was made possible because the instinct to
grant political autonomy to third tier government enabled them to participate in
the very negotiations that would determine the institutional dispensation affecting
them, while at the same time it reflected that at stake in the process was the
very role that local governments should perform. We shall see, that is, that that
the current dispensation both wants leave political space for local government to
determine their own roles and to pre-define that role a prior. We shall see also
that this ambiguity is reconciled, today, by way of a certain theoretical maneuver
concerning the notion of autonomy.
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SECTION 4: THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The urban profiles discussed above have largely been gathered from readings of
brochures, structure plans, mission statements, interviews and so on. They
seldom appear today as explicit intentions. There may be two .ssons for this.
The first is implicit in the methodology of municipal planning Lilat never gave
expression explicitly to the politi( al values that informed spatial schemes. The
second reflects South Africa's apparent political consensus that sees most
institutions using, at least formally, the language and metaphors of the new
govemment. I will argue here that these factors have concealed a major political
rupture that has seen South African local government invested with a radically
new conception of its role.
It was common practice in South AfTica for town planning to be appended to the
Town/City Engineer's department. This meant that spatial design was usually
subordinate to the perceived technical requirements of the urban infrastructure.
In this regard, budgetary preferences privileged the engineering aspects of land
use integration and/or development. This institutional arrangemsnt. was not
accidental. It was allied to a certain understanding of municipal planning.
Until recently local governance was informed by a notion of 'blueprint' planning.
This posited an imaginary ideal13 that required munlclpal interventions to give it
expression. In this regard the realisation of the 'blueprint' was conceived as tne
technical manipulation of existing social, demographic and transport trends.
Town planners were expected to monitor land use patterns and develop
proposals to encourage developments that seemed likely to promote the ideal or
to discouraga those that did not. Annual municipal structure plans thus contained
detailed recommendations for each planning zone.
Following an international shift away from 'administration', however, blueprint
planning was replaced by 'the management approach' (Germiston Structure
Plan, 1995, p.4). The latter assumed that there was no direct correlation
between plan and execution. It did not presume that implementation followed
13 The supposed blueprint, however, seldom received explicit expression. Hence my circuitous
reconstruction of its implicit premises.
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from the technocratic application of plans. Rather, it implied that the process
should simultaneously accommodate (manage) delays and intenuptions. The
Germiston Struct ..re Plan for 1995 thus remarked: "the object [of the structure
plan]is to enable [k..::algovemment] to deal with pressing matters without losing
sight of long-term ... objectives ... It accepts that development is an incremental
process, and that the outcome of planning interventions are not always certain"
(Ibid., p.4). Moreover, it acknowledged that local govemr"lent '... does not have
absolute controi over land usage and development ...' As a result it
recommended that plan be used as "an overall development framework ... within
which current issues and concems can be addressed" (Ibid., p.4).
Whereas 'blueprint' planning was almost solely concerned with the end result,
'management' emphasised the method. It sought to accommodate (even
anticipate) potential disturbances to the process. Yet both town planning
approaches shared a common relation to the city. They both assumed the
political values that informed their tasks as a given. The 'management approach'
merely problematised the relationship between plan and execution. It did not
solicit discussion about the function of the city itself·. 'Blueprint' planning,
likewise, merely took for granted the political objectives that its technical
operations sought to realise. In this way, both concealed the political values that
informed local govemment functions, indeed displacing political conflicts away
from the sphere of the political - miraculously, as we have seen, everybody in
Boksburg, Alberton and Germiston apparently agreed on them - to other, more
technical, "a-political" domains. As a result we find in local govemments
generally just a superficial rehash of principles garnered from the upper reaches
of govemment, making, as we have seen so far, the ambiguities in South African
local government appear in the practical state. To find them expressed politically,
therefore, and to give them theoretical expression, we need to cast cur gaze, for
the moment, higher up the govemment hierarchy.
14 The management approach implies similar epistemological claims to Lenin's relation to the 'current
situation'. Lenin (in concept) treated the General Contradiction as given and tried merely to specify it illthe
conditions and circumstances of the conjuncture. In the same way, the management approach assumes the
concept of the city as given and tries merely to situate it in the current situation.
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The Meanil1g of the Political
During one or other public statement, Jay Naidoo then Minister in the Office of
the President (otherwise known as the office of the RDP}, referred to local
government as the hands and feet of the Reconstruction and Development
Programme. The metaphor meant that third tier government was responsible for
the delivery side of development plans arranged from his office.
On November 3 1995, his ministry released both an urban and rural
development strategy. What was important for our purposes was the role it
proposed for local government: "The primary responsibility of local authorities is
to ensure the delivery of services at a community level within an agreed planning
framework. In support of this, local authorities will be responsible for
development and physical planning as well as the preparation of s-vear
infrastructure investment programmes· (Urban Development Strategy, p.35).
In this regard delivery referred to the provision of basic services, planning spoke
of a technical guide to satisfy future 'needs' and infrastructure programmes
referred to investment strategies to finance further development. These
elements - delivery, planning and infrastructure - were intended to align the
bureaucratic capacity of the local state to the development imperatives of
regional frameworks.
The logic of the UDS was partly inherited from a tendency in the 'One City'
slogan. We have seen that the it stressed the common structure of urban
apartheid geography and by inference also the common experience of urban
residents vis-a-vis the city. I have already discussed the theoretical basis of this
link in my discussion of 'community' and NDR. It maintained that certain
objective interests resulted from these encounters that were the same across
South Africa. In government circles it ",';)'3 self-evident that urban policy be
designed nationally. The section @ed I~ 11'211 Re...lities' (UDS, 1995) argued that
the urban sector was characterisec oy SIX principal 'realities':
• four city size classes: large metropolitan, large cities, medium-sized cities,
small cities and towns
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G stark contrasts
• city centres under strain
• economic challenges
• links to rural areas
• urbanisation
As a result, the document suggested, urban development should "focus on
critical backlogs, the restoration of infrastructure services and the formation of
govemance capacities through effective government and vibrant civil society" in
the short term. In the medium term government would prioritise "cementing an
integrated package of planning, housing, infrastructure, economic development
and social policies and programmes" (Ibid., p. 10).
We can summarise the UDS as follows: The shared features of the South
African urban form were believed to determine certain development principles for
all Sout'l African cities. This logic was premised on the notion of experience
already discussed. In this regard objective material interests were believed to
issue from an experience of the real such that the real could later be configured
according i,') those interests. I am reminded here of Althusser's 'theoreticist error'
in Reading Capital, where he (and Balibar) attempted to determine the real
without reference to 'external
gene. 'ing system: experienr
government who realises th'
lriitions'. The UDS thus posited a self-
interests which are then processed by
There was an apparent ..Iy, however, in the above UDS reference. How
was the notion of civil so..., I reconciled with this logic? How was it reconciled
with the metaphor of 'hands and feet' mentioned earlier? We have already seen
that 'civil society' is deemed permanently outside the state precisely because its
multiple and diverse interests can never be represented by it. Has the UDS in
this way not returned to urban government the conditions? Does the reference to
'vibrant' civil society not imply that a certain autonomy will be accorded the city
precisely because no national policy can claim to articulate all local interests?
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In this regard it is important to notice the provisions of the Interim Constitution
and the Local Govemment Transition Act. They defined local authorities as
autonomous tiers of govemment entitled to manage their own affairs. The
Interim Constitution even went so far as to warn that "Parliament or a provincial
legislature shall not encroach on the powers, functi(J,1sand structure of the local
government to such an extent as to compromise [its] fundamental status,
purpose and character" Cnterim Constitution, Section 174(4». Some of these
statements were unclear. What, for example, was the 'fundamental status' of
local government? This is perhaps the crux of the question in South Africa. I
want to suggest this apparent anomaly is resolved cy way of a short-cut - or
rather, by way of a certain conception of democracy.
The 'autonomy' mentioned above usually referred to the operational
independence of local government. It was often synonymous with management
autonomy vis-a-vis the mechanics of decision-making, organisational structure
and finally, the mode of implementation. Simply put: autonomy was referenced to
the internal the workings of the institution and its means of service delivery etc. It
did not, however. refer to the choice of policy. Local government was 'free' to
determine its own mode of regulation and execution provided these
organisaticnal decisions were referenced vis-a-vis the Reconstruction and
Development Programme. This is how the term was mostly understood in South
Africa.
The 1990's have thus seen considerable effort to 'change manage' various
bureaucracies. The phrase - one of the key elements of the government's new
vocabulary - referred to the alignment of existing II.sututional capacities with the
values and policies of the new government. Organisational change, what is often
termed 'transformation', when applied to local government, usually referred to:
8> improving the authority of elected councillors vis-a-vis officials,
• affirmative action, and
• reconciling Council priorities with RDP principles
These elements were given causal unity in the following way: The negotiated
settlement reached at Kempton Park obliged the new government, including new
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local governments, to inherit officials from former local authorities. As a result
new structures were staffed with persons unfamiliar and sometimes even hostile
tc changed policies. Old officials also lacked the experience and the knowledge
€lffectively to implement prr.'jects premised on a new methodology: community
participation. Elected councillors were thus challenged by an 'old-guard'
bureaucracy that even if willing to act on council resolutions lacked the
knowledge and experience to do so. Affirmative action in the administration was
believed to resolve this tension. It was assumed that African officials had
interests in common with their political masters by virtue of their shared
experience of the 'apartheid' city. Together they shared objective concerns in the
new developmental imperatives of ~he RDP and other regional development
frameworks.
'Transformation' thus implied reconciling local capacity with national
development plans and/or national political imperatives. Local conditions referred
to the specific circumstances that needed to be 'handled' for the task at hand. It
was common, in .Ilis regard, to view them in terms of management-type
vocabularies. SWO-~- analyses were often popular. This method reduced the
'current situation' to Opportunities and Threats in the 'external environment' and
Strengths and Weaknesses in institutional procedures and structures. All these
variables were measured impliCitly against the fundamental purpose of local
govemment: in the words of the UDS, service delivery and infrastructural
development. This is how the apparent anomaly between autonomy and agency
was resolved. The former referred to the intemal management of the
organisation to realise developmental imperatives determined elsewhere.
We are now in a better position to give meaning to the term 'local democracy' as
it is used in South Africa. When local government delivers municipal services
and executes infrastructural development projects it is believed simultaneously
to realise the general will. In this sense there is no contradiction between local
govemment's technocratic function and its ostensibly democratic appointment.
Indeed, its technocratic function is its democratic mandate. We have already
seen tile theoretical conditions of this reconciliation: the 'apartheid city' is
believed to share a common form that produces common experiences of the
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city. These, in tum, issue shared urban political interests that are the task of
democratic government to realise. When local government thus satisfies these
interests in practice it simultaneously fulfills its democratic mandate,
This notion of democracy does make another small concession to the
'conditions'. It accepts implicitly that there are variations in each city. The latter,
however, refer to the detail of the urban morphology rather than its structure. As
a result the content of the general will, although similar iT) principle, varies
circumstantially. In this regard local governments do not know the detail of
infrastructural needs or the order of development priorities in advance. They
must be determined locally. This is how 'community-dtiven-development' has
come to be understood.
In their original formulation Local Development Forums and Community
Development Forums were to intended to exercise a watchdog role over local
government (Swilling, 1990). It was believed that they were embryonic organs of
'people's power' that operated on ths basis of 'direct democracy'. In so doing, it
was claimed, LDF's and COP's would vitiate against the inherent class and race
prejudice of representative democracy by monitoring and opposing any racial-
class bias in the workings of local government As the transition progressed,
however, so their independent function was gradually eroded and they were
seemingly appropriated for representative democracy. That is, forums have
mostly been reduced to advisory bodies for when local government determines
,[S priorities for development expenditure.
Local government is thus believed to discharge its democratic responsibility by
consulting the community directly to ascertain local development needs. They
are deemed to be doubly democratic when they a) determine priorities through
community participation and b) implement the general will by delivering services
and providing capital infrastructure. The capture of LOP's et a/ for representative
democracy, however, is only superficial. Indeed, it sometimes looks like
representative democracy has been captured by 'people's power'. In this regard,
South African local government sometimes resembles democratic bodies
envisaged by classical Marxism.
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In Civil War in France Marx used the phrase 'universal franchise' and invoked
the principle of 'immediate recall'. This was taken to mean that democratic
practice in classical Marxism resembled features of liberal democratic theory.
Both were premised on elections, electoral mandates and accountability. As
Althusser would say: all that the two systems shared in common, however, was
a loose collection of phrases. Voting in liberal democratic theory and in classical
Marxism related in radical!y different ways to the general will. Whereas for the
former elections periodically adjudicated between competing notions of the
public good, for Marx and later Lenin, they merely selected personnel to
implement an already given notion of the general will.
South African conceptions of local government sometime coincide with this last
meaning. Indeed, this is the implication. I have suggested, of the metaphor of
'hands and feet'. As Fl result the role often given to local govemment obscures
another meaning for 'autonomy': the possibility that local govemments try to give
their own content to the urban torrr It means further that 'autonomy' as
guaranteed in the Interim Constitution may have referred to quite different
processes. It is likely that it meant simply that local governments had the right to
manage the implementation of policy without interference; that is, develop
modes of execution that paid cognisance to local conditions. But it may have
also meant something different: the right of local govemment to determine its
own political role and function.
If the meaning of autonomy was opaque in the Interim Constitution it was easier
to estimate its meaning in the language of regional frameworks. There it tended
to reduce the role of local government to technocratic funcflons vis-a-vis
implementation. It did not refer to the relative political space of local government
to give autonomous political meaning to its urban jurisdiction. This is the site of
the equivocation in South Africa. Does policy simply refer to management? Does
it simply detail measures to improve the capacity of the local state to implement
national priorities? Or does policy, in addition, imply the formulation of local
political agendas. The term policy may itself be symptomatic of this wavering. It
conflates two related but distinct processes under the same word: management
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autonomy and political autonomy. Recognising the difference between them
allows us to better understand the terms of a much wider debate.
Relative Autonomy
Associated with the general failure of the African state to realise policy there has
been growing interest in decentralisation. This is not.a term widely used in South
Africa. It is often displaced by debates about 'federalism'. Viewed from the rest of
Africa, however, South African local government is highly devolved. What is
Interesting about the ambiguity discussed above is that it mirrors tensions in the
practice of decentralisation more generally. In this regard decentralisation has
two possibilities.
• the decentralisation of administrative/technical responsibilities such that
implementation of State/regional policies can take cognisance of local
conditions; or
• the decentralisation of political responsibility such that the local territory is
associated with autonomous political practlcests.
Koffi Attahi, a Ghanaian academic, remarks that decentralisation encompasses:
delegation, privatization and de-regulation (Attahi, p.24). In addition, he argues, it
sometimes confuses administrative decentralisation or deconcentration and
political decentralisation or devo,lution. Deconcentration and devolution are not
simply management autonomy and political autonomy more elegantly re-stated.
But they help better to distinguish between them.
15 These possibilities may also help illuminate differences in South African conceptions of 'federalism'. The
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) sometimes implies that the Province under its jurisdiction is the site of'certain
political practices that require partly autonomous expression. Since 1990, for example, the lFP has to some
extent sought to build a territorial base on Kwazulu-Natal's chiefs. The 1990 Arnakhosl and
Iziphakanyiswa Act, for example, provided for the remuneration of'traditional leaden, by the Chief
Minister. This was aligned to what was called in October 1995 at a demonstration in Pretoria' African-type
direct democracy'. It is nol clear exactly what this meant. It may have referred to the pitsa. That is, an
historical practice that apparently saw every male person of age attend a consultative gathering to review
ChiciJy decisions. lnkatha's more recent support for chiefly local authorities suggests that for the IFP,
federalism (ambiguously) refers to the recognition of Zulu political practices. This is sometimes allied to the
slogan: 'bringing democracy closer to the peopie', Is it assumed that a federal provincial system will partly
herald in African traditional forms? This qu» 'ion is obscured by the presence (at the same time) of aI'other
conceptual register. One that appeals to the uecentrn1isation of national powers Onthe basis of better
government. That is, granting Provincial governments greater independence so that they may take
cognisance of local needs and conditions. Ironically, there is significant ANC provincial approval for such a
conception.
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Attahi quotes deconcentration as: "the organisation of the central
administration's activities outside the seat of government, taking place either
through administrative measures allowing for the transfer of resources and
responsibilities to agents appointed by the central administration, or through
political means allowing for the attribution by the government powers, of
responsibilities and of resources specific to local administrative authorities" (Ibid.,
p.27). Deconcenfratlon thus refers to the transfer of decision and implementation
to elected leaders in local and/or regiOMI qovernments, Devolution, in contrast,
means the temporary transfer of authority from the central administration to
external agencies for specific tasks (Ibid., p.28). In this regard, devolution and
deconcentration share a common relation to national political imperatives: they
are both means of realising state objectives 'outside the seat of government'.
Attahi remarks: 'ihe approach focusing on the state (deconcentration) [is] rooted
in the principle that the state is the only proper guarantor of the public interest"
(Ibid., p.28). In contrast, devolution implies that local, private and community-
based initiatives are better able to accommodate local preferences. Devolution is
thus similar to the South African meaning of 'comrnunity-criven-developrnent',
'Vhat is important to note is that devolution and deconcentration share a
common criterion. They are both measured vis-a-vis the req\isation of the 'public
good', where the latter is detc-rnined nationally. The only difference between
them is that deconcentration locates responsibility for the execution of policy in
the local agents and decentralisation transfers that function to local institutions.
What is not in dispute, however, is the very substance of 'public good' itself.
This is how the term is mostly understood. Associated with the failure of African
states (and states in the so-called developing world in particular) to realise policy
objectives on the ground, there has been a growing interest in decentralisation.
Indeed, at the time of writing this paper the United Nations Development
Programme had just commissioned a 10 country study in this regard. UNDP
were interested in decentralisation as a means to "build a strong foundation for
sustainable human development by improving the capabilities of local
institutions, reducing the ccsts of governance an enabling environment for the
development of social capital (UNDP, 1997). It remarked further that:
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"decentralization (sic) is considered ... one of the most appropriate responses to
excessive centralization (sic), inefficient and ineffective public sectors, and the
failure of the state and its institutions to build a sustainable basis for participation
(ibid., 1997). These sorts of studies take as giVt:,..lexactly what this paper wants
to problematise. It assumes, that is, that the problem of the 'third world' state is
the inability of their national governments to execute their plans.
The very idea, however, that the national government is the sole guarantor of
the public interest is premised on the essentialist philosophy explored earlier. It
rests on the assumption (explicit in both Black Consciousness and the theory of
National Democratic Revolution) that the political task at hand is to address the
primary social experience. We saw that for BC this entailed white domination
that following Hegelian principles required 'black unity' as its antithesis. The
theory of NOR identified the primitive logic of capitalism as the truth of apartheid.
In both cases the soclal totality' was defined by a certain essential experience. It
followed that this be addressed in the national state because a) the politicsl
forces in question struggled for exclusive control in the same political territory
and b) the social experience was deemed a national experience". Moreove:, if
the social was a phenomena of an essential experience and the experience itself
was a national one then it followed that there were common national political
interests.
Hirst suggests, for example, that the great left-right opposition that Axhausted
the political topography until recently was premised on 'one great question':
whether the predominant type of property relation would be private property or
collective ')wnership (Hirst., 1994, p.1). He notes, that is: "Within the nation
state's exclusive control of its territory, subject to a single sovereign political will,
and to a coherent system of national administration, there could be but 'one'
policy" (Ibid., p. 8) (my emphasis). Critical of such thinking, Hirst argues today
that "new poiitical forces are too diverse, too concerned with different issues, to
be placed on a single spectrum" (ibid., p.9). By way of example he explains that
1GThisreasoning is certainly 110trestricted to the national state. The premise of'Pan-Africanism was the
continental nature of the coloma! experience that required pan-african unity. The same applied to the
International Communist movement. Capitalism as a global system required international revolutionary
solidarity as a condition of its defeat,
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"[t]here are new types of nationalist and regional autonomist parties, and ethnic
and religiously-based campaigns. There are also new forms of politics centred
on resistance to racism, gender issues, the environmental question and on
llfestytes" (ibid., p,9). As a result Hirst concludes that: "new political problems
and new social expectations are ill-accommodated by the old party systems ...
and the traditional parties of both left and right..." (ibid., p.9). They are unable to
represent 01' even manage diverse interests issuing from a radically expanded
political terrain.
This concem is similar to Castells' worry that institutional (or party) Marxism
lacked a concept to grasp the 'social movements' of the 1960's and 1970's. That
is, left politics was fixated on the state and the issue of property to the virtual
exclusion of everything else. Hirst rejects monist conceptions of politiCS that
reduce it to 'one big question'. Although, Associative Democracy is a popular
text and polemical in nature it is premised on a anti-essentialist philosophy which
Hirst has expressed elsewhere (see Hirst, P (1985) Marxism and Historical
Writing. Routledge and Paul Kegan Ltd: London.). Both Castells and Hirst take
the Althusserian defeat of the classical notions of 'experience' and 'interests' as
their starting points. They reject (Hirst explicitly and Castells in practice) the
reduction of the social 'totality' to a Single experience that can be stated in
advance and they disavow the Marxist 'faith that issued objective political
interests from the experience. In so doing they multiplied the political terrain.
Castells gave to political theory the city. Hirst has gone so 'far in this regard that
he today favours ceding certain traditional state functions to voluntary and
democratically self-governing associations. (ibid., p.21).
The expansion of the political field, however, does not mean simply that there
are numerous interests, values and political objectives that cannot
simultaneously be represented in the state. This is how classical liberal theory
mostly interpreted plurality. It accommodated political surplus in a multi-party
system; and today more and more through the notion of 'civil-society'. In other
words it retained a monist conception of the political and the social where
competition is addressed to the national state to give expression to a changed
political conception nationally. In the aftermath 0'( so-called totalizing ideologies,
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of political discourses that reduce the social 'totality' to phenomenon of an
essence, however, it is impossible to expect all political values, interests and
objectives to be addressed by the national state. This would be homologous to
Althusser's self-confessed 'theoreticist error': generating the real nationally from
national policy,
The very authority of the national state and its sovereign jurisdiction over a
national territory rested on the application of various essentialist philosophies to
the boundaries of historically contingent units. That is, each territory was
mythologised as the expression of some or other experience. Former colonies,
for example, celebrated their independence and freedom from colonial
domination generally and their peculiar experience in particular. States of the
former Soviet Union often seceded on the basis of their ostensibly shared
language, culture, religion, and, moreover, their common oppression by RUssia.
German unification was celebrated as the final victory of a German, European,
humanist tradition over the aberrations of nazism and communism. Serbian
military aggression was premised on a complaint of supposedly long-standing
ethnic oppression and victimisation at the hands of nazis and later Croats. What
these recently formed (or reformed) states did was apply a political logic,
sedimented earlier this century by political and economic precedents, to new
spatial units. From the late nineteenth century, that is, the nation state became
the centre of social welfare provision, and from the 1930's the locus of effective
macro-economic management (ibld., p.6). Two world-wars furthermore
sfimulated the growth towards centralisation and reinforced the sense that only
the nation state could martial, coordinate and mobilise all the resources
necessary to guarantee 'national survival' (ibid., p.6). The durability of the
'nation-state' was thus premised on three elements: an essentialist philosophy
that reduced the social to a single experience, and the application of this logic to
a territorial unit under the precedents of economic management and military
defense/offense.
It is not the intention here to debate the whether the changed conjuncture -
economic global;~ation and the end of the cold war - makes the nation state as
we know it obsolete. That discussion is beyond the range of this paper. What
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can be said, however, is that a non-essentialist philosophy subverts (in concept)
practices that give automatic primacy to the central state. We have seen also
that the accomplice of such a philosophy is the notion of relative autonomy. Not
decentralisation. Not deconcentration. We are not dealing here with more
effective means of realising the national will. This is precisely the difference
between management and political autonomy. The first is referenced vis-a-vis
the execution of the 'general interest'. The second speaks of a limited space to
determine the 'public good' autonomously".
In South Africa attention remains mostly fixed on national government and its
political interests. Indeed, any contrary tendency has been fiercely resisted".
Skepticism of political autonomy may also be symptomatic of apartheid state
loqlc, where so much of the social seemed determined by national policy and
national political interventions. I want now to demonstrate the persistence and
durability of this logic by considering local govemment responses in the
aftermath of fighting in Katlehong, Tokoza and Vosloorus (KATORUS). Despite
the 'unique' conditions of civil conflict in KATORUS local govemments persisted
with policies determined by national development imperatives.
The following section will not simply try to demonstrate the irreducibility of the
local to national political processes - by demonstrating the interruption of
specifically local and contingent processes in the unfolding of national events -
but more importantly, it will attempt to outline the factors making it difficult,
indeed impossible, to appropriate to the conception of local government
discussed, the political situation in KATORUS. I will argue there that whereas the
latter assumes the iterpellatlon of its municipal subjects as national-democratic
subjects (that is, as members of the community), which justifies predefining its
democratic tasks vis-a-vis the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the
17 A notion ofa general interest is not necessarily premised on essentialism. It can be construed in
diachronic and contingent terms. Rejecting the notion of 'objective' interests, that is, does not mark a
retreat towards or into radical individualism. It remains possible to assume relations of social equivalence.
What becomes impossible is to generate equivalence ontologically.
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wares) in Katlehong, Tokoza and Vosloorus is the proof exactly of the limit of
such an assumption. In other words, I will argue that the conflict in KATORUS
was in part provoked by the refusal of hostel dwellers to submit to a pOlitical
definition (and hence political campaigns) that reduced them merely to bearers
of a national oemocratlc task. They refused, in other words, to treated as
members of +he community, as defined via the Theory of National Democratic
Revolution.
18 This is manifest not simply in the antagonism between the ANC and the IFP over federalism. It is
apparent also in the dismissal of Patrick Terror Lekota as premier of the Free State and the virtua1
appointment of Ivy Matsepe Cassaburi in his plar \; hat was being opposed by the ANC in this case was
the potential of the premiers to exercise some pu ...cal independence from national party headquarters. The
same logic applied when national At'lC the Northern Province branch to appoint Ngoako Ramatlhodi as its
chairperson. In this case the Province was defiant. The moves were widely interpreted as attempts by the
ANC to retain control from the centre.
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SECTION 5: KATORUS
Katlehong, Tokoza and Vosloorus together form a zone of African residential
settlements positioned on surplus and marginal land on the Southern edge of
what was then the E; Rand conurbation. Their close proximity - framed
together in the West by the R26 freeway and cut transversally in the East by the
N3 highway to Durban - formed a logical unit for urban planners in the then East
Rand Administration Board and later the Transvaal Provincial Administration.
Sometime during the 1980's the acronym KATORUS was coined. It combined
tile first two letters of Katlehong and Tokoza and the last three letters of
Vosloorus. If the expression's origin is somewhat banal, as violence escalated in
the three townships from August 1990, the term 'KATORUS' was used to
express South Africa's most bloody urban fighting in decades, if not ever.
Indeed, fighting in these areas achieved so common an association between
them that the term today barely speaks of their perceived functional integration.
But rather, and more importantly, (If their common bloody-minded ness.
Taxonomies of Violence
An ominous metaphor was frequently repeated in the KATORUS area. It
opposed 'the forces of darkness' to a VUlnerable and precarious site of
'community'. In many espects this analogy gave expression to a profound
anxiety: what many (and the media in particular) referred to as the
'senselessness' of the East Rand war. Combatants seemed to lack reasonable
motive. No-one was clearly an aggressor. Everyone claimed to be acting in 'self-
defense' or 'self-protection'. The 'forces of darkness' were not just pernicious,
they were usually anonymous and unintelligible.
In such confusion, tre identity of the 'enemy' was sourced from a variety of
places: nascent images from the area itself, media stories that confirmed or
·esonated with existing stereotypes; perceived obstacles to political mobilization;
potentially even the rumours of a 'third force'. So the enemy became: 'hostel
residents' or 'the township' or 'the youth' or 'Zulus' or 'not Zulus' or 'the ANC' or
the 'IFP' - depending on the terms of the reference. And yet even these
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categories were at best vague and imprecise. In the absence of marked,
identifiable attackers, mere membership of an alleged enemy group sufficed.
Hence, all hostel residents were deemed the aggressors, or all township youth
etc. And yet the sociological status of a person within this taxonomy was not
always self-evident. As a result, various techniques (usually remarkably esoteric)
were used to discover the 'benign' or 'malicious' quality of the person in question.
It is explained, for example, that people were routinely questioned for obscure
Zulu words that would indicate to the examiner their identity as an 'authentic'
Zulu-speaker or not. In which case, depending on the desired result, the
interviewee might be murdered.
What is also significant is that almost all parties denied their alleged definition in
the various taxonomies of war. So former SDU commanders vehemently
repudiated their alleged status as ANC soldiers, hostel dwellers outrightly
rejected claims that they occupied some marginal (and hostile) position relative
to the "township" or that hostels where places of "Zulu" or even IFP refuge.
Indeed, almost all protagonists laid claim to their membership of the "community"
as a whole, and denied the particuiarist agendas or sociology implied of them
One former SDU commander {Fi . Katlehong 13/9/96) thus explained: that apart
from the military (para-military) function of the units, they were charged primarily
with the responsibility of .rying to identify attackers. This was more than a
military-logistical requirement. It indicated the quite profound mystification
experienced by combatants. Who were they supposed to defend or protect
themselves against? Who was attacking the "community" ?
If this generalised mystification seems to give greater credence to the
widespread belief in the 'third force' it fails to explain how conspiratorial agents
where able to generate and sustain large-scale fighting - uniess tht;y provoked
an already existing propensity for conflict, and hence encouraged already
present myths and stereotypes.
It is perhaps worth mentioning too, as an introductory remark, that many of these
taxonomies of war were variously realised, not because they spoke of a basic
tension or antagonism that definitively explained the fighting, but because during
the war they were sometimes believed to be true and hence became, if you like,
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selt-fulfilllnq, In an environment where the medium of communication was the
rumour imagined groups actually became the adversary. Hostels were attacked,
first language Zulu speakers were killed, suspected members of either the ANC
or the IFP were murdered, and so on.
For example, when in June 1992, SAN CO organised a march against rent
increases; one that would proceed along the notorious I<humalo Street in
Tokoza, past hostels 1,2 and 3, rumours were heard that hostel dwellers
planned to fire on the demonstration. These reports allegedly came at a time
when planning and organisation for the event was already advanced (apparently
too advanced to postpone the event or even change the route). As a result many
supporters, on the day of the march, carried with them various weapons.
Convarsely, the preparation and route of the march suggested to many hostel
residents that the protest would be used as cover for an attack by militant youth.
Rumours of guns merely confirmed their worries. Predictably, on the day of the
demonstration, armed marchers confronted armed hostel residents. In the
ensuing battle several people were killed. I believe that this incident was a
turning point. It transformed the conflict from a localised clash in and around
Phola Park into a generalised war affecting the whole of KATORUS. This shall
be explored in greater detail later. For our purposes what is important is the self-
fulfilling terms of the conflict: enemies that were mati'~ true by rumo.,;
If the reason for the war remained unclear to even combatants, other than as a
vague will to defend the 'community', this was true for it'e local authorities
adjacent to the KATORtJS area and as well. For research purposes, moreover,
existing taxonomies tended to be unhelpful. Too many 'exceptions' subverted
the host of simple binary oppositions that variously served as explanations: ones
that posited a rurally inclined hostel culture against a highly politicised urban
youth experience, or opposed Zulu men against either Xhosa~speakers, or
against a generically undefined 'township'; and/or which reduced the contlict to
an omniscient and omnipotent 'third force', and/or which saw in the war an
attempt by the ANC to consolidate its support (or assert its hegemony) in
preparation for CODESA, or altematively saw the Inkatha Freedom Party seek
to end Its parochial association only with KwaZulu/Natal by aggressively
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mobilising outside its traditional domain in order to assert its status as a truly
national political party.
What follows is a discussion of the fighting as an accumulation of conflicts, I will
suggest that the sense of an ANC-IFP conflict or any other simple explanation
functioned as a myth, Not in the ',:>lIoquial sense that it was somehow imaginary,
but rather in the sense that it suosumed all other antagonisms and dislocations
to its terms,
Gestural Observations
There has been very little research on the KATORUS fighting. An article was
written by Meshack Khosa on the taxi violence and its association with the 'war'.
The Goldstone Commission heard several thousand pages worth of testimony
but this was never edited into a report. The HSRC produced a compilation of
work by several researchers" which, unfortunately, were written at a time when
access to the area was hazardous - if not impossible. As a result many of these
papers contain gestural observations and more usually simply repeat
stereotypes prevalent at the time. It is nonetheless worth reviewing some of this
material. Despite its scarcity and often tentative explar tions it has received
fairly widespread currency.
One of the most endUring mt,hs about the East Rand war in particular, and the
Reef conflict in general is the notion of 'isolated' hostel residents (Minnaar, 1993)
antagonised by an urban township community. In this regard, fighting between
these parties is treated as the consequence of a long-standing animosity.
Anthony Minnaar, for example, has argued that Influx control and migrant labour,
in effect, generated a cultural animus in many South African townships. "[H]ostel
residents ... drawn from the rural poor, largely from homeland areas ... [came] to
the cities as unskilled workers usually starting off as cleaners and night
watchmen or in other low-paid menial jobs. Many, despite their years in the city,
18 (1993) Communities in Isolation: perspectives on hostels in South Africa, edited by Anthony
Minnar (PretOria, Human Sciences Research Council)
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[spoke] little or no english. They tended to be looked down upon and scorned by
the more sophisticated township residents" (Minnaar, p.27) "This has come
about", M!nnaar suggests, "with increasing urbanisation whereby the lifestyles of
township residents have become more sophisticated and their links with rural
areas ever more tenuous (sic)" (Ibid, p, 28). Minnaar continues: community
amenities were often denied to hostel residents because they were not seen as
permanent members of the community but rather as temporary sojourners. They
were often accused by township inhabitants of interfering with local girls. In
addition, he suggests, youths dUring the 1980's and early 1990's were 'envious'
of hostel dwellers for their jobs and hence their income. In addition hostels
attracted informal economic activity including shebeens, prostitution and drug-
dealing which earned them the stigma of 'immorality' and 'depravity'. In this
atmosphere "hostel residents perceive[d] themselves as being unloved and
despised ...u (Ibid;, p. 30). This was due, Minnaar argues, to a feeling that they
had "borne the brunt of social and political insult of a hostile urban environment
for many years (sic)" (Ibid" p.36). As a result recreational and/or sporting
activities tended to remain secluded from wider community involvement.
Moreover, hostel beer halls "discouraged any social contact between hostel
residents and township inhabitants" (Minnaar, p.36) because the former were
patronised exclusively by hostel residents.
Minnaar locates political animosity and the violence itself in precisely this cultural
tension. He remarks: "since their contact with surrounding communities was
minimal hostel residents were usually the last to know about any major
community decisions such as stayaways, consumer boycotts or days of
mourning ...". As a result "hostel residents bec[ame] the victims of angry groups
of township youths trying to ensure that stayaways or boycotts were observed ..."
These confrontations 'inevitably' led to violent clashes that would themselves
"escalate into revenge or retaliatory attacks ...". "In this way", Minnaar concludes,
"the seeds of lasting ill-feeling and violence were sown between the rurals' and
the 'urbanites" (Ibid.. pAD). When various organisations were unbanned in 1990
"there were persistent public calls by civic and political leaders at rallies that
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hostel residents should vacate hostels to make way for [political] exiles". "Hostel
residents resented these calls and organised to resisL.". (Ibid., p.41)
This is the coup de grace of Minnaar's argument. It rests on the following
syllogism. There has been a long-standing cultural tension between hostel
residents and township inhabitants. In 1990, civics, the ANC and other alliance
partners organised in the townships. In so doing they gave political expression to
this animosity. If Minnaar's particular causal link is perhaps tenuous - the
evacuation of hostel residents for political exiles - he repeats a popular logical
sequence. That is, the war is explained as the politicisation of a long-standing
cultural difference.
Minr.Jar ostensibly even goes some way in explaining the apparent ethnic
semblance of fighting. Whereas in the Transkei, land available for agricultural
production was widely devastated, in the homeland areas of Zululand and Natal
the same did not equally apply, As a result many Trankein migrants began
leaving their homesteads permanently - many bringing their wives with them.
Single-sex hostel accommodation was thus no longer suitable for these persons.
Many began to settle, instead, in informal settlements often adjacent to hostels.
In contrast, land in KwaZulu-Natal remained capable of sustaining settlement.
Zulu-speaking migrant workers thus continued to vacillate between their urban
hostel lifestyle and their family homesteads in KwaZulu-Natal. If this perhaps and
partly explains 'changes in the ethnic composition of hostels' - the title of one of
Minnaar's sections - it does not explain why fighting happened between these
protagonists. EVen if one concedes that the sociology of these groups did not
itself cause fighting, but rather gave the conflict such an appearance after it had
already begun, Minnaar does not explain what tile antagonism between these
groups was.
This is thE:lsite of an explanatory lapse. He argues that tre Reef war began as a
struggle between 'squatter' settlements and hostel dwellers. In August 1990, for
example, an offensive attack and subsequent retaliation between inhabitants of
Phola Park (an informal settlement in Tokoza) and the nearby hostels resulted in
the spread of fighting - primarily to the neighbounng townships of Katlehong and
Vosloorus. Given the ethnic sociology of the original clash (Xhosa-speakers in
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the 'squatter settlement and Zulu-speakers in the hostels) fighting was
subsequently politicised when Zulu-speakers were associated with Inkatha.
Given this political identification, non-Inkatha hostel residents were subsequently
targeted for expulsion - especially those speaking Xhosa. The latter "sought
refuge in the surrounding squatter settlements (such as Phola Park) and the
conflict soon became one between youths (ANC-aligned comrades and self
oefence units) supported by township inhabitants and IFP supporters backed by
Zuiu-speakinq -speaking hostel residents" (Ibid., p.4~\ There at least two
contradictions in this explanation.
Given Minnaars earlier (culturalist) description of the tension between townships
and hostels it is difficult to understand the hostility between the latter and
informal settlements. According to Minnaar squatter areas were themselves
populated by forrner hostel residents - ones who presumably har! a secluded
relationship to the rest of the township as well. What then was the source of the
antagonism between them? This explanatory flaw leads to the second
contradiction. If both areas were inhabited by (former or current) hostel residents
then both shared a common 'isolation' vis-a-vis the township. And if this was true
then why did the conflict 'soon' develop into one between "township inhabitants
and hostel residents" (Minnaar, 1992)? Minnaar's only way out is to assume a
direct relationship between ethnicity and political affiliation. Only if attacks on
hostels were assumed also to be attacks on Zulus which were, in tum, believed
to be attacks on the Inkatha Freedom Party can the linkage to wider township
involvement be sustained. And only if one assumes an aggressive ANC
campaign against the IFP.
Minnaars chains of explanation assume exactly what this section wants to
problematise: that a certain automatism functioned between ethnicity and
political allegiances. It fails to consider - because the question is never posed ~
that these alliances were the products of discursive political constructions forged
in the peculiar labour and political history of the area. This section will explore
the KATORUS war as an accumulation of conflicts given 8,.,}YW,mt unity by the
generic battle between the ANC and IFP. The KATORUS war, at least in its
early days, may have consisted of many wars. Each (however temporary) with
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its own notion of the enemy and the allied, All given a coherence, and all
apparently confiated into a single war by the sense of imminent attack, the
anonymity of the attackers, and the empirical presence of the dead.
Fighting in the region was the result of at least five antagonisms: a parochial
conflict between Phola Park and the Tokoza hostels, a taxi conflict, a labour
tension arising from a strategic and political shift in trade-union politics, an IFP
recruitment drive in preparation for CODESA and ANC activity to consolidate its
strength in anticipation of those same negotiations.
Trade-Unionism
On the 19 September 1991, Sam Ntuli was murdered in Tokoza. His car was
apparently forced off the road and he was subsequently gunned down by
assailants in a blue Chevrolet. Ntuli's murder is more commonly attributed to his
status as General Secretary of the Civic Associations of Southern Transvaal
(CAST) because para-military attacks against hostel residents were ostensibly
coordinated by local civic assoclatlons. His death, however, may also gesture
towards an element of th ~conflict previously unexplored.
During the rrid-1980's Sam Ntuli played a central role bridging the former gap
between labour organi satlon and wider township struggles on the East Rand, He
played, therefore, a crucial role on the side of a certain (and later dominant)
political shift in union politics. It is worth exploring this briefly,
In October 1972 and February 1973 mass strikes jolted Durban, The Metal and
Allied Workers Union (fII1AWU)was formed that year end together with five other
industric;1 Jnio'1" they formed the Trade Union Advisory and Coordinating
Committe:~ (. JAC). By the end of the 1970's Iv'lAWU had successfully made
and consotldated its transition up to the Rand. When the Federation of South
African Trade Unions (FOSATU) was formed in 1979, MAWU became one of its
key constituents. The MAWU sociology, however, gave the union federation a
curious political composition, In particular it drew substantial support on the Rand
from hostel residents that gave tt') FOSATU a membership partly unaffected by
the "leveling and homogenising" (Bonner, 1995) effects that 'stabilisation'
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ostensibly gave to the rest of the urban population. This distinction is useful to
make.
What was important vis-a-vis urbanisation, Bonner suggests, was not only the
duration of the stay but also (and perhaps more importantly) the connections that
resulted. "[T]hose who established new relationships with other women found it
next to impossible to maintain a family in the countryside and a family in the
town". Once a man had found a companion in the city "his ties with his [rural]
home invariably weakened and he tended to return much less frequently"
(Bonner, 1995). What this alerts us to is the centrality of durable sexual
partnerships in this regard. That is, farnillal-type relations consecrated in the city,
and not Originating in rural homelands, were instrumental to new social
arrangements and a partially changed attitude to the city. In particular, Bonner
argues (and perhaps also exaggerates) that such liaisons created "more shared
conditiOl,.J of life" including a "new sense of common identity... which overrode
many of the ethnic and social divisions ...[ot] previous decades" (Bonner, 1995),
In contrast, residents that either maintained contact with their rural families or
brought them to the city retained an interest in their rural homesteads or their
reserve-based extended families. Following this definition of urbanisation, we
can say that the East Rand townships were home to a large population living in
the city but not of the city. In other words, an important segment of people
resident in these are's had not been integrated into the political and social
values that informed urbanised relations; ones that from the 1980's were
increasingly informed by notions of solidarity and communality drawn from the
Theory of National Democratic Revolution ..
This social-ideological distinction was reinforced by recruitment patterns. Several
large employers, including SCAW metals in Wadeville, relied on generations-old
networks that stretcheo into KwaZulu and sometimes into the Transkei. The
SCAW hostel, for example, typical of many of the East Rand foundries, mostly
housed migrant men from these regions. This created on the East Rand, and
especially around the steel-based foundries of Germiston and others, a large
migrant population drawn from and deeply implicated in rural areas. These male
workers mostly retained connections to their 'homeland' origins and in this sense
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occupied a sociologically different position to permanently rooted (or 'stabilised')
urban dwellers. Whereas the latter may have experienced some form of
'homogenisation and leveling' ~ that is, interpellation into a new, urban, social
(and conceptual) form - hostel residents often still referenced their experience
vis-a-vis a 'traditional' (i.e. non-urban) SOcial cosmology. In this regard certain
notions of masculinity and order strongly informed social and later political
responses. In particular, threats to what were regarded as natural, age-based
hierarchies were judged deeply disturbing to notions of nature and discipline.
These ideas were not isolated to hostels only. Sustained relations with rural
homesteads and partial adherence to 'traditional' cosmologies happened
amongst township inhabitants as well. Indeed, this linkage was often less
structured by political-economy than it was determined by often idiosyncratic
cholces.
Sipho Sithole, for example, moved to Johannesburg in 1980 looking for work.
Here he stayed with his sister until 1985. His marriage to a woman from
KwaMashu in 1985 resulted in his departure from Soweto and the later
movement of himself, his new wife and children to Tokoza. "It is wise if people
stay together," he explained, "because when we struggle we are together"
(Interview with Sithole and Dlamini, 1995).At no stage did he reside in a hostel.
This was paralleled by the personal trajectory of Thabane Dlamini. Dlamini was
born in Mahlabathini in 1950 and attended school at Mkhiweni Higher Primary
Srl'lOol in Ndebele. In 1978 he graduated to the Eikane High School in what he
termed "rural Natal". Dlamini's parents had in the mean time moved to
Johannesburg to look for work. By the time he arrived in Soweto in 1981, his
mother and father had already been here for some time. When he failed to find
permanent or even long-term employment he joined the IFP as a full-time office-
bearer in 1991. At no stage did Dlamini seek accommodation in a hostel.
Both (ItVII regarded their urban biographies as utterly conventional. "It was very
common," Sithole remarked, "that people from KwaZulu-Natal... had family in the
townships". "Let me tell you something," tie continued, u here in the loeation...
there [was sometimes] no hot water and no bathroom[s]. [I]n the hostel, because
[they] were [more] advanced than this place [the loeation]... people... [came]
~D~E=M~O~C~R~A=C~Y~.~C~IT~I~ES~A~N=D~S~P~A~C~E~~ ~_I04
here [to] wash themselves ..." Moreover, he added "I am telling [a] fact ~and you
can ... ask anyboay - these people used to go to the hostel and wash
themselves... and then there was no difference between the hostel and the
location" (Interview with Sithole, 1995)20. In this regard Sithole and Dlamini's
relation to the hostels was typical of many other township men. This observation
was often repeated by second or even third generation urban youth interviewees
- including some of those prominent in offensive activities during the war'.
What is important about these particular narratives is their source. Thabane
Dlamini and Sipho Sithole were not just random voices in Tokoza. Thabane was
Chairperson of the IFP youth Brigade in Tokoza- indeed, the name for the IFP
para-militaries (Self Protection Units) was reputedly his own innovation. Sipho
Sithole was also involved in youth Brigade activities and was later nominated to
stand as the IFP candidate for Phenduka section - an area with a large hostel
population and a housing quarter largely occupied by war-time refugees
sympathetic to the Inkatha Freedom Party.
DUring the 1980's, therefore, both men had no special or intimate relationship to
hostels. Their youth Brigade activities were confined to sympathetic township
youth and they even experienced hostel residents through a medium common to
many township inhabitants: washing and sometimes drinking. Dlamini and
Sithole's narratives thus suggests that the political linkage made between the
IFP and hostel dwellers was neither a function of ethnicity nor language. This
was clearly understood by early Inkatha ye Sizwe organisers on the Rand.
Mrs. Zikalala, the niece of Chief Luthuli's 'deputy', was involved in organising
Inkatha in the Transvaal in the late 1970's. "At that time there was Black
Consciousness, the ANC was in exile and quiet and Inkatha became the biggest
organisation at that time" (Interview Mrs Zikalala, 1995). What is interesting
about her narrative is tile description of early recruits. "People who were
interested were Zulus," she commented: that is, "teachers, doctors and
professionals of both sexes" (Ibid., 1995). What was interesting about this
remark was the mention of hostel dwellers only as an afterthought. Indeed,
20 In the case of interviews conducted in English when English was not the interviewees home language
responses have been edited for grammar,
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significant recruitment amongst this quarter only began in the mid and late-
1980's. Before that, she explains, Zulu-speaking hostel residents could not
understand the role for an Inkatha-type organisation: they believed themselves
to be loyal subjects of the King, had a direct relationshin with their Chiefs through
resident Indunas and could, therefore, see no place for Inkatha. A political entity
that wanted to "fight for their rights" as subjects of the Kingdom of KwaZulu
seemed to be superfluous. In this regard, Mrs Zikalala explains, hostel residents
were concerned that Inkatha would "interfere with His Majesty 'the King" (Ibid.,
1995). Structures already existed for them to 'exercise their rights' as Zulu
subjects. What was most worrying in the cities was not their status in the
Kingdom of KwaZulu, but rather, there status as industrial workers. And these
concerns could be expressed through the unions.
Until the mid-1980's union politics focused specifically on so-called shop-floor
issue, that is, problems related to working conditions, dismissals and wages.
Indeed, TUAC unions and later FOSATU eschewed alliances with organisations
and/or groupings outside the factory. This was peftiall~' a theoretical decision: it
was argued that existing political tendencies (like Black Consciousness, African
Nationalism, ethnic particularism et aO reflected forms of consciousness that
inhibited class solidarity which in tum, was best forged on the factory floor alone.
It was partly also a strategic acknowledgment. Explicit political coalitions
potentially alienated sections of the unions' (politically and socially) diverse
membership.
The mid-1980's, however, saw an important political shift as trade-unionism after
1976 increasingly eschewed its political r l-alignment. The potential
consequences of such a move, however, was also legible in its origin.
Trade-Unionism and the 1976 Student Revolt
During the student revolt of that period, hostel residents from Mzimhlope hostel
in Soweto repeatedly attacked student protesters. Township youth demanding
compliance with work stayaways etc. were deeply offensive to adult hostel
residents - many of whom were also parents. Children ordering parents. It
appeared to many an inversion of the natural order. Sipho Sithole thus
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explained: "Discipline is very important.. If you are a child growing up [in a Zulu
household] ... you are not used to speakfing] with your father. Mou always speak
with your mama. [If] you ask for something you ask your mama and... your
mama tells your father ... [IJfyour father feels you mustn't do it, you are not going
to do it" (Interview Sithole, 1995). In 1976 this was turned upside down -
"children [were] telling their parents what to do". It seemed "the bottom was
coming on top" (Ibid., 1995). If student 'indiscipline' seemed to challenge nature,
it also seemed to threaten 'migrant' households.
Hostel workers usually had little or no regular schooling and were, therefore,
reserved for menial, repetitive-type tasks that required almost no formal training.
They constituted what Eddie Webster calls the 'secondary market'. That is, a
category of casual employment requiring only elementary skills and offering
almost no job security. This was aggravated by rnanapemsnt policies that saw
no threat to productivity by such things as low worker tum-over in this market.
Regular dismissals were deemed effective for wesding out the slow and the
cheeky. Faced with the 'ever-present' possibility of replacement, migrant workers
were disinclined to orders from a township youth that did not fully appreciate the
implications of their dismissal. In this sense, for many migrant workers,
instruction to 'reckless' action may have jeopardised their families' often already
tenuous SUbsistence.
1976 was nonetheless a turning-point. From then on it was less and less easy
for labour struggles to ignore political pressures not arising from the point of
production. By the mid-1980's many of the 1976 students and leaders had
entered employment.. Moreover, associated with the massive educational
expansion after (and as a result of) the 1976 uprising, FOSATU found a new
element amongst its membership. Young, militant and school educated. Many
were initiated into politics through the radicalism of socialist, africanist and
national revolutionary slogans. In this atmosphere there was growing irritation
with FOSATU's strongly 'workerist' tendency. Many complained that the union
federation was invested with a deep 'social conservatism' that militated against
political interventions outside the factory. The appointment of Chief Mangosuthu
Buthelezi to chair the Industrial Information Centre (IIC) - to give the union
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respectability amongst 'traditional' quarters i1KwaZulu and in Natal - seemed
merely to confirm this agenda. As a result there was !drowing pressure for uruon
activities to Iii tK to a host of extra-factory politlcal currents, and in particular new
recruits were eager to articulate their '.'nion activities to wider struggles for
'national liberation' through 'African Natio:1i3Iism'.
These tensions came to a head after the Fatti's and Moni's strike in Cape Town
in April 1979. The strike itself was accompanied by a massive consumer boycott
that halved factory profits. Within seven months workers were reinstated and the
union recognised. Within FOSATU the Cape action generated furi-:-.'Js, debates
about the federations appropriate strategic direction. There w~., =tsed
criticism of the factory-oriented nature of organisation and it '''; -
community and political struggles. By the early 1980's certain f:L . .,
were already beginning to widen their involvement. They coilabora I -,
of 'community' struggles, explicitly spoke of National Democratic Rev.
used a host of politically-aligned slogans.
Central to these changes on the East Rand was Sam Ntuli. He together with
Enoch Godoma sought to link trade-union militancy to the concerns of the
recently launched '.lnited Democratic Front (UDF) and the formation of civic
organisations I., 1984 the Metal and Allied Workers Union split on precisely this
issue. A more 'populist' union was subsequently formed: the United Metal and
Allied Workers Union of South Africa (UMAWUSA). This marked the beginning
of what Eddie Webster has called 'social-movement unionism' in South Africa.
Throughout the Rand it began to transform the political culture.
Aggripa Shandu, today an UWUSA organiser, and in ti Ie local government
elections an IFP candidate, explained: In the late that 1970's he joined MAWU in
Alrode in Alberton. "When I joined," he recalls, "I thought that [MAWU] is a union
that is going to stand for my rights as a worker. I did not know that [the union]
was going to change name and involve politics. MAWU split... [and] I left in 1985
[to) join UMAWUSA. [W]e did not understand where [the splinter unlorq stood
because it was confusing work and politics. When COSATU was formed in 19L5
I resigned because I was not an ANC trade-union[ist]" (In~s'Viewwith Aggripa
Shandu, 1995). During interviews conducted by Lauren Segal, moreover, a
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hostel respondent remarked: "I'm only interested in my rights as a worker, that is
ali." He continued: '. joined NUMSA for their protection at the workplace and not
their political alliance" (Segal, i992).
If labour's new direction accommodated the "'hidden world' of African
Nationalism" (Webster, 1991), it also neglected (and alienated) a host of other
polltlcal traditions. Speaking of the 1982-83 strlkee at Scaw metals, Bonner is
quoted as saying: "You could see their [hostel residentsl interE'sts not being
properly represented, eclipsed by other constituencies. We could see ~'igrants
retreating into themselves, even when continuing to be union members. e.g. in
Zulu ethnic associations' (Bonner cited in Mamdani, p.247).
What the new trade-unionism m, ssively underestimated was the strength and
durability of p(.)litical sympathies premised on 'traditional' social practices and
values. In this regard, the style of the new nationalist politics was often m"':e
disturbing than its content per sa. In particular, many oblected to the leading role
thst youth played in many township activities in the form of COSAS. Youth
Leagues, civic organisations and so on. In addition the new politics seemed
mostly concerned with peculiarly urban issues. To residents still dee~\f
interested in the well· being of their rural homesteads and/or their place of origin
the latter were usually secondary concerns.
In a context where trade-unionism seamed distracted by issues not arising from
the shop-floor, openings were granted to organisation;; (like the Inkatha
Freedom Party) that had previously been rejected. Whereas 'social
conservatives' had felt comfortable to partiCipate in focused (shop-floor) union
activities, strategic (and ideological) shifts created an important hiatus. In this
gap Inkatha could partly define its role as the new interlocutor of social worries
and the defender of norms and values. II" this way, the conditions for the
articulation of soolal ethnicity to pOlitical nationalism had already been made
possible. Before it could haopen in KATORUS several other factors needed to
intervene first.
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The Threat of Hostel Conversions
From 1986 there was growing concern in government circles about living
conditions in most hostels. What was apparently disturbing to state functionaries
was the single-sex format of this accommodation that raised the spectre of
homosexuality and seemed to clspcse more readily its occupants to violence. As
a result the then National Party government toyed with the idea of converting
hostels into family-type units. These plans, however, stalled until the early 1990's
when conversion became the focus of much political activity (Minnaar, p.32).
What seems to have r('juvenated interest (in KATORUS especially) was the
violent conflict that started between residents of the Phola Park infonnal
settlement and inhabitants of the neighbouring hostel, in October 1990. Many
argued at the time, that the congregation of single men in demeaning living
quarters increased their propensity for violence (Zulu, p.22). If they lived with
their families, the argument continued, they would be more loathe to fight lest
they exposed their families to danqsr,
Many hostel residents found the campaign deeply disturbing. For those men
reluctant or unable to move their families to the city it potentially meant the loss
of their accommodation. What compounded this worry were relatively high
rentals in the township. A backyard room could cost between R60 and R120 per
month. The municipality, in CI"'1trast, charged only R15 a month for a hostel bed.
Conversion thus seemed to make continued residence in the city unaffordable.
This was further aggravated by low wages and tenuous conditions of
employment w made even worse by sta.natlon in the economy generally and
10C-Ci1 industries in particular. Given the importance of urban remittances to the
reproduction of rural economies, conversion seemed to threaten the very
sustainability of the homestead unit. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the
campaign was strongly resisted.
In that year the Tokoza Hostel Residents Association (THRA) was formed. Its
establishment marked a fundamental re-alignment of organisation In the hostels,
Contrary to Minnaar and others, hostels during the 1980's were very loosely
organised. Indeed, interviewees disputed the 'hierarchical controls' that Anthony
Minal:;;r speaks of. One is IEift with the distinct impression that his description
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draws on g< ' ..."alised notions D! hostels in the 1950's, 1960's and to a lesser
extent the 19',O's coupled with an .npresslon of their social structure during and
after the war. Hostel residents themselves observed that prior to fighting hostels
were places of 'multiracial' residence - where the term here was used to denote
multi-linguism: that is, the presence of "Zulus·, "Xhosas", "Sothos·, "Pedis" and
others (Buyafuthe induna, Katiehong, 26n 195). Indeed, there was no formal
hostel-wide organisation. Indunas appointed by local chiefs in KwaZulu-Natal
presided over men from their jurisdiction only. In this regard, their responsibility
was curtailed to parochial functions: "Our duty," an Induna from Kwesini hostel in
Katlehong explained, was to "link ... [the] community and arnakhosl, Whatever
people corr,,:.lclin[ed] about we report[ed] ... to the Chief and the Chief [took] it up
with His Majesty [the king)" (lbld., 2617195). In this regard, Indunas were
responsible for communication between the city and the homestead. They
presided over death. organised the conveyance of bodies "back home",
arranged transport and remittances to homesteads, adjudicated between
disputes amongst hostel residents, and were sometimes the first port of call for
job recruitment agents.
If threatened eviction gave hostels some form of organisational unity, the brokers
of that unity emerged from the Phola Park conflict and the nature of Inkatha
mobilisation in the hostels.
When fighting started between the Tokoza hostels and Phola Park. the former
were allegedly placed on a 'war footing'. In this ragard, Indunas allegedly
organised weapons and ammunition from the escalating violence in KwaZulu
and Natal. Military .ltelligence also recorded the movement of trained fighters
from Ulundi to the Rand - what MI called Scouts (Interview with Military
Intelligence, Group 41 Germiston, '14/6/95). Given recent testimony in the
Geneml Magnus Malan Trial and the evidence of Operation Marion it is tempting
to source the latter from IFP men trained in the Oaprivl Strip by the SANDF (Mail
and Guardian 16/8/1996). Moreover, recent statements in mitigation by Colonel
Eugene de Kok * (if Vlakplaas infamy * suggest that the Security Branch
supplied weapons to senior Inkatha persons * and Themba Khosa in parflcuar -
for use on the East Rand (Mail and Guardian 21/8/1996). Fighting in KATORUS
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thus achieved an important conflation: Indunas became the agents of hostel
organisation as a result of their access to the traffic of weapons feeding the
armed conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. A Kwesini elder thus remarked: "They [the
indunas] look after the welfare of people - mainly to see there is no provocation
or violence against inmates [hostel residents]". In this way Induna political control
was secured through their access to guns, bullets and training. Provision of the
resources for 'war' aided an IFP recruitment drive in Reef hostels at this time -
and particularly those in KATORUS. In this regard, the IFP gave the growing
tension over conversion a new spin. Spokespersons argued that the issue was
being used by the ANC deliberately to evict and 'disperse' single, male hostel
residents. This created the conditions for an important conceptual leap: it added
a third variable to a chain of political equivalence: hostels-lndunas-lnkatha.
Whereas before the 1990's Zulu ethnicity in the city was practiced mainly
through 'custom', - that is, through obedience to certain dietary habits, dress
codes, respect for social and gender hierarchies - after 1990 this began to
change. There was a growing sense that the very Zulu polity - to which these
practices were referenced - was itself under threat. We have already seen that
for many hostel residents, conversion represented a danger to their own
livelihood and the sustainabiUty of their households. In the context of IFP
mobilisation it was not difficult to link this issue to a sense of imminent cultural
threat.
"If you are a Zulu·, an interviewee explained "there are customs[to which] you
have to adhere... [W]e believe in the ancestors - amadlozl., and if things go
wrong you have to... slaughter a cow to remember those ... forefathers who
passed away, [Y]ou have to respect them ... [I]f I am down in Natal ... I have to
wear the skin of an animal... [I] have to teach my children... where they are
coming from and where I am corning from because we are the Zulus and we
he ,e hereditary [responsibilities] ... [I] must know that my father's name was ... a
Zulu name and I have to know my father'S name" (Sithole, Sipho, Tokoza
26/10/95). The interviewee then juxtaposed this description with the following:
"The Zulu people are a very dangerous people in South Africa.[We] are not
conquered even now. [T]hat is why the ANC is trying to fight us... [T]hey extract
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the king from our nation ... and by taking [him] away [th1Y] take aNay the past. .."
(lbid., '1995). "If you want to interrupt the system you have to go to the strongest
point...and the strongest point is the King" (Ibid., 1995).
What is important about this discussion was the ease at which the respondent
shifted from a description of 'Zulu customs' to an analysis of how they were
politically threatened. If the 1980's witnessed the deepening alienation of SOCially
cultured Zulu-speakers from labour and urban political movements, the 1990's
saw this distance expressed as political threat, articulated as a sense of danger
to the very object of Zulu identification itself: the King. We have already seen
that for many hostel residents 'family-unit' conversions represented a threat to
rural households themselves. In the context of aggressive IFP campaigning it
was not difficult to make the following link: an apparent attack on the household
was simultaneously an attack on 'Zulu culture' per se. In this regard, hostel
conversions were not just a concern for single-sex Zulu-speaking hostel
residents, they were symptomatic of a campaign against Zulu institutions and
practices themselves.
This artioulafion created a specific and unique opportunity for Mangosuthu
Buthelezi and the IFP. "When he (Buthelezi) became President of Inkatha [he]
didn't move away and forget that he hard] ...a tribal authority [to lead]"
(Anonymous, Buyafuthe hostel resident (b), 1995). Given the perceived capture
of King Zwelithini by the ANC, and the apparent assault on the rural homestead,
Chief Buthelezl and the Inkatha Freedom Party were granted G political role.
They were well positioned to defend the integrity of 'Zulu culture' and of 'Zulu
institutions'. Several interviewees remarked that Chief Buthelezi is "very strong,
he is very honest and that is why we are united. He is unifying us" (lbld., 1995).
Concern during the late 1970's (and even during the 1980's), therefore, that
Inkatha (or an lnkatha-type organisation) might "interfere" with the Zulu King had
certainly evaporated by the early 1990's. If Zulu-speaklnq persons (inclined
towards 'traditional' practices) had felt comtortable in the past to exerc'se their
cultural identity through the 'traditional' .::.ystem itself and their urban political
interests through the trade-unions, 'interruptions' to bath required created tne
opportunity for another political party. ln this regard, Buthelezi's role as former
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leader of KwaZulu and his 'traditional' status as a Chief made him best suited to
come to their defense. He was ideally placed to reconcile a political intervention
with a 'traditional' one. After all, he bridged both functions himself.
The Unbanning of the ANC
In this context of heightened vulnerability, civic organisations (partly bolstered by
former trade-union organisers) mobilised aggressively ('Jring this time. This was
compounded by the unbanning of the African National Congress in February
1990. On the East Rand, and also more generally, the effects of unbanning were
initially delayed. ANC and ANC-aligned structures initially feared a public profile
lest the political mood changed and they were left exposed and compromised.
By the end of the year this worry had partly dissipated. All around the country
ANC branches were formed and rallies attended.
The mobilisation (and consolidation) of support in preparation for national
negotiations may explain the intensification of social and political animosity on
the Rand; although that alone does not explain the fighting ill KATORUS.
Katlehong, Tokoza and Vosloorus were not alone for having hostels adjacent to
townships adjacent to infornal settlements. Nor did they alone have precarious
social relations potentls antagonised by a!:lgressive political mobilisation.
Despite initial and sporadic clashes, Temblsa remained relatively quiet, So too
did Wattville in Benoni - notWithstanding land invasions aligned in some cases to
the local civic, and in others to the IFP; in an area, moreover, proximate to an
IFP hostel. As Kahla Shubane recently remarked (informal conversation at the
offices of the Centre for Policy Studies, Shubane, 5/3/97) KATORUS was not
alone for having 'social tensions'.
We need, therefore, to consider three more elements very briefly: a conflict
between Phola Park and the Tokoza hostels, a taxi conflict and covert actions
(and/or omissions) by the state.
Phola Park's Parks conflict with Khalanyoni Hostel
The particular content of' the Phola Park dispute remains beyond the scope of
this paper. For our purposes, however, its conflagration marked the beginning of
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violent conflict. The first fighting in KATORUS seems to have happened on the
evening of the 12 August 1990. That night and the next morning informal
residents' and hostel dwellers clashed. By the late [doming 20 pee 'had been
killed. The following night Khalanyoni hostel was attacked. On the 15 August
hostel residents apparently retaliated. These incidents are I" ....ed by many as
the opening salvos of the KATORUS war. Yet the continuity. ,.llied by such a
phrase, 'KATORUS war', neglects important evidence.
Many youth combatants did not icientify 1990 as the beginning of the conflict.
Indeed, their' chronology began almost three years later. In May 1993, they
argued, a march to the stadium in Tokoza - to protest against rents and services
- was fired upon. A prominent 'commander' at the time thus cornmf>nted: "When
[the] Phola Park - hostel violence spread to [the] township [it strong. After
[the May] march, violence became strong". Casca MOh.........J - a senior
combatant in 'Slovo Section' in Tokoza - ,....marked t.hat many youlhs would
sometimes watch hostel residents marching to Phola Park without intervening.
"Only a few joined the fighting. It was not our fight" (Casca Mokoena, 1995).
This observation refers to a disjuncture between the politics of the informal
settlement and the township. Indeed, during a focus group session a respondent
suggested: "People from squatter camps are a problem. The people who hired
these shacks are the ones who started the violence. Zulu people told others that
they are lnkat'ia members and Xhosas ... fought amongst themselves. It went as
far as Gatsha telling his people that they must kilt all the Xhosas. Xhosas fought
for themselves and it affected us..." Another respondent continued: "We don't
want these shacks,., Sometimes a fight breaks out far away from our place.
They come to fetch the people in your yard [to] tight with them. As you won't
allow it you also fight and the nekhbours will come to help and it will end up
being a big thing" (Focus Group: Refugees, 1995).
These responses suggest the parochiality of informal settlements when viewed
from the township: their politics, their sociol'I~,~11and lh::i. l~i~p;'.Ites.It is difficult to
assume, therefore, that attacks and counter-attacks by informal and hostel
residents respectively automatically 'spread' to the township. lnde=d, the
respondent above suggested that if fighting did spread it happened indirectly.
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Evidence led during various Goldstone hearings seem partly to confirm this
disjuncture. When a commission established in 1992 under the Chair of
Advocate Sithole investigated "the escalation of violence in the area" (Sithole
Inquiry, 1992) it mostly found protagonists to be either hostel dwellers or
residents of Phola Park.
The first incident it explored was the murder of 18 hostel residents in September
1991. On the 8th day of that month a march organised by the Tokoza Hostel
Dwellers Association was attacked from several directions by men firing AK47's.
The Comrnlcslon found that earlier in the moming 'section-leaders' in Phola Park
had "arranged to mount an ambush on the' hostel dwellers" (Ibid., 1992).
Commission findings suggest that this pattern of conflict configured fighting late
into '1992. An attack on a Rand Water Board kombi in February 1992, they
found, "was planned and mounted by the Phola Park SOU". This was believed
also to be the likely source of 'massacres' in the informal settlement of
Crossroads between 3 and 4 April that year and also Zonkezizwe two days later.
As a result the Commission concluded that: "the most serious rivalry [was]
between the residents of Phola Park and the hostel dwellers" (Sithole Inquiry,
1992). Moreover, Sithole and others concurred that "serious rivalry ... [was] in
itself aggravated ... by the fact that the one group is predominantly Zulu an"! the
other is predominantly non-Zulu with a heavy (but not predominant) Xhosa
influence. Fighting was further "coloured" by "the fact that the one group [Zulus]
tends to be affiliated to the lnkatha Freedom Party and the other [Non-
Zulusf;(hosas] to the so-called Patriotic Front, which is heavily influenced by the
ANC' (Sithole Inquiry, 1992). At no stage was their mention of armed groups
ertanatlnq from the formal township itself. Indeed, hearings on 'the causes and
phenomenon of violence in the Tokoza area (sic)' explored the quite parochial
origin of this conflict. Apart. from the later polltlclsation of these tension- -
associated with national processes - variables discussed in that section were
mostly pecuiiar to Phola Park and the hotels. Population density: 4000 - 5000
shacks in small area. Homelessness: intense competition for accommodation.
Living conditions: no sewage, no sanitation, no schools, no electricity, no refuse
removal, ('Inly 4 communal taps. And sociology: division between single
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migratory labourers and families. These factors were seldom pertinent generally
and only occasionally applied to formal township residents as well.
'Taxi-War'
If the Phola Park conflict seems to have militarised the hostels, taxi conflict in
Katlehong may have had similar affects in the township. On the 24 February
1990 a "bloody and ghastly" (Khosa, p.245.) war broke out in Katlehong.
Roughly 50 people were killed and more than 350 injured. Several houses were
also bumt. According to Meshack Khosa fighting originated from a dispute
between the Germiston and District Taxi Association (G&DTA) and the
Katlehong Taxi Association (KTA) over access to routes. Members of the latter,
he argued, "were mostly Katlehong residents, especially 'young' comrades"
(Khos8, 1992). In contrast, members of the G&DTA "were allegedly from Natal
and largely represented Zulu-speakinq operators, most of whom were living in
migrant hostels" (Khosa, 1992). As a result, Khosa argues, "fighting which began
as a feud between two taxi groups developed into running battles between
youths on the one hand and taxi operators supported by vigilante gangs on the
other" (Ibid" 1992). This implies, therefore, that the fighting's subsequent
taxonomy - hostel vs township - originates frorr the sociology of the taxi War21.
Khosa might have confused the sociology of taxi-owners and their drivers. Mrs.
Zikalala mentioned that during early recruitment campaigns in the late 1970's
Inkatha was successful amongst Zulu-speaking 'professionals': nurses,
teachers, clerks at al. (Interview with Zikalala, 1995). This points towards 'middie
income' Zulu-speakers (sometimes ethnically conscious) in the township itself.
When the kornbi-taxi industry began to satisfy gaps left by cut-backs in public
transport (and in particular the Public Utility Transport Company (PUTCO») these
people were well positioned to enter the market. They had relatively well paid
21 What is puzzling in Khosa's account is the apparent absence of attacks against hostels. His description of
fighting locates It in taxi ranks, on the streets, m schools and even in certain homes, Nowhere is there
mention ofa hostel. This is surprising for a 'war' in which some of the leading protagonists were
accommodated there'! The anomaly is not easily explained by claiming that hostel-based taxi owners used
vigilantes drawn from Natal to do their fighting. Khosa has himself indicated that attacks were often
launched against taxi drivers IIlIdtheir owners. If'vigilantes' could attack youth 'comrades' in their homes
and in their schools, it is difficult to understand why G&DTA taxi-owners were not attacked in (or even
nearby) their residences.
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jobs and could sometimes afford the initial financing. Many G&DTA taxi-owners
were thus often township residents as well. Many drivers, on the other hand,
were drawn from the Katlehong hostels.
When KTA members mobilised for battle many used Phola Park as a source of
training and weapons. This almost certainly identified young, township men with
the inhabitants of the informal settlement. The residence of many G&DTA taxi-
drivers in the hostels had the opposite effect. it was the beginning of a deadly
chain of associations. When attacks were launched on KTA vehicles along
Khumalo Road in Tokoza, it is rumoured for example, that passengers and
drivers alike were taken into the hostels and assaulted.
There is circumstantial evidence to suggest that this conflict was implicated in
Sam Ntuli's murder. The Sithole inquiry found that there was a "vicious and
sustained" (Sithole Inquiry, 1992) attack on funeral-goers after the ceremony.
Despite the apparent anonymity of the killers the presence of one Ndebele
implied to the Inquiry that a KAPTA (formerly the G&DTA) "squad" may have
been responsible. Ndebele himself was a hostel resident and a well known taxi-
driver.
The taxi feud may thus have achieved a deadly association: KCA - Phola Park -
township men. This artlculaflon was matched from the township side by the
apparent collusion of hostel dwellers with the G&DTA. For many township
residents the mobilisation of the IFP into these quarters seemed to confirm its
aggressive posture vis-a-vis urban residents. When the relationship between
hostels and urban youth descended into Violence, the IFP's war-like instincts
seemed verified. In this regard, increased social and political distance from the
township, the taxi conflict, the fight with Phola Park and intensified polltical rivalry
may have thus conf1ated the following elements: hostel residents - political
conservatism .•violent aggression - Inkatha Freedom Party.
These localised conflicts may thus have solidified and antagonised the political
labeling already happening. For hostel residents the affiliation of Phola Park with
the UDF and later the ANC certainly reinforced fears that they were partially
threatened by these organisations. The presence, moreover, of young men (and
sometimes women) in leading positions in many urban political structures made
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their style uncomfortable. Later it merely emphasised their aggressive attitude to
hostel residentc. When Inkatha began to recruit successfully in the hostels in the
early 1990's they were already extensively organised, armed, militarised and
most importantly wary of young, township men. Boycotts, stay-aways and
demonstrations launched from the township merely aggravated an already tense
situation. In May 1993 this seems to have come to a head. As discussed in the
earlier, a demonstration against rent increases resulted in a lethal clash between
marchers and hostel residents in Tokoza. For the first time since fighting was
reported in 1990, hostels were attacked by armed groups from the township.
This gave to the violence in I<ATORUS a complex new sociology. One
moreover, arranged through a host of social and recreational practices that
introduced a new organisational format to tile conflict.
The Violence transcends its local origins
During the 1980's the informal unit of social interaction was the street or
neighborhood. These tended to define the sociology of gatherings and
recreational activities. In this regard the boundaries of the social group was
partly determined by the form of transport available. Walking defined a much
narrower spatial perimeter. Social geography was also mediated by the size of
the township, socio-economic stratification, unemployment and even the ethnic
layout of many African townships. In this regard. youth gangs and social clubs
reflected a host of social boundaries in a customised vocabulary that reflected
youth priorities. In this regard, 'starlings' (double pleated pants with tum-ups) and
'old Stars' (flat, white takkies) or 'crocker and Jones'(leather shoes) identified
the wearer as a 'clever'(as opposed to a 'stupid') - where the distinction hinged
partly on one's ability to afford beers and shebeens. A bounce in one's walk, a
floral shirt, bell bottoms and stretched hair (permed and straightened) marked
one as an Ivie. This contrasted with Mapantsula's with their two-toned shoes and
'attitude'. Iveys (or Softies) were allegedly polite and dutiful. "They would greet
their girlfriends nicely. Would buy them brown bread and acha and crisps. They
weren't Mapantsulas" (Interview PT, 1996). Moreover, they were happy to do
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"part-time jobs: [they] worked at Checkers, did gardening or worked as [golf]
caddies" (Ibid., 1996)22.
The emergence of the Congress of South Afrir.an Students (COSAS) in
Katlehong and Tokoza during the late 1980's, as well as various youth
conqresses, partly displaced these practices. Many inl.erviewees remembered a
decline in such modish appearances and their renlacernent by the political T-
shirt. Despite appearances, however, political mobilisation seldom supplanted
these social networks. What it seems to have done instead was give to yolith
practices a new vocabulary: politics in addition to fashion. 111 many cases,
COSAS and the various youth congresses rested on these informal contacts. So
did the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organisation
(AZAPO). When the Katlehong and Tokoza Civic Associations tried to give
cohesion to a fragmented political environment they were strongly resisted. 1'\11
interviewee remarked that, "COSATU and the Youth [Congress} were more
active in mobilising residents than the civic". The latter was weakened. he
argued, when "certain Azapo and PAC elements ... wanted to hijack the civic
body" (Interview with Matlstsi, 1996). Internal strife apparently reflected the
opposition from certain youth gangs to subordination in a larger structure.
In this context there was a notable distance between apparent organisational
structures and their practice on the ground, Members were associated through
networks that asserted de facto autonomy from the political executive. Matlatsi
·',us comments that when the ANC was unbanned and street ccmmittees
formed \1 Tokoza and Katlehong "the purpose was to bring back discipline within
our ranks" (Ibid., 1996). In this regard, he continued. "certaln members [of the
Youth Congress] were criminals and harassed people [and] some were involved
in gang warfare" (Ibid., 1996). "When war started," he add.d, "everybody
became [a] self defence unit. From the street committee to criminals to
gangsters" (Ibid., 1996). This observation is crucial.
21 It would be misleading to assume that style and fashiou were direct measures of class, geography el al.
The choir ...of fashion and style often reflected idlosyncratic concerns. In this regard clothes and accessories
themselves may not have spoken of political economy, Their mode ofnttainment certainly did.
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Despite ostensible affiliation to the political organisations, SOU structures were
often linked to sub-terralnean social networks. As a result they had their own
internal hie, .rchles and modus operandi. They seldom functioned according to a
code or strategy determiner' by the civic or any political organisation. The Police
and the army massively underestimated this autonomy. Military Intelligence
seems to have confused civic claims with practice in the field. According to the
former, that is, SOU's had the following operational structure: each street had its
own commander who was in tum accountable to the Block commander who was
in tum was accountable to the Sectional commander who was in tum was
accountable to the Area commander who was in tum a member of the Supreme
Command. This almost certainly did not happen. In many cases targets and
schedules were determined idiosyncratically. A SOU combatant thus described
how fightinr was often preceded by heavy drinking and dagga smoking - during
which the method and objective for the day would be discussed (Casca
Mokoena, .Tokoza, 18/8/95).
Numerous cease-fires were thus violated bil 'renegade' units disregarding the
military-political structures to whom th~y were supposedly aroountable. In this
regard, several members of the Supreme Command angrily distinguished
between 'real' and 'criminal' SOU's in order to differentiate those under its control
and those not. It is my belief that the conditions for a binding 'peace-treaty' were
CIOu:'::'U, .10t by political design, but by the logistics of the war. As the fighting
escalated alli SOU's felt out-gunned - with their 'qutus' (home-made weapons),
knives ?tc.- the ".ontiict entered a new stage. The scale of tighting required much
greater coordination between local units. Funds needed to be raised widely and
training was required. Most importantly, units needed to arrange warning and
defensive systems that often required a combined effort. In this way a military-
type leadership emerged that had actual meaning on the ground. When a peace
treaty was signed by units under the KATORUS Central Command and the
leaders of the SPU's in May 1994, it thus mostly held.
I have argued so far that conflict in KATORUS was overdetermined. It was the
product of the violent unity produced by three autonomous but interrelated
processes. The first, and the most important, saw the progressive alienation of
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hostel workers from the trade-union movement as the latter embraced political
movements outside the factory gate. This created a political opening for the
!nkatha Freedom Party to fill the space left by FOSATU-allied unions. But I have
suggested also that whereas this shift certainly aggravated social relations
betwee: hostel residents and township based political movements elsewhere,
only in Katlehonq, Tokoza and Vosloorus did this take the fonn of a protracted
urban war. What explains the particular fonn of the KATORUS violence, I have
argued, was the force given to it separately by the battle between the Phola Park
infonnal settlement and the Tokoza hostels and the taxi violence. It was, in this
regard, a specifically local conflict that 'Jlas not simply resolved by a national
political settlement.
Most importantly, I have suggested tl1at the condition of the KATORUS war(s)
was the growing preeminence in trade-union politics, from the early 1980's, of
what has been called social-movement unionism, or what was tenned at the time
as a charlerist union tendency against a workerist one. The articulatlon between
industrial unions and township-based political movements had two primary
consequences: it saw the isolation of migrant workers from the new-styled
unionism and it gave rise to civic organisations. These two developments must
be understood together because they both shared a common denominator: the
growing influence of the theory of Nr .tional Democratic Revolution.
We have seen that the strategic and ccnceptual implications of NDR made it
possible to think the possibility of a strategic alliance between working-class
movements and populist ones pursuing a nationalist agenda. We have seen in
an earlier section that in stressing the multi-class nature of the apartheid
experience, the proponents of NDR insisted that a political unity could be forged
from a complex sociology, because all black persons were oppressed as racial
subjects. I have suggested, therefore, that the possibility of civic organisations
emerged in this politico~theoretical space that allowed trade-unionists to think in
tenns of class alliances. I have suggested also was that this politico-strategic
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alliance was only thinkable within the theory of NDR23. What this meant also was
that any politics infonned or arising from the theory of National Democratic
Revolution was ineluctably geared to the capture of the national state and was
necessarily disinterested or hostile to political issues not attached to such a
horison. Indeed, a politics inspired by the theory of NOR was driven to reduce
every political campaign to its terms or reveal itself to be at best a political
voluntarism, or else arbitrary. This last point is important. Only if the apartheid
experience was one of national oppression did the alliance make sense. If not,
there was no common interest between workers and members of other classes.
But more importantly, only if the apartheid experience generated objective
interests in national democratic revolution, ones that could be read a priori from
the structure of the pofitical-economy, could pOlitical orga'1isations seriously
claim to speak on behalf of the nationally oppressed. In other words, only if the
'people' acted like the people as defined by the theory of National Democratic
Revolution, could civics, and even the African National Congress more
generally, legitimatsly claim to represent them. When certain migrant workers
and other township residents (that I have called 'traditionally inclined) seemed
disinterestec in the political campaigns that issued from a nationalist politics they
were defined as atavistic, that is, obstacles to the realisation of the people's will.
In KATORUS, for example, 'social conservatives' were stigmatised by civic
organisations and other UDF-aligned structures precisely because they were not
principally attached to african nationalist political objectives. Hostel residents,
that is, seemed interested in political aims different to those apparently issuing
from the apartheid experience and, therefore, refused to be captured to the
terms of NOR's politico-theoretical problematic. What was at stake in Katlehong,
Tokoza and Vosloorus, therefore, was precisely the detil,ition of the people or
the community. In other words, what was violently contested in the war(s), at
least in practice, was the very social and political consensus both assumed and
required by the nationalist politics of the 1980's; one that concerned a) the
automatic right of civic organisations and UDF-aligned structures to speak on
23 I do not mean this as an absolute statement; i.e. that only NOR permitted the notion of class alliances,
but rather that within the existing political repertoire of South African trade-unions it was only NDR that
permitted such a possibility.
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behalf of residents, to speak as the (objectively) appointed representatives of the
people and b) the content of the objective interests that the apartheid experience
issued.
We have seen so far that the current definition of local government, although
making a concession to certain notions of political plurality vis-a-vis who
represents the community, is nonetheless determined to pre-define the content
of local governments function in accordance with the believed objective interests
of the community as defined via the theory of NDR.
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SECTION 6: LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE AFTERMATH
In this section I want to reconcile two major themes in this paper: the dominant
conception of local governme:nt in South Africa as primarily a managerial
institution and the social consensus that was contested during the KATORUS
war(s). I will argue that the response of Boksburg, Alberton and Germiston to the
aftermath of this conflict(s) reveals, in the practical S·_·"'. exactly the
consequences of the current definition of local government. That is, the
authorities in question, in being deemed autonomous bodies were left to take
political responsibility for the developmental requirements of the area, now
enormous, while at the same time expected to fulfill their technical mandate as
service delivery agents, As we shall see this not only prevented them from
grasping, or even trying to grasp, the complex social conditions produced by the
fighting but even from fulfilling their technocratically defined role as agents of
delivery.
In the aftermath of the fighting local government plans were still informed by
national development principles and regional policy that took for granted that
there was social consensus in KATORUS about the broad objectives of the
RDP. In this regard the 'current situation' was treated as a problem for
management: how could COUncils realise development plans in a post-war
conjuncture. Despite the violence of the conditions, despite the specificity of the
local, Boksburg, Alberton and Germiston still pursued pollcles informed by
regional frameworks and national principles. It shall be argued here that these
development plans and interventions were merely inscribed in the spatial logic
described earlier. Boksburg, Alberton and Germiston's very narrow conception
of their political function - reinforced by the general definition of local govemment
- meant that they were concerned primarily with management and administrative
functions related to service provision and the RDP, rather than political
challenges arising from the war(s). In other words, the very social consensus
disputed by the wares) was taken as the point of departure.
It will be argued here that the local governments in question tried to discharge
this managerial functioi by trying either to avoid or to crirninalise certain political
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and social practices arising from the fighting. That ls, they tried doggedly to
perform their role in spite of the conditions. The result was a general state of
vacillation, delay so that in many cases very little infrastructure was repaired or
rebuilt.
The Development Facilitation Act
During the course of 1994 ANC politicians and the South African National Civic
Organisation began to worry that institutional obstacles were hampering
reconstruction and development in fonner African areas. in this regard they
sc;.'Jghtremedy in legislation. The Development Facilitation Act (DFA) provided
mechanisms to 'fastrack' development by 'streamlining' certain bureaucratic
processes. In particular it provided for Development and Planning Commissions
in each province that would advise the Premier (or appropriate MEC) on the
following matters:
• policy and laws related to planning development in general; and land
development in particular
iii policy and laws related to the identification, assembly and release of land for
development; particularly for the benefit of low-income and historically
disadvantaged communities
• policy and laws related to engineering infrastructure, services and related to
services to be provided by public authorities (Chapter II, Section 14, DFA).
In addition the Act allowed a Commission to perform any function related to land
development; where 'function' could be detennined by the Premier and/or
designated MEC24. Moreover, the decision of a Provincial Commission was
binding on all local authorees within its jurisdiction. The Act did provide for
tribunals in the case of disputes or non-performance, These bodies were
24 Provided the area of jurisdiction was compatible with Schedule 6 ofthe Interim Constitution.
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empowered to make rulings that carried the same weight as those made by a
magistrate's court25.
The new dispensation suggested exciting opportunities for the Eastern Gauteng
Services Council. It was especially encouraged by Section 14 of Act. The latter
enabled a Commission to select the "appropriate levels of government at which
planning should be carried ourzs (Development Facilitation Act, p.22). This
meant that a Provincial commission could recommend to the Premier that these
functions be perfonned by, say, the EGSC. If this happened the Council would
have le!;Jal(and enforceable) rights to planninq and development in the region':?
This is exactly wh3t the EGSC was looking for. After all, we saw in section 3 that
prior attempts to orchestrate regionally coordinated development produced only
agreements in principle. The Services Council was thus at pains to present itself
as an ideal candidate for appointment.
On the tst and 2nd of July 1996, the EGSC hosted a 'Deve/opm"Jnt Today'
roadshow. The spectacle had two primary audiences: the Gauteng Provincial
Govemment and 'East Rand' local government officials. Presentations stressed
the similarity between the EGSC's proposals and the DFA. In a speech titled
'From Current Reality to Desired Future' the Council re-stated its 'Spatial
Development Principles'. It was difficult not to notice their convergence with
some of the DFA's 'General Principles for land development', These were
followed the next day by a bus tour of the urban core and a helicopter view of
rural areas. The excursions were intended to demonstrate the EGSC's familiarity
2S 'The DFA potentially raises an interesting legal question, If, for example. a tribunal (as envisaged in the
Act) rules unfavorably on a dispute raised by a local authority, does the latter still have recourse to the
protection of the Interim Constitution ? The Interim Constitution stated that: "a local government shall be
autonomous and ... shall be entitled to regulate its affairs". It continues: "Parliament or a provincial
legislature shall not encroach on the powers, fanctions and structure of a 10c:U government to such an
extent as to compromise the fundamental status, purpose and character of local government", Could a local
government object to an order or decision by a Provincial Development and Planning Commission on the
following grounds: (1) that it interferes with the local governments' autonomy; or (2) that it "encroaches"
on its powers, functions and structure or (3) that it compromises its "fundamental purpose"? And ifthe
local authority won the case would it make the entire Act unconstitutional, or merely rule the particular
instruction ultra vireS?
26 See the Development Facilitation Act, Section 14 (a) and (b).
27 While it might be tempting to view such a body - that is, e. regional organisation responsible tor planning
and development in an area - as the backdoor route to a metropolitan chamber, there is an important
difference. 'The DFA route grants ultimate authority to the Provincial government. This is certainly ,10t the
case with a metropolitan chamber.
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with the region, its understanding of developmental problems and its strategic
and technical capacity to deal with them. The Council was eager to prove that it
was ideally suited to prepare both a comprehensive framework for development
in the area and negotiate a shared conceptual framework for growth.
If the roadshow was intended to illustrate the suitability of the EGSC for regional
development and planning, it seemed to had another function as well. The event
was carefully choreographed to publicize the close relationship between the
Province and the Council; and in particular, the convergence of its plans with
those of the DFA. This carried an implicit threat to local governments: be
....epared to realise your earlier commitments in principle, or be forced to do so
later.
Non-performance seemed to the Council one of two possibilities: it was either
the result of apartheid belligerence or it reflected a genuine methodological
dilemma. Over and above the former, it was thought unlikely that the
fundamental principles of development and planning where themselves a
problem. Documents produced for the 'Roadshow', for example, supposed a
linear process of decision-making. It started with 'raw data' and ended finally with
'informed decision-making'. The graph assumed that the raw data spoke for
itself. 'Information' when properly gathered produced 'knowledge' that WOUld,in
tum, develop into a common understanding. When conflict did arise it occurred
at the level of 'understanding' precisely because the raw data and had not been
properly collected. (EGSC, p.15) And this, the EGSC believed, could be
remedied by an appropriate rnethodolocv.
It proposed that a development strategy be sourced from two basic processes:
public participation and a scan of the 'external environment'. 'Community-based'
organisations, on the one hand, would evaluate land, housing, transport and
services in order ~odevelop a-schedule of social 'needs' . .An environmental scan
on the other hand would make for a better understanding of the institutional and
adrnlnr lrative context in which decision-making took place. The result of the
process would be a 'growth and development strategy' for eastern Gautang.
This methodology was believed to create suitable conditions for a 'shared vision'
(EGSC, p. 23). The EGSC also suggested that planning be conducted in a
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federated, regional structure. 'Eastern Gauteng' would be divided into two
geograJ..hic zones, urban and rural. Each would have its own Coordinating
Committee, The EGSC's urban and rural planning teams would form the core of
each committee respectively; and the remainder would be delegates from the
local authcrides within their jurisdiction. The urban committee would receive a
representative from each TLC and TRC, and LAC deleJgateswould attend in
rural areas. These committees would, in effect, be the work-horses of a
development framework. Here, information would be marshaled, coordinated
and integrated to produce a consensus schedule of regional development
(EGSC, p.19).
EGSC documentation also reisrred to the work of urban and rural committees as
'technical' (EGSC, p.19). This followed from the methodology discussed above.
If the raw data was correctly gathered and processed in the appropriate bodies it
would lead to an 'informed' vision of cevelopmeet - where informed here meant
a vision that coincided with the then RDP. The role of committees, therefore,
was to undertake these technical functions (coordination and integration) to
gather the data that would speak for itself.
What eluded the EGSC methodology was the possibility that different priorities
spoke, not simply of apartheid belligerence and/or of social infrastructural
priorities, but rather of different concepts of the city and different functions for
local governments. This was impliCitly understood by the DFA itself. It sought to
facilitate the implementation of the RDP by not making its implementation
dependent on the political will of local government. As a result the Act effectively
displaced policy-making away from local authorities to the Prov'v.
government. Even the space granted third tier governments to develop their own
Land Development Objectives (LDO's) was circumscribed by Provincial
oversight. 'East Rand' officials reported at th~ time of writing, for example, that
the EGSC had issued guidelines for determining development priorities. These
came with an lrnplicit criteria for selection: Land Development Objectives must
privilege social infrastructural spending. In other words, the political choices
available to local governments had effectively been narrowed. They could select
land development objectives within a pre-determined range of choices. They
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could choose provided they chose RDP-type 'objectives'. Local government
LDOs, moreover, had to be vetted by the EGSC. If the Services Council
disapproved the selection it could refer them t') the MEC for Development
Planning in the Gauteng Provincial Government who could, in tum, refer them
back to the respective local government for reworking.
For Boksburg, Alberton and Germiston, therefore, Provincial supervision existed
(in the form of the EGSC) in case local choices diverged sufficiently to be a
matter of principle. In other words, if !ocal choices did not privilege social
investment they could be overrule": by the Provincial Government. Most local
government councillors, hoy/ever, were happy to accept the political priorities of
the then RDP. EVen in those Councils where the ANC majority was marginal the
RDP vocabulary was hegemonic. In this regard, policy-making in these Councils
referred not to political policy-making proper but rather to institutional
management, 'transformation' and the mechanics of implementation. That is, in
Councils like Germiston, for example, the challenge was understood to be
realising RDP principles.
Germiston
After the local government elections on November 1 1995, the African National
Congress found itself the majority party in the Greater Germiston Transitional
Local Council. In this regard it set about 'transfonning' the institution. Maverick
Koetz, head of the RDP department, commented:
"...you may have the electoral majority. And yet [the councillors]are meeting up
against well experienced white officials that have been in power a long time.
They know all the little bureaucratic procedures. They know the technical parts
and how to work very well. There is a sense, in fact, [that] they are controlling
the show from behind the scene. So the couno 's are telking all so very nicely
about the RDP, but [as] someone said to me privately the po'(~r,.:arts are busy
with trivial things. Officials don't care about local develoorr .ent and are not
interested in [the RDP]" (Interview with Maverick Koetz, 1996).
Koetz suggested here that newly elected councillors were easily distracted bV
details. They lacked sufficient experience to understand the political
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consequences of the apparently technical reports. This gave officials latitude to
make political choices by presenting them as technical decisions already
determined by the situation. As a result, Koetz remarked: "my office is very close
to the politicians. I am their eyes and ears in private - that is why I have the right
to intervene in all departments and say: Hey guys what is happening; why are
you doing this, who are you?" (Ibid., 1996), In other words, Koetz monitored
other officials to ensure that they were acting on their political instructions. In this
regard the Council had granted him 'executive powers' precisely to supervise
parallel departments. Koetz termed this 'steamrollering transformation'. "The old
way of thinking," he remarked, "says [that] when I want to speak about
something [in another department] I have to speak to the head of the department
[HOD]. With me [that] has gone... If I see non-performance... I can get [a]
statement and take this matter to Council. It embarrasses them. They are silly
not to perform" (Ibid., 1996).ln this way, he argued, the Germiston Council was
able to discard its former 'military-style' management - where inter-departmental
relations were conducted only through the HOD - and was, therefore, better
placed to realise its developmental mandate.
It was aiso suggested anonymously that 'transformation' in Germiston involved
more than bureaucratic accountability. A senior ANC official remarked that policy
was often formulated in the ANC caucus assisted by officials. "When [these
policies] come to Council they are sort of rubber stamped. Decisions are taken
before [hand]" (Germiston official, 1996). Despite claims by the Mayor to temper
this account, 70% of the new budget was nonetheless allocated for capital and
maintenance expenditure in Katlehong.
CL.... ~iI priorities thus marked an important departure. Previous interventions
were mostly confined to investment in the industrial infrastructure. Even the later
notion of 'balance' was referenced to the local economy. Interventions in this
regard, sought to encourage a range of economic activities to include business,
commerce and retail sectors, in addition to the historical role of industry. Simply
put: 'balance' referred to variety in the field of supply. Prior to the new Council,
therefore, the satisfaction of private choice was deemed a by-product of
economic growth narrowly defined. Employment in a growing industrial,
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business, retail or commercial sectors was deemed a sufficient condition for
household consumption. New policies, in contrast, privileged social spending.
Germiston since the 1995 election shared with other RDP-type interventions a
commitment to growth through public, social expenditure. This meant that new
policies did not simply re-direct municipal spending.
Council interventions were also accompanied by a changed modus operandi.
The TLC (following the then national RDP) adopted the principle of 'community
participation' to determine inventories for public expendfure. Katlehong was thus
divided into 14 'Action Areas'. Each section had its own RDP committee and
RDP coordinator. The latter reported directly to an RDP facilitator who, in tum,
delivered all reports to the Council. The latter was then responsible for
developln, ::t schedule of social priorities based on these submissions. In this
way the Council was able to 'know' what the 'key issues' were. That is, it
concluded authoritatively that "the most needed thing is housing and then sports
facilities and [then tile] delivery of adequate services." (ibid., 1(96),
Germiston thus took steps to align its bureaucratic structure to its new policy
'choices'. In this regard, the new HOD played an important political role. He
made apparent to new Councillors the meaning of technical information and the
choices that it made possible (or not). It was perhaps less easy, therefore, for an
official in Germiston to pass off political choices as fait accompli; by presenting
them as options already determined by the circumstances.
What is important for our purposes is that 'transtorrnatlon' in Germiston was
symptomatic of the dominant conception of local government in South Africa.
The Council understood that its primary role was to realise the RDP. Local
political choice referred almost exclusively to the mode of delivery and the order
of developmental priorities. What was most remarkable in Germiston was that
the conflict was thought simply to be an obstacle for delivery. It wac in no way
believed to affect the political choices the Council assumed as given. That is,
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fighting may have altered the sequence of infra.structural expenditure, but it did
not make the Germiston council think in 'new ways' about its function or role".
Alberton md Boksburg
In Alberton a narrow election victory by the ANC vitiated 'steamroller
transformation'. As a result the Council appointed an existing official to preside
over development; what it called 'Community Services'. This was true also of
Bokscurq where the former City Engineer was given responsibility for the RDP.
In this regard it postponed sizable financial allocations to Tokoza in the short
term by leaving this responsibility to the Special Presidential Project (SPP). The
latter was established to rebuild the infrastructure, services and houses
destroyed in the war. For this purpose it was give an up-front budget of R650
million and another R2,4 billion allocated through Nationa' and Provincial line
department expenditures. For the purposes of the SPP, IlIe:,! authorities were
made responsible for implementation and maintenance. Alberton, however, was
apprehensive about this role in the aftermath of violence. Mike Morkel, leader of
the Project Management Team for the Special Presidential Project, observed
that in Alberton "officials fight shy of crucial decisions ... They don't want to work
out political strategies to deal with complex issues." Instead, they U prefer to
adopt a hands-off approach," he added (Interview with Mike Markel, 1995).
This preferred detachment certainly resulted from the Council's own
understanding of the violence. John Weiman, the Head of 'Community
Services', explained that fighting started when the unbanning of the ANC
politicised criminal, youth gangs. The latter, he suggested, then attacked IFP
hostels (Interview with Weiman, 1995). Since the 1994 elections, however,
conflict had "... passed because youth criminal instigators [wers] taken up in
many community programmes" (Ibid, 1995). Alberton's interventions in
2M E.P Thompson, in his well known book 1111!Poverty of Theory and other &says (Merlin Press;
London, 1978) suggested that 'experience' is a startling process. It "walks in without knocking at the door,
and announces deaths, crises of subsistence, trench warfare, unemployment, inflation, genocide. People
starve; their survivors think in new ways about the market. People are imprisoned: in prison tl'ey meditate
in new W1\YSabout the law" (Thompson:PT, p.201). I have criticised this elsewhere for assuming exactly
what needs to be doubted: the relationship between experience and knowledge and, therefore, between
experience and social/political interests.
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KATORUS were thus underscored by a profound anxiety: "The Alberton TLC is
hoping it won't provoke pollticlsation" (Ibid., 1995). In this regard, and
unsurprisingly, the antidote was believed to be 'depolltlcisatlon': a situation, were
"people don't take [to] boycotts and stayaways. People say they want to live their
lives" (lbld., 1995).
Alberton's usage of the term 'political' is used here in the sense I have discussed
earlier. It refers to the management of the situation to tacilltate development; in
this case repairs and rebuilding to Tokoza. The council, however, is fearful of
this function but has no political space to define another role for itself. This is
arises partly from Alberton's own reading of the war(s) that precludes an
explicitly political function. Moreover, the management role given to it by the SPP
is buttressed by a national political consensus that encourages such a uefinition
for local government As a result, Alberton (and Boksburg) were (at the time of
writing) exploring strategies that by-passed 'politics' as they understood it
Privatisation, in this regard, seemed to them promising. They were considering:
• 'privatised' contracts between the local authority and service users. They
assumed that 'individualised' contracts - for rent and services, accommodation et
aI, would vitiate collective action by personalising responsibility for these items
• The term also referred to the use of intermediaries to perform a host of functions:
from debt collection to refuse removal
Alberton and Boksburg were eager to enter contracts with hostel residents for
accommodation and services so that they could hold them individually
accountable for their bills. In this regard they simultaneously improved their legal
capacity to evict defaulters through the courts. These measures were
syrnptomatlc of a deep concern. In Boksburg , the Council continued to provide
services to these institutions at a cost of roughly R75 thousand a month. In
return they received only R15 thousand in payment for rent etc. In Tokoza the
Alberton TLC calculated that it required R112 SOD per month to maintain
accommodation for 7 500 beds, It too only received R15 000 a month (Ibid.,
1995).
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These problems weI e compounded for Alberton by the Special Presidential
Project. Weiman complained that "damage in Vosloorus was not as severe as in
Tokoza or Katlehong. As a result RDP funding goss much further in Vosloorus"
(Ibid., 1995) In Tokoza and Katlehong, in contrast, "we are virtually building new
towns" (Ibid. 1995). The Boksburq TLC was thus able to finance upgrading to
Nguni and Sotho hostels in Vosloorus from its portion of SPP funds. Alberton
and Germiston, in contrast. had more widespread repairs to perform, which
made the quality of the Vosloorus upgrade unaffordable. As a result Alberton
and Germiston had not only to finance malnienance for the hostels in their
jurisdiction, they had to largely pay for the improvements as well,
Upgrading for the Boksburg TLC, however, brought its own problems. Even
though the costs were mostly covered by the Special Presidential Project, the
Council became responsible for future maintenance to improved municipal
infrastructure and, therefore, to increasea upkeep costs. Boksburg too wanted
to recover any future costs from municipal levies and so on.
All three Councils believed, therefore. that 'privatisation' was a way of improving
levels of payment if they created the legal machinery to enforce it. It seemed
attractive to officials, moreover, because it removed the day-to-day management
of the hostels from the local government itself. In this way the Council hoped to
displace any consequent political action away from itself - and presumably onto
the private company, Local governments, that is, were not clear how to
discharge their managerial function without antagonising political sensitivities. In
~his relJard they worried about the powerful Induna structures that controlled the
hostels since the conflict. In their zest to avoid confrontation, however, they
overlooked (or underestimated) certain consequences of the wares}.
During the violence many hostel residents lost their jobs as a result of perennial
non-attendance. The often peripheral geography of many hostels made
residents utterly reliant on kombi-taxis for transport. Given their unemployment,
however, many could not afford a trip even to look for work. In this regard 'no-
go' zones further increased taxi costs. This was specially true of Kwesini,
KwaMazibuko and Buyafuthe hostels in Katlehong; were the rail-line had been
destroyed during the conflict. The cost of a return trip to 1001<. for work was
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usually unaffordable. Hostel residents were thus caugh~ in the metaphorlcel
Catch-22 situation.
This affected the general economy of the hostels. Spaza-shop owners, shebeen
proprietors, tailors and cobblers all complained that residents could no longer
afford their services. This was further aggravated by the disappearance of
former township clientele. Mafuleka, a hostel resident in Tokoza and s local
'businessman', complained that prior to fighting he had several taxis in his
service to drive home inebriated township patrons. Since the fighting his clientele
had mostly disappeared (Mafuleka, 1995).
Apart from affordability, individualised contracts ignored also the political affects
of the war(s). We have seen that the threat of converting hostels into family
units, the conflict with Phola Park and the KTA and later the IFP recruitment
drive saw the formation of powerful hostel assoclations. In particular lnduna-led
branches of the National Hostel Residents Association (NAHORA) were
established Given tile mil1tarisation of hustels during the conflict, and the
consequent loss of municipal authority, moreover, Alberton and Germiston had
been using Indunas and hostel associations to collect rents etc. Council officials
worried, however, that Ind'!nas tolerated non-payment, charged very low rates
and even misappropriated funds. Individualised contracts were hoped, therefore,
to make such structures dispensable by compelling ordinary residents to pay
their rents and service charges directly to the local government. Individual leases
were hoped, moreover, to restore municipal authority through the backdoor.
Contracts would ostensibly allow TLCs accurateiy to determine the size of hostel
populations and, therefore, regulate their occupancy.
It is difficult to understand, however, why, if Indunas received much of their post-
war authority from their control of services and so on, they would not have
opposed evictions; even if they were directed at individuals. Boksburg and
Alber.on's somewhat simple approach to the situation was symptomatic of their
understanding of their function as local governments, More shall be said about
this in a moment.
Alberton's attitutJe to housing repairs and refugees, moreover, was also a
function of its general state of apprehension. During the violence thousands of
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people fled their homes often because they were proximate to hostile
neighbours, destro. "lei. ....,ld/or were caught in areas of intensive fighting. In
Phenduka Section in Tokoza houses opposite hostels 1, 2 and 3 on Khumalo
Road were mostly abandoned. Shortly afterwards, several residents from
Khalanyoni hostel (destroyed during fighting with Phola Park) entered these
homes. More commonly, however, tnay wer~ occupied by residents displaced
from other areas of Tokoza and/or Katlehong - either because they were
sympathetic to the IFP or because they were alleged to be S029. Mike Mork"'l,
project team manager of the Special Presidential Project, once commented:
"They don't want to get involved. They see it as a political issue" (Mike Morkel,
1995). Officials did attempt to negotiate with Transnet, the railways para-statal,
for the vacant land behind the hostels as a potential source of altemative
accommodation for the 'displacees'. After the para-statal withdrew, however, the
process stalled. Officials from both the local governments and the SPP did not
know what to do with existing residents. Repairs to homes in the area were thus
halted because the SPP refused to repair 'illegally occupied' houses.
Repairs to hostels and housing raised also another concern. Significant RDP
investment would increase the costs of maintaining the repaired (and sometimes
improved) infrastructure. This was particularly true in Germiston and Alberton.
Despite external financing for the projects all councils would be responsible for
upkeep to the area after the project ends. Officials worried that R600 million
rands worth of investment across KATORUS translated into massively increased
maintenance costs all around.
RDP-type investments seemed also to neglect the long-term sustainability of
such projects. There was often inadequate consideration of the capacity of local
government to service the new infrastructure into the future. There was already
a concern that rising maintenance costs would pressurise upwards the costs of
rates and levies payable by industry, business and by households in former
'white' suburbs.
29 The diverse geography of refugees disputes conventional taxonomies of the conflict that posit hostels
against the township. 'Displacees' confirm the large (albeit minority) IFP support in the township and
gesture, moreover, to significant intra-township fighting as well.
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Investment plans rested on the hope, therefore, that increased financial
obligations would partly be offset by increased levels of payment from township
residents themselves. This made the low level of service payments in
KATORUS critical. Despite the Masakhane campaign Boksburg officials widely
agreeo that levels of payment per household had not changed. They remained
fairly stable at between 10% and 15%:10,In Alberton the situation was similar.
Levels of payment seldom rose above 20% of potential rate-payers. Germiston
figures, furthermore, failed to distinguish between flat and economical rates. The
latter referred to a metered charge that fluctuated according to usage. It was
usually calculated to approximate the costs of providing the service - although
different TLC's offered varying scales of rebate. I.-rate on the other hand
referred to a fixed tariff (usually substantially below cost-recovery) that was paid
irrespective of consumption. Reported levels of 60% payment in Katlehong were
found, therefore, to translate into 60% of households paying the R40 flat-rate I
We can characterise the management approaches of all three councils as
follows. In varying degree they pursued their traditional functions in spite of the
conditions, in spite of the KATORUS war(s). GermistCln, for example, contlnusd
to try align its bureaucratic system with the developmental imperatives of the
then RDP; that is 'transform' itself. And it continued to determine schedules for
infrastructura! expenditure. Boksburg, following the Special Presidential Project,
involved itself mainly in infrastructural repair and upgrading to hostels. Alberton
was more wary of a developmental role and mostly confined itself to the
conventional functions of service delivery. In other words, all three local
30 The dismal state of payment was sometimes disguised by municipal accounting. Statistics were often no
more than a ratio of what the council expected to receive for the month against what it actually collected.
TIley did not necessarily reveal how many people actually paid for their services. In Boksburg, for example,
the council anticipated R2 813 439 inDecember 1995 to cover, not just the costs of services, but also the
costs ofits administration etc. for Vosloorus. It collectedjust R257 276. According to the Council levels of
payment for that month where, therefore, only 9"10. Contrast this with the sallie ratio for November 1995:
just one month earlier it was as 'high' as 21%. This did not mean that levels of payment dropped 12'110in
Vosloorus in one month, The sometimes discrepancy between estimated levels ofreal household
contributions and TLC figures reflected the inclusion in many statistics of income collected from other
sources. In one month, therefore, a local authority might receive, in addition to service payments, 11
months of arrears - paid by people wanting to buy or sell It home for whom all outstanding amounts to the
Council need to be settled in order tor the transaction to proceed, a down payment by a developer or a
philnnthropic donation. All these contributions were included in the equation. As a result payment figures
did not necessarily reveal how many households actually paid fur their services.
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governments treated the fighting in Katlehong, Tokoza and Vosloorus as
obstacles to the execution of their managerial functions.
We shall see, however, that it was precisely when Boksburg, Alberton and
Germiston tried to exercise a primarily managerial! administrative role that they
compounded the conditions that made it difficult for them to execute this function
in the first place.
Contingency
During the four-year war(s) almost all violent incidents were recorded as political.
In this regard the region was (statistically) purged of crime per se. After the 1994
general election, however, and the formation of the Government of National
Unity there was a concerted effort to de-emphasise the political dimensions of
continuing sporadic incidents. This was certainly related to the official culture of
reconciliation and 'nation~building' that tried to stigmatise any further incidents eiS
a-political. Complicit with this development was the reduction of violence either
to a function of socia-economic deprivation (a scarcity of resources-type
argument, such that the conditions for peace were believed to be development)
or a function of simple criminality.
In this regard development was believed to be a condition fA lasting peace. This
meant also that those bodies that were (or alleged to be) elther opposed or
hostile to development plans were treated simply as criminals. In this regard,
former many former combatants were no longer regarded as 'freedom fighters',
'defenders of the community', or victims of apartheid repression and/or
deprivation. If they had not joined the formal I'JfOceSSthe tendency was to treat
them simply as criminals. As a result peace in the area was largely abrogated to
the police as a security problem. In other words, peace in the area rested on two
related elements: development, to reduce the impulse to violence and policing to
ensure that development could proceed smoothly. This approach merely
reinforced the managerial instincts of local governments.
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Policing
During 1994 nine hundred fonner combatants were 'assimilated' into the South
African police services. It was thought that the integration of fonner para-
militaries into the fonnal structures of the police would remove them from the
influence or control of their 'commanders'. It would subje<-. stem to a disciplined
regime that would direct para-military energies away from civil conflict towards
peace-keeping and crime prevention. Moreover, persons from the Gauteng
Ministry of Safety and Security reasoned that if fonner SOU and SPU members
perfonned duties together their joint experience would build mutual trust. This
WOUld,in tum, help them transcend their sectarian politics. Together Provincial
politiCians - and Jesse Duarte in particular - hoped that these changes would
impose a new institutional order on former combatants and hence remove them
from an environment impulsive to war.
• At the beginning of the process SOU and SPU commanders were asked to
select personnel for medical and aptitude tests. These persons underwent four
weeks training by the South African Police Services and if they qualified fanner
para-militaries were deployed at police stations around the area. By the 1996
'community constables' (as they became known) constituted 60 - 70 % of the
KATORUS police services (Interview with Pleterse, Dawie (Captain). at the
SAPS Genniston Area Commission, Genniston 21/8/95).
Persons invited to apply for integration usually came from para-militaries already
committed to the peace process. In this regard they were drawn from the SDU's
falling under the jurisdiction of the KATORUS Central Command (KCC), on the
one hand, and SPU's on the other. What the process falsely assumed, however,
was the political and military sovereignty of the KCC. In other words, it was
believed that KCC structures spoke for most 'real' SOU's. We have already
seen, however, that not all self-defence units felt themselves subordinate to this
structure. Many had their own autonomous command structures motivated by
often very different imperatives. Their reason-d'etre, often related to the peculiar
circumstances of the of the parochial conflict from which they originated. It was
not always exhausted by the generic IFP-ANC conflict.
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We have already seen also that the KATORUS war was an accumulation of
wars - an accumulation of circumstances - given 'ruptural unity' by the
mobilisations of the (recently unbanned) ANC and the IFP. Despite the
inscription of most of these conflicts into the language and form of an ANC-IFP
clash, the terms of certain micro-disputes retained their specificity. In other
words, we cannot simply attribute a uniform set of motives to all combatants.
Certain very local antagonisms regained preeminence after the general peace,
precisely because they were no longer subsumed into the binary logic of the
ANC-IFP clash.
Paradoxically these forces were often obscured by the very success of the May
1994 peace agreement. The apparent authority of the KCC and SPU
commanders obscured forces that chose to opt out of the process. That is, they
were concealed precisely because the KCC was assumed to be representative.
After the Central Command had been in operation for a year, a civic
spokesperson boasted: "Quite honestly, we have an accountable structure
where the SDU's are under control. Our commanders are velY disciplined ... All
of them want peace" (then civic leader Louis Sebeko quoted in the Mail and
Guardian, .July 8 1994). When violence again disturbed Tokoza in July 1994,
more than a month after the peace treaty, ANC and civic leaders were quick to
disclaim responsibility. The violence, however, had been blamed on disaffected
SDU's. Phillipa Garson, a correspondent for the Mail and Guardian reported at
the time: "During a heated meeting this week, the SDU Central Command - a
structure coordinating 600-odd SDU members operating in Tokoza's 14 Sections
- vehemently denied that any of its members had [violent] intentions. [Itl blamed
misinformation on "opportunists who are acting on their own" (Mail and
Guardian, 8 July 1994). Another person from the Central Command commented:
"We are angry at some of the things being said. Those people are not SDU
members. We don't know who they are, except that they come from the
shebeens. Our soldiers are disciplined" (Mail and Guardian, 8 July 1994).
When seven people were killed and ten injured in Phola Park on the 15
December 1995, focal and provincial politicians reacted similarly. Despite
residents' claims that SDU's were involved (and despite witness accounts),
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'community leaders' and the Gauteng MEC for Safety and Security, dismissed
the allegations. Instead, Jesse Duarte blamed the violence on "criminals calling
themselves SDU's" (Mail and Guardian, 15 December, 1995),
Phola Park continued to be a site of lethal and periodic fighting. Again in June
1996 clashes erupted in the area. Attacks sometimes targeted exactly those
former combatants who had entered the police services. Indeed, some
'community constables' houses were bumt during the fighting. Cumulatively
these sporadic incidents scuttled any development plans for the area. The New
Housing Company (Newhco), for example, withdrew from a project to build
houses there partly as a result of the violence.
Units that integrated into the police, moreover, sometimes had a dual
personality. On the one hand, the SAPS demanded that 'community constables'
fall under their sale jurisdiction. On the other hand former 'commanders'
continued to make claims on their former combatants. There were numerous
reported cases in this regard. In December, '1995, for example, there were
claims that certain 'reservists' (community constables) were "undisciplined,
trigger happy, out off control and unaccountable to the police" (Mail and
Guardian 13 December, 1995), The accusations arose from an incident in Siovo
Section were a reservist had shot and killed someone in a fit of rage. More
importantly, the accusations referred to evidence that certain 'community
constables' continued to take orders from their former commanders. In other
words an informal leadership structure paralleled the SAPS hierarchy.
The end of fighting did not just see the criminalisation of sorne former
combatants.31. It applied in certain cases to refugees as well.
-------------------
31 TIle semantic dispute which oppose SL .J's and criminals implicitly mirrors the conceptual distinction
between contingent and managed state relations. When para-militruy units obeyed the authority I)f certain
political structures, they were recognised by these organisations as 'SDU's'. When they did not they were
labeled criminals. In this sense 'criminal' refers to the forces of contingency. It describes those groups
outside formal or acknowledged structures that interrupt the workings of the former. It is in this sense that
KA TORUS has seen increased criminal activity since the end of fighting.
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Phenduka Section
During the conflict 'IFP' 'displacees' (as refugees were called in KATORUS) from
all over KATORUS took occupancy of deserted homes in Phenduka Section in
Tokoza - abandoned by families fleeing intense fighting in that area. These new
families were met by displaced persons from the ex-Khalanyoni hostel -
destroyed during clashes with Phola Park.
Boksburq, Alberton a'1d Germiston originally hoped that if repairs where
undertaken impartially '0 all housing stock, refugees would retum to their
previous homes. Former residents of Phenduka Section indicated a willingness
in this regard. This was not matched by existing occupants. Many claimed they
were not safe in their original homes and preferred the apparent protection of
proximate hostels. An IFP candidate commented at the time: "There is an
attempt to find alternative places behind the hostels. People want to live in areas
where they can exercise their rights and be safe. People did try to move back ~
but three people were killed in June [1995]. People [then] decided it was not
worth trying" (Interview with Sipho Sithole, 1995).
IFP 'displacees' demanded new houses on Transnet land behind the existing
hostels, The SPP refused. It was opposed to the politicised spatial configuration
arising from the violence. In particular consultants were worried about a de facto
IFP island in an ANC coer 'f'1terviewwith Morkel, Mike. KATORUS Special
'lsidential Project, 199f
Matters were further ,(ICCliedby the local guvemmr'lt elections on
November 1, 189' office-bearers, supporters and candidates were
comident of a victor, I, 'ani 7. The latter included all the Tokoza hostels as well
as Phenduka Section. VVhen voting started, however, many former residents of
Phenduka arrived to vote in the Section of their official address. When hostel
residents realised what was happening they tried to close access to the voting-
station. Violence was mostly averted by the later intervention of a large army and
police force. The incident merely confirmed to hostel residents and IFP
'displacees' the sinister motives of the ANC and further strengthened their
resolve not to move.
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C.1 the 28 November, however, the Alberton Council began evicting 'illegal
occupants' tram the houses in Phenduka. Councillors were under growing
pressure to return the houses to their original owners/occupants. Indeed, days
before the ANC councillor for the Section led a march by legal owners/tit!e-
holders into the area.
On Wednesday the 11th of December, police assisted by the army, evicted
many of the 'IFP' retJgees. They planned to remove the remaining 500 families
over the following days. By the next morning, however, 10 of the 16 evictees had
already returned to the houses in Phenduka. Louis Sebeko - local ANC leader
and member of the Alberton Executive Committee - reacted: "the IFP can
exercise its democratic right to apply for an interdict but we will oppose that
application" (Saturday Star, 14 December 1996). He continued: "We have laid
criminal charges against those who have gone back into the houses they were
occupying ..." (Ibid., 1996). The unwillingness of refugees in Phenduka to return
to their original homes, however, was premised on a worry that clandestine
forces continued to threaten their safety in Tokoza and Katlehong.
Local governments' managerial definition was encouraged by these semar+ic
developments after the fighting. In particular the de-emphasis of thf\ politi
legacy of the conflict and the criminalisation of some of its resultant practices
discouraged an overtly political rate for local government. In this context it
seemed appropriate (and there was pressure) for Boksburg, Alberton and
Germiston to continue primarily with service delivery and infrastructu.al
development. Yet local governments' technocratic function, ironically, was also a
condition for failing in terms of that role.
During the 1980's electrical cut-offs and the withdrawal of services were often
matched by informal arrangements: most commonly electrical cables were re-
connected by local informal technicians. This demonstrated the Vitality, during
this period, of local agents. In KATORUS these networks were reinforced by the
war(s}. The following dialogue, recorded during a Centre for Policy Studies focus
group, for example, indicated the range of contenders in formal areas for the
exercise of municipal-type functions. When asked who was best suited to
administer their area a random group responded as follows:
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• Street Committees [are best suited to solve our problems]
• I don't see the need for a street committee. To me a street committee does not
exist..
• It could be the civic association
• I think it's the councillors. Civic associations are just messengers. Councillors
have contact with higher authorttles. They are able to contact people like Tokyo
[Sexwale, Premler of the Gauteng Provincial Govemment]. They are the ones
who should solve our problems because they are closer to the people at the top.
" I think they all work ~ogether. Street committees act as middlemen between the
top and us at grassroots level. (F"ocusGroup, 1995)
This debate was implicit in many group discussions. Disagreement hinged on
the following: which organisation (street committee, civic or local government)
was best able to communicate social 'needs' to higher tiers of govemment.
There was a shared understanding that rnal authority rested with the Provincial
Govcmment or at the National level. Local Govemment, in this regard, was
believed to be merely a messenger amongst a host of local bodies. It was not
deemed to have sole responsibility for the area under its ostensible jurisdiction.
In other words local councils in KATORUS (although this may have been true
nationally as well) potentially competed with a host of agents to perform
municipal-type functions. Local governments in KATORUS are thus faced with
competition for jurisdiction and authority from a host of formal, informal and
sometimes clandf!stine forces.
Indeed, Alberton'S hesitance to govem was compounded by precisely the
multiplicity of such intermediaries in the area. Govemment plans seemed
constantly shadowed by other bodies that threatened to disrupt their
implementation. SDU's, street committees, Induna structures etc. all gestured
towards an enduring aspect of the I<ATORUS wars, and a source of constant
worry: the presence of robust social and political networks that mediated
between townshipl hostell informal reslcents on the one hand and Council plans
on the other. Throughout KATORUS, therefore, various committees,
organisations and bodies regulated in a host of social activities. As a result the
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more Boksburq, Alberton and Germiston pursued their managerial/administrative
functions, to the neglect of a political role, so they failed to address the political
legacy of the contlict: durable and active socia-political networks that competed
with local governments for jurisdiction over certain areas. No matter how
efficiently local government performed their service deliveryl developmental




I have argued that certain ambiguities in South African notions of local
govemment are symptomatic of the incongruent philosophies implicit in their
recent history.
On the one hand, the theory of National Democratic Revolution merely
accommodated contingency in diachronic time. It simply appropriated other
struggles to its teleological schema by reducing them to moments in a linear
sequence that culminated finally in historical closure. We saw, for example that,
unlike Black Consciousness, NOR treated the struggle against racial oppression
(what it called national oppression) as the first stage in the struggle for socialism.
Although the city was never explicitly theorised or discussed by the South
African Communist Party or by other proponents of NOR, urban struggles were
treated similarly. It is unlikely that civic politics was deemed another distinct
stage of struggle. If they were we could have expected literature and
pronouncements in this regard. It seems more likely that the capture of the city
was (later) believed to be a moment of the national democratic revolution.
On the other hand, contemporary local government was strongly informed by the
work of certain activist-intellectuals; several situated at the Johannesburg NGO,
Planact. Their work, in tum, was often influenced by the writings of the French
academic, Manuel Castells. He argued in The City and the Grassroots that
urban political movements (what he called social movements) did not simply
arise from the point of production but mobilised around specifically urban issues.
In this regard he defined the city as a relatively autonomous political space.
Although Castells never used the term 'autonomy' I have suggested that the
specificity of the city qua political space was only thinkable within the Marxist
tradition by way of Lcuis Althusser's concept of tile social whole. Castells evert
credited hrs early ideas to Althusser.
I have argued that this tension was implicit in the couplet city--comm!Jnity, where
the first term was given its meaning vis-a-vis NOR and the second via Manuel
Castells. , have argued that this couplet informed the local govemment
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negotiations during the political transition after the unbanning of the ANC and the
current structure of local govemments. in South Africa. Moreover, and more
importantly it informed the predominant understanding of their political function
and also the concept of local democracy. I h?""! suggested that this role is
rendered ambiguous, in practice, by these incongruent theoretical legacies,
This tension is also manifest theoretically in the recently published book by
Mzwanele Mayekisc. In Township Politics: civic st/Uggles for a new South Africa,
he writes: "... to link our community struggles to the traditional struggle for
socialism requires us to consider carefully the new politics of what I call working-
class civil society' (Mayekiso: 1996, p.13) (my emphasis). This last mentioned
phrase is equivalent to the couplet city-community as discussed.
Civil society, in Mayekiso's usage, is a synonym for a social movement; a term
he borrows explicitly from Manuel Castells and the text City and the Grassroots
in particular. Civic organisations, in this regard, are deemed to be social
movements representing a 'working-class civil society'. Mayekiso worries,
however, that the term civil society has ambiguous meanings - what he calls
'progressive' and 'reactionary' potentials. "What is needed to combat (the
agenda of imperialist development agencies) is a far more class conscious
perspectlve on civil society, one that highlights those strategies and instruments
of the wor'r<ingclass that are crucial to social, political and economic progress"
(ibld., p.14). Yet I'vlayekiso acknowledges too that his notion of civil society is
potentially also contradictory. In this regard he asks questions that are
reminiscent of NDR: "can... township civics represent poor and working people
and the small but important black middle class at the same time? Can we
represent people with homes as well as the homeless? Can we confront the
diverse issues that divide people and cut-across our various identities?" (ibid., p.
13). Mayekiso acknowledges it is a 'taU order' (ibid., p. 13). He assures us,
however, that is possible. The apparent paradox can be resolved because:
"even in a democratic society we will continue to need civics to represent
(residents') interests on socioeconomic (and hence political) issues in a
nonpartisan way" ('. d., p.13).
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Mayekiso thus defines an ambiguous role for civic organisations. On the one
hand, they must guard against reactionary agendas by highlighting working class
interests. On the other hand they must impartially mediate between severa) class
interests. This was precisely the tension that Castells used the term social
movement to avoid. Social movements made political demands on the urban
form that were not simply reducible to class interests.
This is also the tension thllt affects South African conceptions of the city. On the
one hand, there is an attempt to pre-determine the pOlitical meaning of local
government; and hence the political content of the urban form. In Mayekiso's
terms, they must secure social, political arid economic progress lor the working
class; that is, realise their pre-defined (i.e. objective) interests. This was the
original premise of the Reconstruction and Development Programme. On the
other hand, local govemmel"ts must mediate between a host of social forces to
reconcile their diverse interests. Given that the outcome of such a process could
never be known in advance, but would depend on the configuration of local
groupings, it followed that local government be granted a degree of autonomy to
exercise its 'neutral' political function.
South African local govemment is thus shot through with ambiguities arising from these
theoretical differences. The Interim Cons .uflon, for example, recognised local
government as an autonomous sphere of government. The final constitution even
defines it as a distinct tier of government in its own right. In this regard local councils are
elected bodies with an ostensibly political mandate: to represent their respective
constituencies (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996)
. On the other hand there is a more tenacious tendency to conceive the
functions and role of local government in administrative and managerial terms:
they are deemed responsible for technocratic tasks related to the execution or
the RDP, that is, realising the general will. I am reminded here of Lenin's
suggestion that the state form during the transition to communism would
resemble a post-offlce, It would perform purely administrative tasks related to the
satisfaction of general needs.
We have seen that this apparent anomaly was resolved in South Africa by way
of a theoretical maneuver lmpliclt in classlca Marxism. The definition of local
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govemment as a democratic institution rested on the following syllogism.
Constituents 'needed' (that is, had an objective interest in) municipal services
and social infrastructure. Local govemments thus discharged their democratic
mandates when they provideu .nese goods. Local councils, therefore, busied
themselves with 'transformation' and 'community' participation; where the former
referred to the re-alignment of institutional capacity and personnel to realise new
priorities. The second referred to consultative auditing processes with
'communities' to determine inventories of social, infrastructural 'needs', It was
common in South Africa, moreover, to speak of capacity-building and
organisational development (00). When these phrases referred to local
govemment they often spoke of the competenr.e of elected bodies to implement
certain development! infrastructural plans. Local Govemment was thus
measured against two criteria:
• the correspondence of policy with local 'needs' and,
• the capacity of local govemment to satisfy social backlogs
In this regard, local government fulfilled its democratic mandate exactly when it
functioned technocratically. Indeed, its capacity problems' referred not to its local
representivity but rather to its sometimes incapacity (or reluctance) to provide
services or implement certain development plans. I have suggested that this
managerial conception of local government obscured local conditions, that is, it
restricted the local as a political space.
Following Louis Althusser, we have seen that the form of the social whole is
determined by remarkable conditions. In this regard, Althusser spoke of two
type,>: survivals from the past and ideological apparatuses. The former included
historical practices that continued to inform social relations. The second spoke
of the interpellation of individuals into ideology. We have seen also the
implications of external conditions on the concept of time and contemporaneity.
This is the great, I would go as far as to suggest unsuroassed, theoretical legacy
that Althusser bequeathed us. He thought rigorously the relationship between
Urns, history and subject. Althusser himself may have been unfaithful (perhaps
dishonest) to his own concepts, but that in no way lessens their value. In
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concept, therefore, he (perhaps it was Marx) gave to philosophy the social
who/e. He gave to POlitical philosophy overdetermlnauon. i.e. social relations
determined in the conjuncture. I want to discuss the implications of such a
concept for space.
I have argued that space, and urban space in particular, is marked with political
meanings that profoundly affect the structure of the whole. The great strength of
studies that culminated in the notion of the 'apartheid city' and the 'one-city-one-
tax-base' slogan was precisely their atternpt to think the political meaning of
South African urban ~eography. Paradoxically this was also their weakness.
They thought space in the same way that Althusser suggested Hegel thought
time: as homogenous and contemporaneous.
We have seen that there were two primary instincts vis-a-vis the city. The first
reduced urban space and its politics to phenomena of the national state. That is,
the 'apartheid city' was the spatial expression of national political concerns and
values. It followed, therefore, that the capture of the national state would entail
also the transformation of the urban form. Local governments were deemed, in
this regard, to be the work-horses of change. They were intended to realise the
new values spatially. The political tasks of local governments were thus chiefly
managerial: they related primarily to institutional transformation, services delivery
and infrastructural development. Discrepancies between the new democratic
values and their local expression referred to a bureaucratic 'error' between idea
and practice. This is similar to the objection Engels raised to Conrad Schmidt:
"the concept of a thing and its reality," he suggested, "run side by side like two
asymptotes, always approaching each other yet never meeting. This difference
between the two is the very difference which prevents the concept from being
directly and immediately reality and reality from being immediately its concept."
(Quoted in Althusser:p.82). In this regard, the South African instinct has been to
further 'build capacity' and further to 'transform' the institution so that the
discrepancy between idea and practice is narrowed.
We have seen, however, that the difference between the concept and the real is
not a technical fault or a problem for management. It is symptomatic, rather, of
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the presence of certain unique conditions. This was the second instinct vis-a-vis
the city. It acknowledged that the urban form was partly configured by local
social forces and interests that originated from diverse sources: consumption,
identity and so on. In this regard local government required (relative) autonomy
to mediate politically between these interests.
What both these instincts in the South African context have done, however, is
undervalue the po'itical content of the urban form.
I want to suggest that the South African city was overdetermined. It was a spatial
product of the articulation of regional and national processes to the peculiar
history of any city in relation to its location, geology, space and social forces. It is
possible therefore to discuss common urban features but not permissible, in this
regard, to speak of common urban functions. That is, the function of the city - the
role of a particular local government and the political values expressed by the
urban morphology - are determined locally and idiosyncratically. It is true,
therefore, that South African cities shared certain common forms. But we have
seen in the case of Boksburg, Alberton and Germiston that they sometimes
expressed very different political valLies. In this regard a managerial conception
of local government neglects the spatlel implications of infrastructural
development. One of the great strengths of the one-city slogan was precisely its
insistence that urban development that did not address the apartheid geography
merely reproduced relations of underdevelopment. This argument has been
eclipsed by the Reconstruction and Development Programme. There is little
debate today, outside the town-planning profession, about the relationship
between the location of new capital assets and implicit concepts of the social
'good'. In this regard, social infrastructure can be provided in the most
'participatory', 'democratic'. and 'transparent' manner - to paraphrase the
language of development forums - without addressing the political affects of their
location.
We can say, therefore, that the social whole is constituted not simply in
heterogeneous times, but also in diverse spaces. If we return to the city the
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conjuncture - the unique conditions that give specificity to the urban form - then
its is no longer possible to reduce space to an epi-phenomenon of national
political processes. It means also that the political role of local government is
partly exercised in practice - by configuring (either through commission or
omission) the spatial form under its jurisdiction. We are now in a position to
conclude finally with some remarks about the meaning of a democratic local
politics.
We have seen earlier that the democratic credentials of South African local
government rested on a concession to certain liberal democratic terms and
practices while retaining the style and faith of the theory of National Democratic
Revolution. South African local governments were believed to discharge their
democratic mandates precisely when they functioned technocratically to deliver
the RDP. They resembled liberal democratic governments only in so far as they
were elected bodies with an ostensibly representative function. Yet, consistent
with the logic of NOR. their political role was predetermined. They were
responsible for realising the 'communities' social infrastructural 'needs' which
were determined objectively and could be known, therefore, in advance. As a
result theit representative function consisted of determining the order and detail
of those 'needs'.
The marriage of a classical liberal vocabulary to NOR was most evident in the
debates about the respective roles for local governments and local development
forums (LDF's). We saw earlier that LDF's in their original formulation implied a
suspicion of liberal democracy per se. Local forums were deemed, instead, to be
orgt 15 of 'people's power' and as such direct expressions of the 'communities'
will. .A.sthe transition progressed it became more common to reference these
institutions in terms of the ambiguous and equivocal language of state and civii
society and to define their role narrowly. Instead of counteracting the inherent
racial class bias of representative processes they were defined simply as
advisory bodies to local governments. In this regard, they participated in the
selection and prioritisatlon of development 'needs'. It became usual to view
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LDF's and other such organisations as the representative bodies of a vaguely
defined 'civil society' in relationship to the local state.
What was important about the discursive shift from 'people's power' to 'civil
society' was the notion of social and political plurality it seemed to accept. Civil
society was deemed to comprise all those elerr ~not present in the state.
Moreover, it appeared to contest the idea that 'communtles' were congregated
around a common political will as suggested by the theory of National
Democratic Revolution. We have seen, however, how this notion was simply re-
appropriated to the logic of NDR. That is, the community as a whole was
deemed to have (objective) political interests in social infrastructural
development. Intra community differences were believed to manifest simply as
divergent priorities.
Yet tho notlo: "f' ~'\fil society (in some of its formulations) grants a certain
complexity anc ,ity to the notion of community. What this partly implies (at
least formally anyway) is the recognition that distinct and plural identities exist
that can not easily be captured by the notion of the general will. In other words, it
sometimes mirrors the Altnusserian critique of experience and, in this sense,
repudiates the politics of at jective interests which can be stated generally or in
advance. But what does it mean politically to entertain the notion of political
difference at a loea/level ?
The main preoccupation of deb..'1tes in this regard has been how to make local
government more responsive to 10c..."I1needs, where it is often acknowledged that
the latter tend to be defined by well organised interest groups within local
constituencies. And yet attention continues to focus on devising mechanisms to
improve the capacity of the state to deliver services. What continues not to be
addressed is the political space in which these needs are defined and
articulated.
If we take seriously the notion of political difference then it becomes undesirable
to rely on a few articulate groups to express the general interest. Rather it is
necessary to expand the political field to accommodate what might only now be
potential voices. -11.u is not simply a matter of capacity building and
organisational development. It requires, rather, making possible the emergence
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of new political forms. In this view the partial role of the state is to help widen the
field of representation so that the character of the social (including the resources
of the state) is continuously available for contestation; that is, to encourage the
formation of new political entities to which the govemlY'ent would be responsible,
who WOl '(d hold the state accountable and which might even become the
govemrl It. It does not mean pro-actively establishing or even encouraging the
formation of certain pre-defined political entities, but rather creating the space in
which organisations may emerge. In other words, the identity of these potential
formations must be defined locally. The challenge is to create the conditions
under which they could arise.
Some words of caution are perhaps required at this point. What this argument
assumes is that the potential risk involved in the political process is unavoidable.
That is, the peculiar field of political struggle in any area will depend on the
presence of organisations arranged to contest that political space. Certain issues
may never arise because no organisation emerges to articulate those interests.
Others may well fail to make an impact. Failure, however, should not depend on
the inability to access basic organisational resources. This marks a break with
conventional liberal notions of the state: that are satisfied to trust the realisation
of political equality to certain legal and constitutional sanctions on the right of the
state to proscribe political competition. In this view the state does not just have a
negative duty but a positive responsibility to partly provide the material conditions
for the \Jemocratic process. Does this mean that democracy somehow has a
neutral value that must be withdrawn as an object of the political process itself?
The tension here is obvious: is democracy itself available for contestation? Is it
simply one of the many competing notions of the social ? The answer must be
yes and no. Yes in the sense that there is no onto-political basis for treating it as
the principal framework; as the 'rules of the ':lame' so to speak. Yes in the sense
that it is always associated with a political intervention which has as its task the
democratisation of political space. Yes it posits a certain notion of the social.
Yes, it is always historical and contingent.
And yet as a conceptual logic, historically contingent, perhaps. ultimately
temporary, its logic must be treated as foundatlonal, Even if we agree that
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democracy qua concept is not prior to any other political concept we have
arrived at the very basis for treating it as supreme or sovereign; that is, for
perfOlT'1ing the very elevation which it seems to negate. In other words
democracy is superior to other political practices precisely because it is rests on
certain 'unique conditions' like all other concepts, precisely because, we can say,
it is onto-politically equal. Let us explore this obvious paradox further.
If we agree that democracy as a political practice is merely one amongst many
and that it has no onto-political claims to meta-status, then we accept also the
potential equality of all systems of knowledge. What this implies politically is that
all political concepts, all notions of the social 'good', should receive the
opportunity for political expression. But this is only possible within the democratic
space! That is, it is only possible in the space granted by democracy to plural
and diverse political competition where the outcome of contestation is not
predetermined.
In this regard democracy is a process supporting .indeterminate outcomes. It is a
process in which radically different notions of the social can not only compete but
also affect the physical basis of everyc.ay life. What this definition disputes is the
non-rnaterialitv ~II the conceptual form. Democracy is not just the competition of
ideas but is tl. e competition of ioeas in the practical state. As such it gives
political ct tents to time and space.
We can finally give meaning to local democracy, that is, to democracy in local
government. I have argued that the urban form expresses political values
through the medium of space. It means that democracy at the local entails
expressing new and indeterminate political meanings in the existing form; and
re-articulating already present spatial structures to new spatial functions. In other
words, space is a political medium that must be available for democratic
competition. The function of local government \'jould be to give political
meanings to spatial forms in a political space where those meanings were
indeterminste. That would be a democratic function for local govemment arrt a
democratic meaning for local politics. In this formulation, moreover, we are also
able to avoid wishing away the national state. We are able to avoid dismissing
the 'conditions'. As a historical entity it exists. Within the current situation,
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however, democratic local governments could express local political values
through the spatial form while simultaneously discharging national political
duties. In this way WI!; carl be faithful to the notion of 'relative autonomy' and
avold false oppositions between the local and the national state.
As a last remark I want to comment on a disagreement between Ernesto Laclau
and Chantal Mouffe on the one hand and Norrnas Geras on the other. I will
restrict my remarks about their sometimes ad hominem argument to their
mention of a central theme of this paper: the notion of 'relative autonomy'.
Laclau and Mouffe have r.d'gued in Hegemony and SocialIst Strategy that we
must discard the notion of 'relative autonomy' for many of the reasons I have
critiqued the theory of National Democratic Revolution. They suggest that "either
the structural framework constituted by the basic determinations of society
explains not only the limits of autonomy but also the nature of the autonomous
entity" in which case that entity is another structural determinant of the system
and the concept of 'autonomy' is redundant; or else the autonomous entity is not
determined by the system, in which case it is necessary to explain where it is
constituted and the premise of a sutured society would also have to be
discarded" (Laclau and Mouffe, pp. 139-140). Their grievance with 'relative
autonomy' (when used by Althusser and others) is that it rests on a notion of
determination in the last instance hy the econornv and is, therefore, implicated
also in essentialism. In this regard the ether spheres of the social (ideological,
political, cultural and other practices) are autonomous only in so far as they are
not fully determined by the economy. Ali+l")nomy is only meaningful (or
meaningless as they suggest rather) in an essentialist discourse reminiscent of
other essential isms.
In reviewing this argument Norman Geras accuses Laclau and Mouffe of an
'unbending antithesis' (Geras: 199CJ,p.73), He writes of their critique above:
"either the basic determinants explain the nature of as well as the limits 01" what
is supposet to be relatively autonomous, so that it is not really autonomous at
all; or it is... not determined by them and they cannot be basic determinants"
(emphasis in original) (Ibid., 1990, pp. 73-74). Yet Geras has read their
argument carelessly. He has misconstrued the object of their remarks. Their
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target is not causality (or determination). They are not making an argument in
logic. Rather, their object of criticism is what they term 'suture', as it is implied by
'determination in the last instance by the economy'. One could restate their
argument in more familiar Althusserian terms. And in particular using Althusser's
Kantian distinctiol1 between the real and the concept.
In concept overdetermination assumed that social practices were multiply
determined. Certain activities were autonomous from the General Principle (the
contradiction between the relations and forces of production) in so far as they
were partly caused by conditions not simply arising from the economy. Althusser
mentioned historical survivals and ideological practices in this regard, 'Relati\Je
autonomy', therefore, was only meaningful in the conjuncture, in the peculiar
circumstances of empirical history. '" his own formulation Atthusser certainly
devalued the 'conditions' by specifying the form of the social in advance; that is,
from the concept. He did this, however, not because the concept required it, but
rather because he WAS unfaithful to it. Again Althusser had committed a
'theoreticist error': he tried to specify the form of the real from the concept itself.
If, however, we retum the concept to the conjuncture, then it becomes
impossible to state in advance the preci ) arrangement of social practices in a
hierarchical structure of determinations. Rather the configuration of spheres and
their relationship to each other is itself determined in the current situation.
'Relative autonomy', therefore, is meanIngful in so far as it establishes a limit to
causality. That is, it posits areas of social practice not fully determined, but partly
determined by other practices whose conditions are multiple and diverse. Laclau
and Mouffe are concerned, therefore, not with causality per se or 'Nith certain
statements in logic. Rather, they raise a philosophical objection to generating the
real from the concept. In other words, their criticism is directed not at 'relative
autonomy' per S9 but rather at 'determination in the last instance by the
economy', or rather, which is the same thing, at 'relative autonomy' not specified
in the conditions.
This paper has suggested a third category of remarkable conditions: space. It
has Argued that pOlitical contents are expressed thrOugh this medium so that it is
theoretically valid to define spatial practices as another distinct sphere of social
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ANNEXURE
Maps 1. RSC boundaries
2. Current boundaries
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